Continental Natural Gas, Inc. v. Midcoast Natural Gas, Inc.

• Citation: 935 P.2d 1185,1996 OK CIV APP 157
• Decision Date: 10 December 1996
• Docket Number: No. 85922,No. 1,85922,1
• Parties: CONTINENTAL NATURAL GAS, INC., Appellee/counter-appellant, v. MIDCOAST NATURAL GAS, INC., Appellant/counter-appellee. Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, Division
• Court: United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma

Page 1185

935 P.2d 1185

CONTINENTAL NATURAL GAS, INC., Appellee/counter-appellant, v. MIDCOAST NATURAL GAS, INC., Appellant/counter-appellee.

No. 85922.

Released for Publication by Order of the Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, Division No. 1.

Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma Division No. 1.

Dec. 10, 1996.

Steven K. Balman, Bond & Balman, Tulsa, for Appellant/counter-appellee.

James W. Rusher, Heath E. Hardcastle, Albright & Rusher, P.C., Tulsa, for Appellee/counter-appellant.

OPINION

JOPLIN, Judge:

Appellant/counter-appellee Midcoast Natural Gas, Inc. (Midcoast) seeks review of the trial court's orders denying Midcoast's motions for summary judgment, directed verdict and judgment non obstante verdicto, and awarding Appellee/counter-appellant Continental Natural Gas, Inc. (Continental) attorney fees after judgment on jury verdict for Continental in Continental's action for recovery of value of natural gas allegedly sold and delivered under contract, alleging error of the trial court (1) denying Midcoast's motions for summary judgment/directed verdict/judgment n.o.v., the uncontroverted evidence showing an accord and satisfaction of the disputed debt, and (2) in awarding Continental allegedly excessive attorney fees. In the counter-appeal, Continental seeks review of the judgment on jury verdict awarding prejudgment interest, alleging miscalculation thereof under the parties' contract.

Continental and Midcoast entered a contract by the terms of which Continental agreed to sell and Midcoast agreed to buy natural gas. The terms of the contract further provided in pertinent part:

Any payments due which are not received by seller on or before the date which is thirty (30) days after the due date for such payment shall thereafter bear interest at the maximum rate allowed by law.

. . . . .

In the event any action is brought to enforce, or for the breach of, any provision of this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its costs and expenses, including attorney's fees, associated with such action.

A dispute subsequently arose concerning amounts owed by Midcoast for "commodity gas" supplied under the contract. After some discussion, and Midcoast apparently believing the parties had agreed on the sum due and owing, Midcoast tendered a sum by check bearing the notation "payment in full" to Continental's "lock-box" account. Continental, apparently without appreciation of the "payment in full" notation, negotiated the check. Upon "discovery" of the restrictive notation, Continental notified Midcoast that Continental did not intend to accept the tendered check as payment in full.

Continental thereafter commenced the instant case in April 1992, seeking recovery of about $15,000.00 as remaining due and owing under the parties' contract. ¹ In January 1993, Continental subsequently filed a motion to set for pre-trial conference, to which Midcoast's then-counsel objected as premature, discovery having yet to be completed. In September 1993, Midcoast's then-counsel subsequently withdrew, and substitute counsel entered an appearance. In July 1994, Midcoast filed an amended answer asserting additional defenses, and did not consent to pre-trial conference until November 1994. Midcoast also filed two motions for summary judgment, one in August 1994 and another in January 1995, asserting entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, and argued that Continental's acceptance of the "payment in full" check constituted an accord and satisfaction.

The trial court denied Midcoast's motions for summary judgment, and the matter proceeded to jury trial. At the close of the evidence, Midcoast moved for directed verdict, again asserting accord and satisfaction, which the trial court denied. Upon consideration of the evidence, the jury returned a verdict for Continental awarding about $10,000.00 in damages and about $5,000.00 in interest at the rate of eleven and one-quarter percent (11.25%). Midcoast moved for judgment n.o.v. on the accord and satisfaction issue, which the trial court denied.

Continental subsequently filed a post-judgment motion for assessment of prevailing party attorney's fees. At hearing thereon, Continental presented expert testimony tending to show that absent the delay, a reasonable attorney's fee would be between $25,000.00 and $26,000.00; Midcoast presented expert testimony that a reasonable attorney's fee should not exceed about $17,000.00. On consideration of the evidence, the trial court awarded Continental about $35,000.00 in attorney's fees representing a sum equal to the verdict with interest, together with an additional amount of about $19,000.00 attributable, according to Continental's evidence accepted by the trial court, inter alia, to the delay between Continental's first motion to set for pre-trial conference in January 1993 and the joint motion for pre-trial in November 1994, caused by Midcoast. The parties appeal as aforesaid.

In the principal appeal, Midcoast argues the trial court erred, at each time the issue was raised, in failing to grant relief on the accord and satisfaction defense. In this proposition, Midcoast asserts that Continental's acceptance and negotiation of the tendered check bearing the notation "payment in full" constitutes an accord and satisfaction, and hence, a complete defense to Continental's claim. See, Wilmeth v. Lee, 316 P.2d 614 (Okla.1957). However, application of the accord and satisfaction defense requires that the parties intend to discharge the underlying obligation, i.e., a meeting of the minds, and "the purpose and intent [of the parties, where disputed] is a question of fact for the ... jury to determine." Polin v. American Petrofina Co. of Texas, 589 P.2d 240, 242 (Okla.App.1978). Having reviewed the evidence adduced on summary judgment and trial of the case, we find reasonable minds might differ on whether Continental intended to accept Midcoast's tendered check in discharge of the disputed sum, and we hold the trial court properly denied summary judgment and submitted the issue to the jury, as well as denying Midcoast post-judgment relief based on the defense of accord and satisfaction. See, e.g., Weldon By and Through Weldon v. Seminole Mun. Hosp., 709 P.2d 1058 (Okla.1985) (standard of review re: summary judgments); Middlebrook v. Imler, Tenny & Kugler, M.D.'s, Inc., 713 P.2d 572 (Okla.1985) (standard of review re: demurrer to the evidence/directed verdicts); McInturff v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Transmission Co., 475 P.2d 160 (Okla.1970) (standard of review re: judgment n.o.v.).

Midcoast also asserts the trial court abused its discretion in awarding clearly excessive fees. Here, says Midcoast, the amount awarded bears no reasonable relationship to the...