LaBrec v. Walker

Citation948 F.3d 836
Decision Date24 January 2020
Docket NumberNo. 18-1682,18-1682
Parties Matthew LABREC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Lindsay WALKER, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)

Brian James Paul, Attorney, Faegre Baker Daniels LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Josh N. Turner, Attorney, Faegre Baker Daniels LLP, Minneapolis, MN, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Clayton P. Kawski, Jennifer L. Vandermeuse, Attorneys, Office of the Attorney General, Madison, WI, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before Flaum, Rovner, and Scudder, Circuit Judges.

Rovner, Circuit Judge.

Matthew LaBrec brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a number of Wisconsin Department of Corrections employees, alleging that they violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution. Specifically, LaBrec, who is an inmate, alleged that the defendants were aware that his cellmate posed a danger to him and that they failed to protect him from that cellmate. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims that LaBrec also brought. LaBrec now appeals that grant of summary judgment. He also appeals the district court’s denial of his request for appointed counsel. We review the court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Sinn v. Lemmon , 911 F.3d 412, 419 (7th Cir. 2018). As for the denial of the request for counsel, we review the court’s decision only for abuse of discretion. Olson v. Morgan , 750 F.3d 708, 711 (7th Cir. 2014).

The plaintiff and defendants present different accounts of what LaBrec communicated to them and to the doctors at Psychological Services. However, in considering the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the district court was required to take all evidence, including reasonable inferences from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Sinn , 911 F.3d at 419. The facts underlying the Eighth Amendment claim, in the light most favorable to LaBrec and crediting his version over that of the defendants for the purpose of the summary judgment motion, are as follows.

LaBrec was an inmate housed at Columbia Correctional Institute, a maximum security institution. His conduct report history included prior assaults on inmates and staff, and on July 20, 2016, he was involved in an incident that resulted in his transfer from General Population to the Restricted Housing Unit. In that incident, LaBrec threw a chair after he became upset that his phone call was disconnected upon the expiration of his allotted phone time, and began kicking and pounding on the control center windows and refused to go back to his cell. He received a conduct report for that incident and was transferred that night to the Restricted Housing Unit where he was placed in a cell with Patrick McNeely. McNeely was in the Restricted Unit following a conduct report for assault involving McNeely and his prior cellmate.

LaBrec was designated a "pair with care" inmate, which means that the security staff needed to take extra care in evaluating the choice of cellmates for him. Because of that status, the Psychological Services Unit was supposed to be consulted prior to assigning a cellmate with LaBrec, but that consultation never occurred before LaBrec was placed with McNeely. LaBrec informed the defendants repeatedly of his status as a "pair with care" inmate.

The morning following his transfer to the cell with McNeely, LaBrec demanded—and was allowed—to see Dr. Julia Persike in the Psychological Services Unit. LaBrec informed Persike that McNeely was talking about beating up his last cellmate and that LaBrec felt intimidated by it and did not feel safe with McNeely. LaBrec further told Persike that McNeely was "acting very unstable, he would get all worked up, talking really fast, shaking his head back and forth, raising his voice and cursing," and that McNeely was "acting crazy" and "displaying very erratic behavior." LaBrec Separate Appendix ("App."), LaBrec Proposed Findings of Facts at A110 ¶ 5 and Declaration of LaBrec A121 ¶¶ 19, 20. Persike and LaBrec discussed both the safety issue and McNeely’s history of methamphetamine use as reasons for moving LaBrec from that cell assignment.

Persike discussed with defendants Joshua Craft and Debra Wilson, who were correctional officers, his conversation with LaBrec and the concerns with LaBrec’s cellmate situation. They then proposed a move to a different cell with a different cellmate. LaBrec asked them to move him as soon as possible as he feared he was unsafe. Despite their assurance, however, he was not moved by the end of their day shift. LaBrec conveyed to defendants Jason Chatman, the second-shift sergeant, and correctional officer Dustin Meeker, who were working the night shift, that he was supposed to be moved and did not feel safe in the cell with McNeely. When it became apparent to LaBrec that he would not be moved that night, he had an anxiety attack and began crying and asking for help. Security staff called Psychological Services, and Dr. Schwenn came to LaBrec’s cell and spoke with LaBrec. LaBrec asked to be pulled out of the cell to discuss the problem confidentially, but that request was denied so he spoke with Schwenn cellside. LaBrec informed Schwenn that he did not feel safe in the cell with McNeely and that he was supposed to be moved. Schwenn asked LaBrec to be specific as to what would happen, and LaBrec explained he was unable to be more specific as he could not predict his cellmate’s actions. No action was taken to transfer him to a different cell.

The following morning, LaBrec again sought help from Psychological Services, this time meeting with Dr. Dan Norge and conveying his concerns. LaBrec subsequently spoke with defendant Lindsay Walker, the Unit Manager, as part of a conduct report meeting, and again explained that he did not believe that he was safe in his cell with McNeely. Walker denies that LaBrec informed her that he felt unsafe, and states that if he had told her that he felt at risk of harm from his cellmate during that meeting, she would not have returned him to the cell. Throughout that time, LaBrec repeatedly informed the defendants that the "pair with care" protocol was not followed with his cellmate assignment.

LaBrec was not reassigned to a different cellmate, and at 2:30 a.m. on July 24—three days after the initial assignment to that cell—McNeely and LaBrec were involved in an altercation in their cell in which McNeely stabbed LaBrec with a pen behind his left ear, in the back, and in his left shoulder. Both inmates received conduct reports for the assault, and McNeely was transferred to the most restrictive housing unit, RHU-1, whereas LaBrec remained in a cell in the mid-level restricted housing, RHU-2. A search of the cell following the assault revealed a note from McNeely in which McNeely set forth his intention to stab LaBrec.

It is well established that prison officials face a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners and that the failure to protect can violate the Eighth Amendment. Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 833, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). The prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in the Eighth Amendment "obligates prison officials to ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of ... inmates.’ " Sinn , 911 F.3d at 419, quoting Farmer , 511 U.S. at 832, 114 S.Ct. 1970.

A prisoner seeking to establish a violation of that Eighth Amendment right must show that the prison official was deliberately indifferent to an excessive risk to the prisoner’s health or safety, which includes both an objective and subjective component. Id . ; Gevas v. McLaughlin , 798 F.3d 475, 480 (7th Cir. 2015) ; Farmer , 511 U.S. at 838, 114 S.Ct. 1970. First, the harm to which the prisoner was exposed must be an objectively serious one. Sinn , 911 F.3d at 419. The parties do not dispute that this criterion is met. Second, the prison official must have actual, not merely constructive, knowledge of the risk to be liable. Id . This requires that the official " ‘must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw that inference.’ " Gevas , 798 F.3d at 480, quoting Farmer , 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970 ; Sinn , 911 F.3d at 419. "Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence ... and a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious." Farmer , 511 U.S. at 842, 114 S.Ct. 1970 ; Gevas , 798 F.3d at 480. Because a prison official’s duty under the Eighth Amendment is to ensure "reasonable safety," prison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety can nevertheless escape liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, whether or not the harm was ultimately averted. Farmer , 511 U.S. at 844-45, 114 S.Ct. 1970.

Only the second part of the test is at issue here, which is whether LaBrec failed to present sufficient evidence to allow the inference that the prison officials had the requisite knowledge to act with deliberate indifference. The district court concluded that the allegations of the threat to LaBrec were too vague and generalized to meet that standard because LaBrec failed to explain why he felt unsafe.

The court considered, in turn, the evidence that McNeely had assaulted his prior cellmate, that LaBrec was classified as a "pair with care" prisoner, that LaBrec told the defendants that he did not feel safe and McNeely was acting crazy, and that McNeely wrote a note to officers that stated that he was going to stab LaBrec. First, the court stated that even if it assumed that all the defendants were aware that McNeely had assaulted his prior cellmate, that would not show the...

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