Hernandez v. Ylst

• Citation: 930 F.2d 714
• Decision Date: 03 December 1990
• Docket Number: No. 88-6459,88-6459
• Parties: Mike HERNANDEZ, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Eddie S. YLST, Warden, et al., Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

Page 714

930 F.2d 714

Mike HERNANDEZ, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Eddie S. YLST, Warden, et al., Respondent-Appellee.

No. 88-6459.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 3, 1990. ^*

Decided April 10, 1991.

Eric S. Multhaup, San Francisco, Cal., for petitioner-appellant.

Donald F. Roeschke, Deputy Atty. Gen., Los Angeles, Cal., for respondent-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

Before WALLACE, Chief Judge, O'SCANNLAIN and RYMER, Circuit Judges.

O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge:

We must determine whether a habeas petitioner's federal constitutional rights were violated by a state court's failure to hold a pre-trial competency hearing.

I

Petitioner Mike Hernandez was arrested following the shooting death on January 16, 1982, of a man who, at least in Hernandez's mind, was having an affair with Hernandez's wife. The evidence tying Hernandez to the killing was substantial. Witnesses observed Hernandez's vehicle at the scene of the shooting, which was identified by the license plate number. The murder weapon was discovered on the very day of the slaying, buried on Hernandez's in-laws' property. Hernandez's alibi was implausible.

At the request of Hernandez's counsel, a hearing was scheduled for April 27, 1982, to determine Hernandez's competency to stand trial. On the appointed day, however, Hernandez's trial counsel declared that he did not believe a finding of incompetency was warranted. Thus, no incompetency hearing was held. Instead, Hernandez moved for a transfer from the San Luis Obispo County Jail, in which he had been incarcerated since his arrest, to the Santa Barbara County Jail. In support of the motion, Hernandez personally described for the court the reasons behind his request. Hernandez's statement was comprised of (in the words of the California Court of Appeal) "bizarre statements of mistreatment in the jail," including allegations of forced drug injections by jailers and sexual assaults by fellow prisoners. ¹

On April 28, the following day, Hernandez appeared before the court for his pre-trial hearing. At that time, the trial court denied the motion for jail transfer. The case proceeded to trial, commencing on May 4, 1982.

In the midst of his jury trial, Hernandez withdrew his plea of "not guilty" and entered a plea of "not guilty by reason of insanity." The trial court postponed proceedings in the trial so three mental health experts could examine Hernandez and report their opinions concerning his sanity at the time of the offense.

By agreement of the parties, the sanity issue was submitted directly to the trial court on May 17, 1982. The jury was excused. The court considered the written reports of the three appointed experts, plus the written report of Dr. Lawrence Ratner, who examined Hernandez before the trial for defense counsel, plus the transcript of the April 27 hearing. The court found Hernandez sane and convicted him on one count of second degree murder. The petitioner was sentenced to fifteen years to life (with a two-year enhancement for use of a weapon) on June 14, 1982. The state appellate court affirmed the conviction on November 17, 1983.

In late 1985, Hernandez filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the California Supreme Court. The petition was denied summarily. Hernandez followed with a habeas petition in federal district court, which was dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies. A subsequent (and second) state habeas petition filed with California's highest court was also denied summarily.

The present section 2254 habeas petition was filed January 12, 1988. The petition asserted that the trial court had violated Hernandez's right to due process by failing to institute proceedings to determine Hernandez's competence to stand trial, and by permitting statements taken in violation of Miranda to be used against him. A magistrate issued an order to show cause, and later filed a report and recommendation without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing. The magistrate concluded that Hernandez was not entitled to the writ because (1) his Miranda claim was precluded by his plea of "not guilty by reason of insanity," and (2) his competency claim was not borne out by the evidence.

The district court adopted the magistrate's report and dismissed the petition on August 29, 1988. Hernandez appeals, focusing exclusively on the competency claim. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2253. We affirm.

II

Hernandez first argues that he presented sufficient evidence of his mental incompetence to entitle him to a pre-trial competency hearing. ² This evidence consisted chiefly of Hernandez's delusional statements made to the court to support a motion for jail transfer. The district court ruled that no hearing was necessary at that stage because the state trial court reasonably found that the evidence failed to raise a genuine doubt as to Hernandez's competence.

The conviction of an accused person while legally incompetent to stand trial is a clear violation of the constitutional guarantee of due process. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378, 86 S.Ct. 836, 838, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966). If a state trial court does not employ procedures designed to protect against the trial of an incompetent, the resultant conviction must be reversed. See id. at 386-87, 86 S.Ct. at 842-43; see also Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72, 95 S.Ct. 896, 903-04, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975). The trial court's constitutional obligation is discharged by holding a hearing to determine competency. See Pate, 383 U.S. at 387, 86 S.Ct. at 843.

A Pate hearing is not required, however, absent a "substantial" or "bona fide" doubt of competency. See de Kaplany v. Enomoto, 540 F.2d 975, 979-83 (9th Cir.1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1075, 97 S.Ct. 815, 50 L.Ed.2d 793 (1977). ³ In determining whether or not there is substantial doubt, "the trial judge must evaluate all the evidence." Chavez, 656 F.2d at 518. On appeal, we inquire "whether a reasonable judge ... should have experienced doubt with respect to competency to stand trial." de Kaplany, 540 F.2d at 983; see also Pedrero v. Wainwright, 590 F.2d 1383, 1388 (5th Cir.) (Wisdom, J.) ("The test is an objective one."), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 943, 100 S.Ct. 299, 62 L.Ed.2d 310 (1979); cf. Smith v. Ylst, 826 F.2d 872, 875 (9th Cir.1987) (stating de Kaplany test for question of counsel's competency), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 829, 109 S.Ct. 83, 102 L.Ed.2d 59 (1988).

The transcript of Hernandez's statements to the trial court concerning the alleged assaults upon his person is set forth in the margin. ⁴ This story was evidently delivered with an equanimity which the trial court found inconsistent with incompetency. Hernandez now invites this court to declare such a tale sufficient to raise doubt as to competency as a matter of law.

The invitation is declined. Apart from this tale, Hernandez did not give any indication of mental illness or hallucinations. In United States v. Auen, 846 F.2d 872 (2d Cir.1988), on which Hernandez relies, defendant "consistently exhibit[ed] behavior and beliefs" of an extraordinarily bizarre nature. Id. at 878. While Hernandez's beliefs were undeniably weird, there was nothing like Auen 's extended time-period of odd behavior, the defendant's unwillingness to retain a lawyer or otherwise provide for his own defense, nor the repeated uncooperative conduct toward the proceedings. See id. at 873-76. Unlike the situation in Auen, there is no indication here that Hernandez could not rationally consult with his lawyer or understand the proceedings against him.

Furthermore, in Auen, counsel for the government indicated that defendant was paranoid and held "irrational beliefs." See id. at 878. Here, Hernandez's own counsel stated that Hernandez was competent. While the opinion of Hernandez's counsel certainly is not determinative, a defendant's counsel is in the best position to evaluate a client's comprehension of the proceedings. See United States v. Clark, 617 F.2d 180, 186 (9th Cir.1980) (fact that defendant's attorney considered defendant competent to stand trial was significant evidence that defendant was competent). We deem significant the fact that the trial judge, government counsel, and Hernandez's own attorney did not perceive a reasonable cause to believe Hernandez was incompetent. See United States v. Richardson, 586 F.2d 661, 667 (9th Cir.1978).

Hernandez points to the psychological evaluation report prepared by Dr. Lawrence Ratner at defense counsel's behest, issued approximately three months prior to trial, as further evidence of incompetency. Dr. Ratner's report was evidently not filed with the court until after the trial had begun, and thus could not have contributed to any pre-trial determination of doubt. See Moore v. United States, 464 F.2d 663, 666 (9th Cir.1972) (per curiam) (" '[e]vidence' encompasses all information properly before the court"). Moreover, Dr. Ratner's opinions were derived solely from two interviews with Hernandez; Dr. Ratner was not provided with records reflecting Hernandez's past medical or psychological history. See United States v. Cruz, 805 F.2d 1464, 1479 (11th Cir.1986) (psychiatrist's testimony insufficient to establish bona fide doubt where it was speculative and opinion was reached without benefit of previous medical or psychiatric records), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1006, 107 S.Ct. 1631, 95 L.Ed.2d 204 cert. denied, 482 U.S. 930, 107 S.Ct. 3215, 96 L.Ed.2d 702 (1987). Most significantly, while Dr. Ratner found Hernandez to be delusional and depressed, and that his mental deterioration "would have prevented him from appreciating the criminality of his alleged misconduct," he offered no opinion as to Hernandez's competence to stand trial at that time or (obviously) several months later, when the trial was held.

Weighing all of the evidence, we cannot say that it was a constitutional violation not...