Felician Sisters v. Historic Dist. Com'n

• Decision Date: 01 January 2008
• Docket Number: No. 17931.,17931.
• Citation: 937 A.2d 39,284 Conn. 838
• Parties: FELICIAN SISTERS OF ST. FRANCIS OF CONNECTICUT, INC., et al. v. HISTORIC DISTRICT COMMISSION OF the TOWN OF ENFIELD.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

937 A.2d 39

284 Conn. 838

FELICIAN SISTERS OF ST. FRANCIS OF CONNECTICUT, INC., et al. v. HISTORIC DISTRICT COMMISSION OF the TOWN OF ENFIELD.

No. 17931.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued September 21, 2007.

Decided January 1, 2008.

Kenneth R. Slater, Jr., Hartford, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

Maria N. Stavropoulos, senior assistant town attorney, with whom were Mark J. Cerrato, assistant town attorney, and, on the brief, Christopher W. Bromson, town attorney, for the appellee (defendant).

Joshua A. Hawks-Ladds, Hartford, for the appellees (intervening defendant Anthony Troiano, Jr., et al.).

ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE and ZARELLA, Js.

NORCOTT, J.

The principal issue in this appeal is whether a town's historic district commission has jurisdiction over the parking lot of a private elementary school pursuant to General Statutes § 7-147d(d).¹ The plaintiffs, the Felician Sisters of St. Francis of Connecticut, Inc., and the Enfield Montessori School, Inc. (school), appeal² from the judgment of the trial court dismissing their administrative appeal from the decision of the defendant, the historic district commission of the town of Enfield (town),³ denying their application for approval of a plan to replace a gravel parking area on their property with a newly constructed blacktop driveway and parking lot. We conclude that although the defendant had jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' parking area pursuant to § 7-147d(d), its denial of the plaintiffs' application was not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following facts and procedural history. The plaintiffs own property located at 1370 Enfield Street, also known as United States Route 5, in the town's historic district.⁴ A private elementary school has operated continuously on the property since 1965.⁵ The property has two buildings in which classes are held, one known as the Graham Guest House, or the "white building," and the other known as Felician Hall, or the "brown building." The property presently has a straight two lane driveway, which leads 150 feet from Enfield Street past the white building to the brown building that is located at the rear of the property, with a small turnaround in front of the white building.

Historically, parking has been problematic on the plaintiffs' property because 50 percent of the school's student body comes from surrounding towns. Although there is paved parking for six cars adjacent to the brown building, parents lining up to drop off and pick up their children have been parking for many years on a grassy area located to the south of the white building, which the plaintiffs have since covered over with gravel to make it more stable for use in inclement weather.⁶ The existing driveway and parking area has 12,413 square feet of blacktop and 6912 square feet of gravel, for a total of 19,325 square feet devoted to parking and vehicular use. Although the addition of the gravel parking area has somewhat alleviated problems caused by traffic overflowing onto Enfield Street, Stephen Mitchell, a traffic engineer, opined that the existing parking area remains troubled because it is "poorly defined," and gets crowded and blocked by the school vans and cars that must make multiple turns and maneuvers to exit the site.

In order to alleviate the parking and traffic problems on their property, the plaintiffs decided to redesign and rebuild the driveway and parking area. They propose building a new blacktop driveway that would lead from Enfield Street to a larger turnaround in the back of the property, with spatial capacity for seventeen cars on that loop located southwest of the white building and north of the brown building. After the new parking area is constructed, the plaintiffs will replace the existing gravel parking area with grass and newly planted trees, which would result in all of the parking being located in an area that is out of the view of Enfield Street. This proposal will result in 16,546 square feet of the plaintiffs' property being devoted to parking and vehicular traffic, all of which will be surfaced with blacktop.⁷

To implement their plan, the plaintiffs applied to the defendant for a certificate of appropriateness pursuant to § 7-147d(d).⁸ See footnote 1 of this opinion. Following a public hearing held pursuant to General Statutes § 7-147e⁹ on July 28, 2004, the defendant's five members voted unanimously to deny the plaintiffs' application on the ground that it did not qualify for a certificate of appropriateness under General Statutes § 7-147f¹⁰ because, inter alia, the added pavement diminished the historic character of the property and the surrounding area.

The plaintiffs appealed from the denial of the certificate of appropriateness to the trial court pursuant to General Statutes § 7-147i.¹¹ The trial court, Hon. Samuel Freed, judge trial referee, first rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the defendant lacked jurisdiction over their parking area, concluding that the phrase "occupational parking" as used in § 7-147d(d) encompasses parking for private elementary schools. The trial court next concluded that the defendant did not act illegally, arbitrarily or in abuse of its discretion when it denied the plaintiffs' application because there was "ample evidence that the additional parking and driveway were not appropriate for the historic district," including the additional blacktop coverage, the fact that the parking is closer to the adjacent historic buildings and would result in some loss of landscaping, and the comments of an intervening defendant, Anthony Troiano, an adjacent property owner. See footnote 3 of this opinion. After denying the plaintiffs' motion for reargument and reconsideration, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing their administrative appeal. This certified appeal followed. See footnote 2 of this opinion.

On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly concluded that: (1) parking for a private elementary school constitutes "occupational parking" under § 7-147d(d); and (2) the defendant did not act arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion. We address each claim in turn.

I

The plaintiffs' first claim on appeal is that the trial court improperly concluded that the defendant had jurisdiction over their application on the ground that parking for a private elementary school constitutes "occupational parking" under § 7-147d(d). Specifically, they argue that "`occupational parking'" is one of "several categories of regulated parking areas associated with business and industry," and urge us to reject the broader reading adopted by the trial court that "include[s] a variety of land uses unrelated to business and industry such as schools, churches, museums and buildings or recreational facilities used or maintained by the state or local government where at least one person using the parking area is employed at the site." The plaintiffs also contend that, in concluding that parking for private elementary schools is subject to the historic district statutes, the trial court improperly considered the exemption of institutes of higher education set forth in General Statutes § 7-147k(b),¹² and read the statute too broadly because "all land uses, save residential uses, involve some persons that are employed to perform a service at the property," which would render the "remaining list of commercial and industrial land uses ... meaningless ...."¹³ Finally, the plaintiffs contend that their school's tax-exempt, nonprofit status distinguishes it from the other "categories of business and industry contained in the statute."

In response, the defendant relies on the plain meaning of the statutory language and contends that the trial court properly construed § 7-147d to cover "any kind of income producing enterprise or occupation...." The defendant further argues that the higher education exemption contained in § 7-147k(b) demonstrates that, had the legislature wished to relieve private elementary schools from historic district regulation, it could have done so. We agree with the defendant.

"Issues of statutory construction raise questions of law, over which we exercise plenary review.... The process of statutory interpretation involves the determination of the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of the case, including the question of whether the language does so apply....

"When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply.... In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Alvord Investment, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 282 Conn. 393, 401-402, 920 A.2d 1000 (2007). "The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Alexson v. Foss, 276 Conn. 599, 605, 887 A.2d 872 (2006).

We begin, as always, with the language of the statute. Section 7-147d(d) provides in relevant part: "No area within an historic district shall be used for industrial, commercial, business, home industry or occupational parking, whether or not such area is zoned for such use, until after an application for a certificate of appropriateness as to parking has...