Lunaas v. U.S.

Decision Date25 June 1991
Docket NumberNo. 90-5067,90-5067
Citation936 F.2d 1277
PartiesThelma Weasenforth LUNAAS, Individually And On Behalf Of All Those Similarly Situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Federal Circuit

Peter W. Murphy, South Texas College of Law, Houston, Tex., argued, for plaintiff-appellant. With him on the brief was Jo Beth Kloecker, Stafford, Tex.

Sheryl L. Floyd, Commercial Litigation Branch, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., argued, for defendant-appellee. With her on the brief were Stuart M. Gerson, Asst. Atty. Gen., David M. Cohen, Director and Terrence S. Hartman, Asst. Director. Also on the brief was John E. Logue, Bureau of Public Debt, Dept. of Treasury, Washington, D.C., of counsel.

Before NIES, Chief Judge, and NEWMAN and LOURIE, Circuit Judges.

PAULINE NEWMAN, Circuit Judge.

Thelma Weasenforth Lunaas et al. appeal the decision of the United States Claims Court, 1 dismissing their claim for repayment of loans made to the Continental Congress by their ancestor, Jacob De Haven. We affirm.

Background

For the purpose of reviewing the Claims Court's dismissal of the complaint, the plaintiffs' statement of the facts is taken as true.

During the winter of 1777-78 Jacob De Haven made a loan to the revolutionary government, in the form of specie and supplies, with an estimated value of $450,000. This loan contributed to the survival of General Washington's army at Valley Forge. The loan was contracted, pursuant to authorization of the Continental Congress, on the following terms and conditions: interest was to be paid at the rate of six percent; the faith of the United States was pledged to the lender for the repayment of the sum borrowed, and for payment of the interest; interest was to be paid annually; and the principal was to be repaid at the end of three years. To date, despite "numerous and tenacious pleas by Mr. De Haven, his heirs and their descendants", no part of the loan or interest has been repaid.

Ms. Lunaas states that she is a descendant of an heir at law of Jacob De Haven, and that she is entitled to a proportionate share of the repayment. On March 17, 1989 suit was filed in the Claims Court to recover the proceeds due. The court granted the government's motion to suspend discovery; and ruled that the claim is barred in accordance with 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2501:

Every claim of which the United States Claims Court has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed within six years after such claim first accrues.

This appeal followed.

Discussion
A

The principal of the De Haven loan became due and payable in 1780-81. The exact dates are not provided by and are apparently unknown to the plaintiffs.

On March 1, 1781 the Articles of Confederation were adopted, providing:

ARTICLE XII. All bills of credit emitted, monies borrowed and debts contracted by, or under the authority of Congress, before the assembling of the United States, in pursuance of the present confederation, shall be deemed and considered as a charge against the United States, for payment and satisfaction whereof the said United States, and the public faith are hereby solemnly pledged.

This protection of creditors was extended in the subsequently adopted Constitution:

ARTICLE VI, cl.1. All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution, as under the Confederation.

Thus the nation undertook to assure creditors that the adoption of the Constitution would not erase existing obligations recognized under the Articles of Confederation. Due to the precarious financial circumstances of the new government, the first Congress adopted, on August 4, 1790, a plan of Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton for settling debts incurred by the governments of the Confederation and the individual states. 1 Stat. 138. The plan required, inter alia, that creditors consent to an enlargement of the term when payment was due. Subsequent congressional enactments renewed this settlement plan, until it finally expired on March 3, 1837. See, e.g., Act of July 14, 1832, ch. 245, 4 Stat. 602; J.Res. 5, 5 Stat. 200 (1837).

The United States Court of Claims was formed in 1855 to hear claims against the government and make recommendations to Congress; the court could not render final judgments against the United States. Act of February 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612. The absence of a statute of limitations was a recognized deficiency. 2 Thus in 1863 Congress assigned to the Court of Claims authority to render final judgments against the government. Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 92, Sec. 3, 12 Stat. 765. A six-year limitations clause was enacted. See United States v. Wardwell, 172 U.S. 48, 52, 19 S.Ct. 86, 88, 43 L.Ed. 360 (1898) (the statute of limitations is a jurisdictional limitation on the ability of the Court of Claims to hear the case); Finn v. United States, 123 U.S. 227, 232, 8 S.Ct. 82, 85, 31 L.Ed. 128 (1887). A savings clause in the 1863 Act provided that claims which accrued six years before enactment would not be barred if the petition were filed within three years after enactment, i.e., by 1866. Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 92, Sec. 10, 12 Stat. 767:

Sec. 10. And be it further enacted, That every claim against the United States, cognizable by the Court of Claims, shall be forever barred unless the petition setting forth a statement of the claim be filed in the court or transmitted to it under the provisions of this act within six years after the claim first accrues; Provided, That claims which have accrued six years before the passage of this act shall not be barred if the petition be filed in the court or transmitted as aforesaid within three years after the passage of this act....

In 1874 the savings clause was dropped, for it "was then needless, the time of the saving thereby created with respect to the claims to which it related having before expired". Clark v. United States, 99 U.S 493, 495, 25 L.Ed. 481 (1878). A six year limitation period has continued to apply, for the Court of Claims and its successor tribunals.

B

According to the plaintiffs, Mr. De Haven made several attempts to recover the proceeds during his lifetime. After his death in 1812 various De Haven descendants and their representatives petitioned the Congress for relief during the 1850s, 1870s, 1890s, and the early 1900s. It is apparent from the complaint that Mr. De Haven and his descendants knew or should have known of the claim after the government's liability for prior debts was reaffirmed in the Constitution. See Hopland Band of Pomo Indians v. United States, 855 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed.Cir.1988) (a cause of action against the government has first accrued when all the events that fix the government's alleged liability have occurred, and the plaintiff was or should have been aware of their existence). Even if the claim were deemed not to have accrued until actual ...

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  • Deeks v. United States, No. 05-5073 (Fed. Cir. 10/4/2005)
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Federal Circuit
    • October 4, 2005
    ... ... See 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (2000); Lunaas v. United States, 936 F.2d 1277, 1278-79 (Fed. Cir. 1991). We also reject Deeks' contention that the Willett Document is a "bill of credit" or some ... ...

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