United States v. Ligon

• Decision Date: 11 September 2019
• Docket Number: No. 18-4234,18-4234
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Marshyia S. LIGON, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

937 F.3d 714

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Marshyia S. LIGON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 18-4234

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: August 8, 2019

Decided and Filed: September 11, 2019

ARGUED: Christian J. Grostic, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. James A. Ewing, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Christian J. Grostic, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. James A. Ewing, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee.

Before: COLE, Chief Judge; GRIFFIN and BUSH, Circuit Judges.

COLE, Chief Judge.

Marshyia Ligon used her friend’s identification to purchase a gun and subsequently pleaded guilty to making a false statement in acquisition of a firearm. During plea negotiations, the government agreed to argue for a sentence in the Guidelines range as contemplated by the plea agreement, which was 21 to 27 months. At the sentencing hearing, however, the government argued for a sentence within the Guidelines range as contemplated by the probation office, which was 30 to 37 months because of an enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). The district court concluded the enhancement applied and sentenced Ligon to 35 months’ imprisonment. Ligon appeals her sentence, arguing that the government breached the plea agreement and that the district court erred in applying the enhancement. Because the government argued for a higher sentence than contemplated by the plea agreement, it breached the agreement and Ligon is entitled to resentencing before a different district judge.

I. BACKGROUND

On October 4, 2017, Marshyia Ligon purchased a Smith & Wesson, Model M&P 15, 556-caliber rifle from a store in Eastlake, Ohio, using her friend’s name and photo identification. Ligon went to the store with her then-boyfriend, Darnell Peterson, but she could not purchase the gun using her own name and identification because she was only nineteen, and Peterson could not purchase the gun because he was only eighteen and under indictment for a felony offense of violence. On October 11, 2017, the firearm purchased by Ligon was used in the attempted robbery of a credit union by Melvin Hill, Arvin Williams, and Dawane Nelson. After the attempted robbery, Peterson told Ligon that he was supposed to go with Hill, Williams, and Nelson to rob the credit union but decided not to at the last minute.

Ligon was charged with making a false statement in acquisition of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) and pleaded guilty to that offense. In the plea agreement, the parties agreed to "recommend that the [c]ourt impose a sentence within the range and of the kind specified pursuant to the advisory Sentencing Guidelines in accordance with the computations and stipulations" in the agreement, and that "[n]either party [would] recommend or suggest in any way that a departure or variance is appropriate, either regarding the sentencing range or regarding the kind of sentence." (Plea Agreement, R. 17, PageID 89.) The plea agreement computed Ligon’s base offense level as 14 and stated that no specific offense characteristics applied. The government agreed to recommend a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility.

The presentence report ("PSR") agreed that Ligon’s base offense level was 14 but also recommended applying a four-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), which applies if a defendant transferred a firearm with knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that it would be used or possessed in connection with another felony offense. Ligon objected to the PSR, arguing that the four-level enhancement should not apply because she did not know the firearm would be used in connection with another felony.

At sentencing, the district court concluded that Ligon had knowledge and reason to believe the weapon would be used in a felony offense and found that the four-level enhancement applied. The district court then applied the contemplated two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, granted the government’s motion for an additional one-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, and calculated Ligon’s criminal history as category IV. The court then announced that its Guidelines calculations "place[d] Ms. Ligon within the range of 30 months at the low end, 37 months at the high end" and asked the parties if they had any objections. (Sentencing Hr’g Tr., R. 41, PageID 272.) The government responded that it did not have any objections and Ligon noted her continued objection to the four-level enhancement.

The district court then asked for allocution statements. The government asked the court to "impos[e] a sentence within the guideline range as laid out, 30 to 37 months" and proceeded to discuss the Section 3553(a)(1) factors, noting that a "sentence within this range" would reflect the serious nature of the offense and promote respect for the law, and stating "a prison sentence within this range would be called for in this case." (Id. at PageID 273–76.) The government argued that Ligon’s offense was "not merely just a straw purchase of a firearm" but instead was an "egregious form of the offense"—a "straw purchase of ... a semiautomatic assault rifle" that "the court[ ] already found that she [had] reason to believe ... would be used in a felony offense, and it was indeed used in a very violent felony offense attempt." (Id. at PageID 273–74.)

At the beginning of Ligon’s allocution, she noted her belief that the plea agreement "bound the government to the guideline range that was contemplated in the plea agreement, which without th[e] four-level enhancement would be a guideline range of 21 to 27 months." (Id. at PageID 277.) She then argued for a sentence at the bottom of the contemplated Guidelines range—21 months. After hearing both parties’ arguments, the district court sentenced Ligon to 35 months’ imprisonment. After the sentence was imposed, Ligon again reiterated her objection to the four-level enhancement. The district court overruled her objection, and then asked the government "to explicitly state [its] objections for the record." (Id. at PageID 294.) The government and the district court then had the following interaction:

[Gov’t]: Well, with respect to the four-level enhancement, it was our position -- and, again, in my -- and I’m not sure if this would -- if it would be an objection. But I would just reiterate that what I put in my sentencing memorandum, that was still the government’s position. I realize that when I was arguing for a sentence, and a lengthy sentence, which I do believe that this defendant deserves, and it’s already been imposed by this court, I said 31 to 37 months. However, I didn’t want to -- I don’t want to be inconsistent. It was the position --

[Court]: Listen, I’m not sure what you’re trying to say, but maybe I can help you.

[Gov’t]: Okay.

[Court]: The plea agreement that Ms. Ligon entered doesn’t obligate me to do one thing or the other. And, in fact, had it, at this juncture, meaning at this moment, I’d reject it and impose the sentence that I’ve just imposed. I’m not bound by that agreement. I’m not the government. I’m not the defense. So if you intend to make an objection, by George, make it now or take your seat.

[Gov’t]: Okay. Then I would object to that enhancement. I --

[Court]: Overruled for the reasons stated.

(Id. at PageID 294–95.)

The district court subsequently entered its judgment and Ligon timely appealed her sentence.

II. ANALYSIS

Ligon argues that the government breached the plea agreement by arguing for a sentence within the range of 30–37 months, rather than the contemplated 21–27 months. "We review the question of whether the government’s conduct, or lack thereof, violated its plea agreement with a defendant de novo. " United States v. Barnes , 278 F.3d 644, 646 (6th Cir. 2002).

"Plea agreements are contractual in nature. In interpreting and enforcing them, this [c]ourt uses traditional principles of contract law." United States v. Lukse , 286 F.3d 906, 909 (6th Cir. 2002). Plea agreements must "be enforced according to their terms." United States v. Moncivais , 492 F.3d 652, 662 (6th Cir. 2007). "In determining whether a plea agreement has been broken, courts look to what was reasonably understood by the defendant when he entered his plea of guilty." United States v. Mandell , 905 F.2d 970, 973 (6th Cir. 1990) (quotations and alterations omitted). "Ambiguities in a plea agreement must be construed against the government." United States v. Fitch , 282 F.3d 364, 367 (6th Cir. 2002).

It is a "seemingly self-evident proposition that prosecutors cannot breach plea agreements." Lukse , 286 F.3d at 913. "[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled." Santobello v. New York , 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971). "Because a defendant obtains a plea agreement only at the expense of his constitutional rights, ‘prosecutors are held to meticulous standards of performance.’ " Moncivais , 492 F.3d at 662 (quoting United States v. Vaval , 404 F.3d 144, 152–53 (2d Cir. 2005) ). "Satisfying this obligation requires more than lip service on a prosecutor’s part." Id. The government may not explicitly repudiate the agreement or engage in an "end-run[ ] around" the promises contained in the agreement. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).

If the government breaches a plea agreement, a defendant is entitled to relief regardless of whether the district court was ultimately influenced by the breach and regardless of whether the breach was inadvertent. The Supreme Court made these two principles clear in Santobello . There, the defendant entered into a plea agreement that stated that the prosecutor would not make any sentence recommendation. 404 U.S. at 262, 92 S.Ct. 495. But at sentencing, a new pros...