Hazlett v. Evans, Civil Action No. 96-254.
Decision Date | 08 November 1996 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 96-254. |
Citation | 943 F.Supp. 785 |
Parties | Ronald HAZLETT, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Dr. Joseph EVANS, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky |
Jack Wilbur Richendollar, Catlettsburg, KY, for Ronald Hazlett, Sherri Hazlett.
Cheryl Ann Eifert, Ashland, KY, for Joseph Evans.
David Reid Dillon, Bailes, Craig & Yon, Huntington, WV, for Cabell Huntington Hosp.
Bernard Pafunda, Pafunda & Anderson, Pikeville, KY, for Leonard Cross.
This matter is before the Court on the motion of the defendant, Dr. Joseph Evans, to dismiss and the motion of the defendant, Cabell Huntington Hospital, Inc. ("C-H Hospital") to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The plaintiffs have responded, to which the defendants have replied. This matter is now ripe for decision. Having reviewed the record and the memoranda submitted by the parties, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Ariel Hazlett was born on November 30, 1992. According to the hospital records, in December 1992 the baby became ill and was taken to the emergency room at Our Lady of Way Hospital in Martin, Kentucky. The baby had developed a fever and demonstrated symptoms consistent with seizures. The baby was initially treated at Our Lady of Way Hospital, but was then transported to C-H Hospital via HealthNet for further care.
The defendant, Dr. Joseph Evans, treated the baby, upon her arrival at C-H Hospital. In rendering care to the baby, Dr. Evans ordered a CT scan of Ariel's head in order to try to determine what was causing the baby to seize. The CT scan results showed that the baby had a diffuse subarachnoid hemorrhage and the report noted that "on the basis of this examination alone, the possibility of Battered Child Syndrome cannot be excluded." Upon this finding, Dr. Evans noted that he was "obligated to pursue follow-up since could be `Shaken Baby Synd[rome]'."
Having concluded that the brain injury was consistent with and possibly could be "Shaken Baby Syndrome", Dr. Evans reported Ariel's injury to social services in order for them to investigate the possibility that Ariel was an abused child. Upon investigating the matter further, social services removed the baby from her parents and Mr. Hazlett was charged with child abuse.
The plaintiffs allege that Dr. Evans wrongfully misdiagnosed Ariel with "Shaken Baby Syndrome" and that this misdiagnosis caused Ariel to be removed from their home, deprived of their care, companionship, and love, and caused her to be unnecessarily committed to the Department of Social Services, suffering mental pain and humiliation as a result. The plaintiffs, thus, have brought suit against Dr. Evans for his alleged negligence and against the hospital in its respondeat superior capacity.
Dr. Evans moves the Court to dismiss the complaint against him for two reasons: (1) the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over him and (2) he has immunity for the charges against him. The defendant argues that the plaintiffs cannot maintain an action against him in the Commonwealth of Kentucky because the Kentucky long-arm statute does not reach him and he does not have minimum contacts with the state. Moreover, Dr. Evans contends that even if the Court did have personal jurisdiction over him, he is statutorily immune from any civil or criminal liability and therefore the complaint fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted.
C-H Hospital argues that the complaint should be dismissed against it as Dr. Evans has immunity. C-H Hospital submits that the legislatures of both Kentucky and West Virginia have granted immunity to those who report suspected child abuse. Consequently, C-H Hospital argues that the action cannot be maintained against the hospital in its respondent superior capacity if the action cannot be maintained against Dr. Evans.
Moreover, C-H Hospital submits that even if Dr. Evans did not have immunity, it is entitled to summary judgment. C-H Hospital argues that Dr. Evans never actually diagnosed the baby as having "Shaken Baby Syndrome"; Dr. Evans only stated that Ariel's brain injury could have resulted from "Shaken Baby Syndrome". Thus, since the doctor never actually diagnosed her, a claim of misdiagnosis cannot stand. Consequently, if no negligence claim can be made against the doctor, then the Hospital cannot be held vicariously liable for his alleged negligence and summary judgment should be granted.
The plaintiffs respond that both Kentucky's and West Virginia's immunity statutes require anyone reporting child abuse to have "reasonable cause" to suspect that the child has been abused. The plaintiffs argue that Dr. Evans clearly did not have "reasonable cause" since Ariel's injuries were "the obvious result of birth trauma and that even a minimally trained pediatrician should have determined this." Moreover, the plaintiffs point out the criminal charges were dropped against Mr. Hazlett; thus, the plaintiffs argue that if the Commonwealth attorney The plaintiffs, thus, argue that this case cannot be dismissed, but must proceed on to the jury for a determination of whether Dr. Evans had "reasonable cause".
The defendants reply that the immunity statutes only turn on whether Dr. Evans had "good faith". The defendants note that the plaintiffs have not produced any evidence that Dr. Evans made the report in "bad faith"; consequently, Dr. Evans has immunity and the complaint should be dismissed as to both defendants.
Since both Kentucky's and West Virginia's immunity statutes are based on the same language, this Court need not delve into a conflicts of law discussion. Under both Kentucky and West Virginia law, a doctor is required to report any possible child abuse when he has "reasonable cause" to believe or suspect such child abuse has occurred. See KRS § 620.030(1); W.Va.Code § 49-6A-2. If the doctor fails to report such suspected abuse, he is subject to a misdemeanor charge. See KRS § 620.990; W.Va.Code § 49-6A-8. Realizing the onerous burden placed upon the doctor and others who fall under the reporting provision, the legislature provided such persons with immunity, civilly and criminally, when the person acted "in good faith". See KRS § 620.050; W.Va.Code § 49-6A-6.
In the case at hand, Dr. Evans performed a series of tests on Ariel which included a CT scan. The CT scan showed the baby as having a subarachnoid hemorrhage. Dr. Evans noted that such injury is consistent with "Shaken Baby Syndrome". Thus, Dr. Evans was compelled, based on his reading of the CT scan, to inform social services of the possibility that Ariel was an abused child. Being that the injuries were consistent with "Shaken Baby Syndrome", the doctor certainly had "reasonable cause" to suspect and report Ariel's injury to the authorities.
The plaintiffs argue that "reasonable cause" is a fact question for the jury. The Court disagrees. The term "reasonable cause" is a standard of measurement. Just as probable cause is an evidentiary standard that the Court determines when a defendant raises Fourth Amendment search and seizure issues, so to is "reasonable cause"; such terms are not for the jury to decide. See United States v. Goff, 6 F.3d 363, 365-66 (6th Cir.1993); see also United States v. Buchanon, 72 F.3d 1217, 1222 (6th Cir.1995).
Whether Dr. Evans had "reasonable cause" to believe that Ariel was an abused child, however, is not the real issue here. The immunity statutes were designed to insulate doctors and other health professionals from actions exactly like this one. The immunity statutes are not predicated on "reasonable cause", but on "good faith". Because doctors are required to report for fear of criminal charges in failing to do so, it is reasonable to conclude that the legislature felt a responsibility to ensure that if doctors reported a suspected case of child abuse which ultimately turned out to be unfounded, they would not be held liable for...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Frederick v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Case No. 2:18-cv-01077
...West Virginia Code, it follows that the other defendants also cannot be held liable and are also immune from suit. See Hazlett v. Evans, 943 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Ky. 1996) (applying West Virginia and Kentucky mandatory reporting and immunity sections).(ECF No. 84 at 9-10). The plaintiffs' Res......
-
A.A. v. Shutts
...2014) ; Morgan v. Bird , 289 S.W.3d 222 (Ky. App. 2009) ; Garrison v. Leahy-Auer , 220 S.W.3d 693 (Ky. App. 2006) ; Hazlett v. Evans , 943 F.Supp. 785, 787 (E.D.Ky.) ("Because doctors are required to report for fear of criminal charges in failing to do so ...").Therefore, what is apparent f......
-
Norton Hospitals, Inc. v. Peyton
...of law and fact must be determined as a matter of law on motion for summary judgment). 11. Emphasis added. 12. See Hazlett v. Evans, 943 F.Supp. 785 (E.D.Ky.1996); Morgan v. Bird, 289 S.W.3d 222 (Ky.App.2009); and Garrison v. Leahy–Auer, 220 S.W.3d 693 (Ky.App.2006). 13.McCracken County Fis......
-
Norton Hosps., Inc. v. Peyton, 2010-SC-000818-DG
...of law and fact must be determined as a matter of law on motion for summary judgment). 11. Emphasis added. 12. See Hazlett v. Evans, 943 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Ky. 1996); Morgan v. Bird, 289 S.W.3d 222 (Ky. App. 2009); and Garrison v. Leahy-Auer, 220 S.W.3d 693 (Ky. App. 2006). 13. McCracken Co......
-
Ironic Simplicity: Why Shaken Baby Syndrome Misdiagnoses Should Result in Automatic Reimbursement for the Wrongly Accused
...(M.D. Tenn. 1997), remanded, No. M2002-03059-COA-R3-CV, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 615 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2005); Hazlett v. Evans, 943 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Ky. 1996). 65. Younes v. Pellerito, 739 F.3d 885, 890 (6th Cir. 2014) (noting that "[a] government employee 'enjoys a right to immunity......