93-718 La.App. 3 Cir. 10/5/94, State v. Dugar

• Decision Date: 05 October 1994
• Citation: 643 So.2d 870
• Parties: 93-718 La.App. 3 Cir
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

Page 870

643 So.2d 870

93-718 La.App. 3 Cir. 10/5/94

STATE of Louisiana, v. Troy DUGAR, Defendant-Appellant.

No. CR93-718.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana Third Circuit.

Oct. 5, 1994.

Robert Richard Bryant Jr., Paul Peter Reggie, for State of Louisiana.

Thomas L. Lorenzi, Clive Adrian Stafford Smith, for Troy Dugar.

Before GUIDRY, C.J., and DECUIR and PETERS, JJ.

[93-718 La.App. 3 Cir. 1] DECUIR, Judge.

The defendant, Troy Dugar, was indicted for the first degree murder of Donald L. Williams, and the state sought the death penalty. The defendant, represented by counsel, entered a plea of "Not Guilty," requested a trial by jury, and moved for the appointment of a sanity commission. Based on the testimony of the appointed commission, the court found the defendant mentally competent and able to proceed to trial. A unanimous jury of twelve found defendant guilty of the first degree murder of Donald L. Williams and recommended that the defendant be sentenced to death. After sentencing, defense counsel filed a Motion and Order for Appeal and a Designation of Record. The court granted defendant's motion.

Subsequently, new counsel for defendant requested a hearing to determine whether the defendant was competent to assist counsel on his appeal. The Louisiana Supreme Court ordered the trial court to consider and rule on any motion having to do with the defendant's competence. State v. Dugar, 527 So.2d 307 (La.1988). The trial court ruled that the defendant was not able to assist on his appeal. As a result, the case remained [93-718 La.App. 3 Cir. 2] in the context of a post-conviction/pre-appeal for four and one-half years.

On April 2, 1993, the Louisiana Supreme Court issued a per curiam order transferring the defendant's appeal to this court. Dugar v. State, 615 So.2d 1333 (La.1993). The court's decision was based on the fact that the defendant was fifteen years old at the time he committed the crime which did not allow the state to constitutionally enforce his sentence of death. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 108 S.Ct. 2687, 101 L.Ed.2d 702 (1988). On the same date the court in another per curiam order addressed the application for post-conviction relief brought on behalf of defendant by his father, Lancaster Dugar, seeking to vacate his son's conviction for first degree murder and sentence of death on grounds that defendant presently lacked the capacity to proceed with his appeal. Addressing the actual merits of defendant's claim, the supreme court found that the defendant's present circumstances did not require abatement of the prosecution against him and that defense counsel could proceed with an appeal on defendant's behalf despite the district court's finding of incompetence. Dugar v. Whitley, 615 So.2d 1334 (La.1993).

Defendant appeals alleging numerous assignments of error in support of his contention that his conviction should be reversed.

ERRORS PATENT

After review of the record, we find there are no errors patent.

FACTS

On October 26, 1986, the defendant, Troy Dugar, waited in ambush for an unsuspecting victim outside the Immaculata Center in Lafayette, Louisiana. The victim, Donald L. Williams, was held up at gunpoint, tied up and forced into the trunk of his car by the defendant.

[93-718 La.App. 3 Cir. 3] The defendant then drove to Crowley, Louisiana, where he picked up James Moore and Moore's brother. The defendant asked James Moore to accompany him to Houston, Texas, and Moore agreed. After Moore's brother was dropped off, Dugar and Moore rode around Crowley for a short while. During this time, the defendant told Moore what he had done. The defendant also told Moore that the victim was still trapped in the trunk. Moore observed a gun on the front seat of the car.

As the two headed towards Houston, Texas, and neared Lake Charles, Louisiana, the defendant told James Moore he intended to kill the victim "under the bridge." However, when defendant could not find a safe place to commit the offense, they proceeded to the nearby town of Sulphur, Louisiana. They traveled down Highway 90 and turned down a gravel road. The defendant turned the engine off and instructed Moore to turn the headlights off. Moore testified that the defendant opened the trunk and at that time he heard the victim plead "[P]lease don't kill me. I'll do anything (what) you want me to do." Moore stated he stayed in the car, put his head down and at that point defendant shot the man. After defendant finished shooting, Moore raised his head and saw the defendant was again loading the gun. Moore put his head down and defendant shot the victim once again. Moore testified that he did not actually see the victim get out of the trunk. Rather, Moore stated it felt as if the victim fell out of the trunk. After shooting the victim the defendant got back into the car and handed the gun to Moore who reloaded the gun and threw the spent cartridges outside the window.

The defendant and Moore proceeded on to Houston, Texas. There they parked the car in a parking lot in downtown Houston and attempted to cover up their connection with the car. The defendant broke the license plate off and attempted to break the ignition. The license plate, floor mats, a baby car seat, and some bags found in the trunk were thrown into a trash dumpster. The gun was thrown down one drain and the remaining bullets were thrown down another drain. The car was brought [93-718 La.App. 3 Cir. 4] to a carwash where the inside was cleaned out because the defendant did not want the police to find any fingerprints. The defendant then called his father, Lancaster Dugar (a Louisiana State Trooper) in Crowley, Louisiana, and asked his father to come for them. In the meantime the Houston Police Department detained the two as runaways until Lancaster Dugar picked them up.

COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL

By this assignment of error defendant argues his conviction was not valid because he was not competent at the time of his trial.

Two sanity hearings were held in the present case. The first, a pretrial sanity hearing, was held on April 15, 1987, and resulted in the determination that defendant was competent to stand trial. The second, a post-conviction sanity hearing on December 14, 1988, resulted in the finding that defendant was incompetent to assist on his appeal.

At the April 15, 1987 pretrial sanity hearing, Drs. Morin and Willis submitted reports to the court revealing that the defendant met all three of the Bennett criteria and that he was able to understand his legal rights and assist counsel in his defense. See State v. Bennett, 345 So.2d 1129 (La.1977), on rehearing. Dr. Morin testified that although the defendant did not have a mental disease or defect he seemed to have a personality disorder. Dr. Morin also indicated the only sign of paranoia he saw in the defendant was an allegation by the defendant that he might have been drugged in jail which he later admitted was his own imagination.

Dr. Morin also indicated that the defendant was capable of understanding the nature of the charge and its seriousness, that he understood what defenses were available to him, that he could distinguish a guilty plea from a not guilty plea and could understand the consequences of each, that he was aware of his legal rights, and that he could understand the extent of possible verdicts and the consequences of a conviction. [93-718 La.App. 3 Cir. 5] In addition, Dr. Morin reported the defendant was able to recall and relate facts pertaining to his actions and whereabouts at certain times, he was able to listen to the testimony of the witnesses and inform his lawyers of any distortions or misstatements, and was also capable of testifying on his own behalf.

Likewise, Dr. Willis found the defendant able to understand his legal rights and assist counsel in his defense and concluded that the defendant was able to meet the Bennett criteria and was sane and competent to proceed.

Notably, Dr. Morin, who testified at both sanity hearings, came to disparate conclusions. At the pretrial sanity hearing Dr. Morin found the defendant sane and competent to stand trial. Thereafter, at the post-trial sanity commission, Dr. Morin found he was insane and unable to stand trial. Despite Dr. Morin's finding, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Dugar v. Whitley, 615 So.2d 1334 (La.1993) found the defendant's present circumstances did not require abatement of the prosecution against him and determined that defense counsel could proceed with an appeal on defendant's behalf despite the district court's finding of incompetence.

Although defense counsel places great weight on Dr. Morin's December 14, 1988 finding that defendant was insane, a thorough review of the record reveals that Dr. Morin's opinion did not change as much as defense counsel wishes us to believe. Prior to the actual post-trial sanity commission hearing, a hearing on defendant's demand for an opposition hearing relating to the capital sentencing report was held on February 5, 1988. At this hearing Dr. Morin reaffirmed his findings of April 15, 1987, that the defendant was at the time able to assist in all phases of trial.

The fact that defendant was found incompetent to assist on appeal and is currently on medication has no bearing on his competence at the time of the commission of the crime or at trial. Thus, contrary to the defense's assertion, the defendant [93-718 La.App. 3 Cir. 6] was not tried while incompetent to stand trial in violation of his constitutional rights. This assignment of error lacks merit.

INDEPENDENT PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATION

Defendant next argues he was denied his right to an independent psychiatric evaluation at trial to testify to his incompetency and his insanity at the time of the offense.

As discussed above, a determination was made after the April 15, 1987 sanity hearing that the defendant was competent to stand trial. Furthermore, the defendant did not plead not guilty by reason of insanity.

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