Evans v. McClain of Georgia, Inc.
| Decision Date | 29 July 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 5:95-cv-112-1 (HL).,5:95-cv-112-1 (HL). |
| Citation | 934 F. Supp. 1383 |
| Parties | Aric EVANS, Plaintiff, v. McCLAIN OF GEORGIA, INC., and McClain Industries, Inc., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia |
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Norman J. Slawsky, David J. Worley, Atlanta, GA, for plaintiff.
Wallace Warren Plowden, Jr., Macon, GA, Thomas H. Williams, Detroit, MI, for defendants.
Before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment against plaintiff Aric Evans, who has brought suit alleging that he was denied a promotion and later terminated from his job on the basis of his race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ( 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)) and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and that he is entitled to receive overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. For the reasons set forth in this order, the motion is granted and summary judgment shall be entered for the defendants, McClain of Georgia, Inc., and McClain Industries, Inc. The facts of this case are described below, taken from the evidence presented by both parties and construed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, followed by a discussion of the relevant principles of law.
McClain of Georgia, Inc., a division of McClain Industries, Inc., operates an industrial plant in Macon which fabricates large steel trash bins and compactors. Plaintiff, who is black, worked at the plant for approximately eight years, and by the time of the events in question had risen to a position of managerial authority, although his authority was never consistently defined. The record shows that in the fall of 1994 the plant's management hierarchy was in a state of confusion. In July, 1994, the plant's manager, Kenneth Graham, resigned, and initially no one was hired to take his place. The assistant manager, Al Buckalew, assumed the role of manager, but only on a temporary basis, with assistance from Plaintiff, who "was effectively running the entire plant." Defendants' Memorandum of Authorities, p. 2. Plaintiff was not given any formal title or position, but remained the lead man for the machine shop while he worked with Buckalew.
On October 3, 1994, Kenneth McClain, chairman of the board and president of McClain Industries, Inc., hired a white man named Ken Cole as the new plant manager. While Cole was manager, he had difficulty filling the subordinate positions. Al Buckalew remained in an unofficial assistant capacity, and told Plaintiff that Plaintiff would be "next in command." Another lead man, Tim Hall, stormed out of the plant in protest, saying that he was not going to work for a "nigger." McClain decided to make Evans the stock manager and make Hall a "plant manager." The evidence does not show the exact nature of Tim Hall's position or of Plaintiff's position after the change in management, but it does not indicate that Hall was made Plaintiff's superior. Conditions at the plant deteriorated under Cole's management, and McClain decided to fire him on November 22, 1994.
From November 22, 1994, until the termination of the Plaintiff, the operations of the plant were in a state of disorder. Because it was beginning production of a new type of product referred to as an "intermodal" container, the company brought in Neal Flowers, a manager from one of its plants in Oklahoma with experience in the production of intermodals, to become the plant manager. As a result of the reorganization, Plaintiff became a salaried employee and was given the title of assistant manager, but his duties were never defined. According to Plaintiff's testimony, he was first put in charge of ordering inventory, then ordered to manage the night shift, later called back as floor manager of the day shift, and finally asked to clean up the plant. Evans has stated that during January and February of 1995 he was spending at least seventy percent of his time supervising, and the other thirty percent training workers.
McClain was not satisfied with Plaintiff's performance, and threatened to fire him at one point, but was persuaded by Neal Flowers to give Plaintiff another chance. According to Plaintiff, McClain made increased demands and promised to hold Plaintiff accountable for any defective products that left the plant. Finally, on February 24, 1995, Kenneth McClain fired Plaintiff, and allowed Tim Hall to assume the responsibilities of assistant manager. Plaintiff contends that he was fired for racial reasons and because of his pro-union activities. (The union claims are part of a separate suit before another court and are not considered here.)
Defendants respond that Plaintiff was terminated for non-discriminatory reasons — for failing to order parts properly, for telling employees they were targeted to be fired, for talking down other managers, for hurting company morale, and for making "veiled threats." Plaintiff claims that had he been white, he would have been given a second chance, and refers to a prior incident when a white employee named Oliver brought a gun to work and was neither disciplined nor discharged. Plaintiff also presents evidence that McClain would not hire black office personnel, and would give loans to white employees but not to black employees.
Finally, Plaintiff claims that he worked many hours of overtime without compensation during his tenure as assistant manager. He argues that he was only made a salaried employee in order to remove him from his union activities and that he had no supervisory duties in his position.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment may be entered in favor of the movant where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 1 no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 2 the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
At summary judgment, the initial burden is on the movant, who must show by reference to materials on file "that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at trial." Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir.1991). If the burden of proof at trial is on the movant, the moving party must present evidence to show that "on all the essential elements of its case ..., no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party." United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428, 1438 (11th Cir.1991) (en banc). If it is the non-movant who has the burden of proof at trial, then the movant may meet its summary judgment burden either by presenting evidence to negate an essential element of the non-movant's claim, or by demonstrating by reference to specific portions of the record that the non-moving party cannot meet its burden of proof. See, Clark, 929 F.2d at 606-608.
Whether the movant or the non-movant has the burden of proof at trial, the Court must believe the evidence of the non-movant party and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Any evidence presented by the movant must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). "The judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2511.
The summary judgment burden shifts to the non-movant only if the movant meets its initial burden at trial. Then it becomes the responsibility of the non-movant to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to each essential element of its claim. Otherwise the movant will be entitled to judgment as a matter of law, "since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. For a question of fact to be "genuine," there must be Id., 477 U.S. at 249-250, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. (Cites omitted). The party opposing summary judgment "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Irby v. Bittick, 44 F.3d 949, 953 (11th Cir.1995) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355-1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)). Only those doubts about facts that are reasonable must be resolved in favor of the nonmovant. Irby, 44 F.3d at 953.
To establish his right to recover under Title VII and Section 1981, Plaintiff must prove that Defendant failed to promote him and later discharged him because of his race. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that "it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Section 1981 guarantees the right of all persons to make and enforce contracts, including the right to modify or terminate, without regard to race, and has been extended by the courts to provide a federal remedy for...
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Evans v. McClain of Georgia, Inc.
...in violation of the FLSA. The district court granted summary judgment against Appellant on both claims. Evans v. McClain of Georgia, Inc., 934 F.Supp. 1383 (M.D.Ga.1996). In concluding that Appellant could not establish a prima facie case of discriminatory failure to promote, the district c......