Schaeffer v. Frakes
| Decision Date | 21 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. S-19-938.,S-19-938. |
| Citation | 947 N.W.2d 714,306 Neb. 904 |
| Parties | Bernard SCHAEFFER, appellant, v. Scott FRAKES et al., appellees. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
Gerald L. Soucie, for appellant.
Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and James D. Smith, Lincoln, for appellees.
Papik, J. Bernard Schaeffer alleges in this action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) that officials within the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services (DCS) violated his federal constitutional rights in the calculation of his parole eligibility date. The district court dismissed Schaeffer's complaint, finding that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Wilkinson v. Dotson , 544 U.S. 74, 78, 125 S. Ct. 1242, 161 L. Ed. 2d 253 (2005), precluded him from bringing his complaint under § 1983 because he sought to challenge " ‘the fact or duration of his confinement.’ " On Schaeffer's appeal of the district court's dismissal, we find that Schaeffer has failed to adequately allege that his federal constitutional rights were violated, as he must to proceed under § 1983, and thus affirm.
The following details are summarized from Schaeffer's complaint: On May 26, 1977, Schaeffer was arrested in Hall County, Nebraska, for first degree murder. He later pleaded guilty to first degree murder in the district court for Hall County. Schaeffer was still a juvenile when the murder was committed. On September 30, he was sentenced to life imprisonment. This sentence was mandatory under then-existing Nebraska law.
On April 12, 1979, Schaeffer was sentenced on an assault conviction in the district court for Lancaster County. He was sentenced to a term of 1 to 2 years’ imprisonment, which was to be served consecutively to any other sentences being served. DCS combined this sentence with his earlier life sentence into a single sentence of imprisonment for life plus 1 to 2 years.
On May 25, 1983, Schaeffer was sentenced on another assault conviction in the district court for Lancaster County. He was sentenced to a term of 12 to 40 years’ imprisonment, which was to be served consecutively to any other sentences being served. DCS combined the sentence with his earlier sentences into a single sentence of imprisonment for life plus 13 to 42 years.
Schaeffer was not entitled to credit for time served from the date of his arrest in May 1977 because he received a life sentence. He was not entitled to credit for time served on either of his assault convictions because he was already serving a sentence at the time of those convictions. Because he was serving a combined sentence of imprisonment for life plus 13 to 42 years, he could not earn "good time" toward parole or discharge.
Initial Postconviction Proceeding and Resentencing.
On April 4, 2013, Schaeffer filed a verified motion for postconviction relief in the district court for Hall County alleging that his life sentence was void or voidable under the 8th or 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution as a result of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012). On February 24, 2016, the district court for Hall County entered an order granting postconviction relief and vacating Schaeffer's life sentence.
After a sentencing hearing, the district court for Hall County resentenced Schaeffer on his first degree murder conviction on January 3, 2017. Schaeffer was sentenced to 70 to 90 years’ imprisonment. The district court also stated that Schaeffer was entitled to credit for time served dating back to his May 26, 1977, arrest. The district court concluded this amounted to 14,472 days.
The district court provided a truth-in-sentencing advisement. The district court stated that on the new first degree murder sentence alone, Schaeffer would be parole eligible after 35 years, assuming maximum good time, and his mandatory discharge date would be after 45 years, again assuming maximum good time. The district court went on to say:
"However, considering the additional sentences to be served out of Lancaster County with aggregate sentences of 13 to 42 years, under current good-time law, you will be parole eligible after 41.5 years[,] assuming maximum good time, less credit for time served, and your mandatory discharge date would be after 66 years, again assuming maximum good time, less credit for time served."
Schaeffer filed a direct appeal, but later moved to dismiss it.
DCS determined that Schaeffer will not be eligible for parole until February 20, 2033. Schaeffer alleges that DCS applied 1975 Neb. Laws, L.B. 567, to calculate his parole eligibility date. L.B. 567 was the good time law in effect at the time of Schaeffer's convictions. Schaeffer asserts that DCS should have calculated his parole eligibility date by applying the good time law in effect at the time of his resentencing, which he claims is 2011 Neb. Laws, L.B. 191. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-1,107 (Cum. Supp. 2018). Schaeffer also alleges that the parole eligibility date determined by DCS conflicts with the truth-in-sentencing advisement provided by the district court for Hall County.
Schaeffer filed another motion for postconviction relief in which he attempted to challenge DCS’ determination of his parole eligibility date. The district court denied relief, explaining that Schaeffer had not shown that his sentence was unconstitutional, but had only challenged postsentencing actions by DCS.
Schaeffer also filed various grievances with DCS in which he alleged that it had not correctly calculated his parole eligibility date. DCS’ responses to those grievances explained how DCS was calculating Schaeffer's parole eligibility date and maintained it was doing so correctly.
Schaeffer alleged that there are other individuals in the custody of DCS who also had life sentences vacated under Miller, supra , but have had their parole eligibility dates calculated differently. Schaeffer identified nine inmates who were sentenced to life without parole but also had other term of years sentences for which no presentencing credit was awarded. He alleged that after these inmates were resentenced, they, unlike him, received "day-for-day" good time credit to determine their parole eligibility date. According to Schaeffer, if he would have received the same "day-for-day" credit for good time, he would have been eligible for parole as of November 28, 2018.
§ 1983 Action.
Schaeffer made the foregoing allegations in a complaint filed against three DCS officials (collectively referred to as "DCS") in the district court for Lancaster County under § 1983. Schaeffer contended that by determining that his parole eligibility date was February 20, 2033, DCS violated his rights under various provisions of the U.S. Constitution. In particular, he alleged that DCS violated his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the 8th Amendment, his right to due process of law under the 14th Amendment, and his right to equal protection under the 14th Amendment.
Schaeffer sought a declaration that DCS’ determination of his parole eligibility date violated the provisions of the U.S. Constitution described above and an order enjoining DCS from enforcing their determination of his parole eligibility date. He also sought attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2012). Schaeffer did not seek a declaration of his parole eligibility date under state law.
DCS successfully moved to dismiss Schaeffer's complaint. The district court concluded that Schaeffer's action could not proceed under the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Wilkinson v. Dotson , 544 U.S. 74, 78, 125 S. Ct. 1242, 161 L. Ed. 2d 253 (2005), which prohibits prisoners in state custody from using a § 1983 action to challenge " ‘the fact or duration of [their] confinement.’ " The district court concluded that Schaeffer was attacking the duration of his confinement by seeking an earlier parole eligibility date.
Schaeffer appeals the dismissal of his § 1983 action.
Schaeffer assigns that the district court erred by granting DCS’ motion to dismiss.
A district court's grant of a motion to dismiss on the pleadings is reviewed de novo, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Salem Grain Co. v. Consolidated Grain & Barge Co. , 297 Neb. 682, 900 N.W.2d 909 (2017). To prevail against a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Davis v. State , 297 Neb. 955, 902 N.W.2d 165 (2017). In cases in which a plaintiff does not or cannot allege specific facts showing a necessary element, the factual allegations, taken as true, are nonetheless plausible if they suggest the existence of the element and raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the element or claim. Id.
A civil remedy is provided under § 1983 for deprivations of federally protected rights, statutory or constitutional, caused by persons acting under color of state law. Waldron v. Roark , 292 Neb. 889, 874 N.W.2d 850 (2016). In order to assert a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege that he or she has been deprived of a federal constitutional right and that such deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Id.
The district court found that Schaeffer's claims could not be brought under § 1983, not because he failed to plausibly allege that he had been deprived of a federal constitutional right, but because he asserted such claims in order to challenge the fact or duration of his confinement. The district court concluded that the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Wilkinson, supra , precluded claims that sought such relief from being asserted in a ...
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