State v. Leyva

• Decision Date: 19 August 1997
• Docket Number: No. 960020,960020
• Citation: 951 P.2d 738
• Parties: 324 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Petitioner, v. Rogelio Limonta LEYVA, Defendant and Respondent.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

Page 738

951 P.2d 738

324 Utah Adv. Rep. 5

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Petitioner, v. Rogelio Limonta LEYVA, Defendant and Respondent.

No. 960020.

Supreme Court of Utah.

Aug. 19, 1997.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 7, 1997.

Jan Graham, Atty. Gen., Marian Decker, Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert L. Stott, Salt Lake City, for Plaintiff.

Joan C. Watt, Salt Lake City, for Defendant.

RUSSON, Justice:

We granted certiorari in this case to answer the following questions: (1) Did the United States Supreme Court, in Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994), overrule this court's holding in State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70 (Utah 1993), that an ambiguous reference to Miranda ¹ rights must be clarified before interrogation of a suspect can begin? (2) Does the court of appeals' decision below (State v. Leyva, 906 P.2d 894 (Utah.Ct.App.1995)) conflict with Utah Supreme Court and United States Supreme Court precedent regarding implied waivers of Miranda rights?

BACKGROUND

On the evening of July 24, 1994, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper John Wassmer was driving south on Interstate 15 in Salt Lake County, Utah. As he proceeded, Wassmer spotted a car that was leaning noticeably to one side. Wassmer decided to run a license plate check to determine whether the car had passed inspection. From the check, Wassmer learned that the license plate had actually been issued to a different car. Wassmer then attempted to pull the car over.

After Wassmer turned on his emergency lights and siren, the driver of the car, Rogelio Leyva, sped up in an apparent attempt to elude Wassmer. Wassmer followed Leyva on the freeway at high speeds for several miles, from approximately 45th South to 90th South, before Leyva exited the freeway. Leyva was driving too fast, however, to negotiate the turn at the bottom of the 90th South exit ramp, and he crashed. Wassmer, with gun drawn, approached Leyva's car. Upon reaching the car, Wassmer handcuffed Leyva.

Approximately a half hour later, Wassmer informed Leyva of his Miranda rights and asked Leyva if he understood those rights. Leyva responded, "Yes." Wassmer then asked, "Having these rights in mind, do you want to talk to us now?" Leyva responded, "I don't know." Wassmer then added: "You don't have to answer questions if you don't want to. It is up to you." Instead of orally responding to this statement, Leyva merely nodded his head. Wassmer then proceeded to question Leyva, asking, "So why did you run?" Leyva responded, "The plate's on the wrong car." Approximately fifteen minutes later, while Wassmer was transporting Leyva to the jail, Leyva asked Wassmer, "So what are you charging me with?" Wassmer responded, "Evading, improper registration, no driver's license, no insurance, and possession of cocaine." Leyva then said, "Hey, man, I'll admit to everything else, but the cocaine isn't mine." Wassmer asked, "So you admit you saw my lights and were trying to run from me?" Leyva replied, "Yeah, I was, but the cocaine isn't mine." ²

At trial, Leyva moved to suppress his incriminating statements. Leyva argued, among other things, that he had made an equivocal invocation of his right to remain silent and that Wassmer should have at that point limited his inquiry to clarifying Leyva's intent. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress, concluding that Leyva "knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights." Leyva was subsequently convicted by a jury of failing to respond to a police officer's signal in violation of section 41-6-13.5 of the Utah Code.

Leyva appealed his conviction to the court of appeals. State v. Leyva, 906 P.2d 894 (Utah.Ct.App.1995). As part of that appeal, Leyva again argued that his statements were obtained in violation of his Miranda rights The court of appeals held that Wood and Davis were not in conflict. The court of appeals held that immediately after an officer has informed a suspect of his Miranda rights, the officer is required to determine if the suspect chooses to waive those rights ("prewaiver scenario"). If at that point the suspect responds ambiguously, then Wood requires the officer to limit his inquiry to clarifying the suspect's response. The court of appeals further held that Davis applies only after the suspect has clearly waived his Miranda rights and then later equivocally reinvokes them ("postwaiver scenario"). The court of appeals held that in such a case officers are not required to clarify the suspect's intent, since the burden lies with the suspect to clearly invoke his Miranda rights after waiving them. Thus, the court of appeals held that Wassmer should have limited his inquiry to clarifying Leyva's response. Because he did not, the trial court should have suppressed Leyva's incriminating statements. Leyva, 906 P.2d at 900-01.

because Wassmer failed to limit his inquiry to clarifying Leyva's equivocal invocation of those rights as required by State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70 (Utah 1993). In response, the State argued that under Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994), when faced with an ambiguous reference to Miranda rights, officers are not required to limit their inquiry to clarifying the intent of the suspect. Rather, the State asserted, Davis held that unless the suspect made his intentions clear, the officers could continue questioning.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of appeals, not the decision of the trial court. In doing so, this court adopts the same standard of review used by the court of appeals: questions of law are reviewed for correctness, and the trial court's factual findings are reversed only if clearly erroneous." State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995) (citations omitted); see also Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 923 P.2d 1389, 1392 (Utah 1996). An appellate court should "review the trial court's legal conclusion of a valid waiver [of Miranda rights] for correctness. However, this standard of review grants a measure of discretion to the trial court because of the variability of the factual settings." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 941 (Utah 1994) (citations omitted). A lower court's interpretation of binding case law presents a question of law which we review for correctness. See Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339, 346 (Utah 1996); accord State v. Richardson, 843 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah.Ct.App.1992).

ANALYSIS

I. DISCUSSION OF DAVIS

AND WOOD

The State argues initially that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Davis overruled our decision in Wood, relied upon by the court of appeals. We disagree.

A. State v. Wood

In State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70 (Utah 1993), defendant Lance Conway Wood appealed his conviction of murder in the first degree, aggravated sexual assault, and aggravated kidnaping in connection with the murder of Gordon Church in November 1988. Michael Archuleta was also involved in the murder. Shortly after the murder, Wood contacted his parole officer and informed him that Archuleta had killed someone. Wood met with his parole officer and other police officers later that day and recounted his version of the events surrounding the murder. Id. at 76. The next morning, Wood directed law enforcement officials to the scene of the murder and to Church's body. After some time at the murder scene, a police officer, Captain Robert Dekker, drove Wood to a spot under a freeway overpass. Id. at 81. Dekker then gave Wood his Miranda warnings, intending to interview Wood in relation to the murder. As soon as Dekker concluded the warnings, Wood "wondered aloud whether he should consult an attorney regarding protective custody." In an effort to clarify Wood's meaning, Dekker asked whether Wood wanted an attorney "for questioning purposes right now." Wood said that he did not and that he wanted to talk to Dekker. Dekker proceeded to interview and take a statement from him. Id.

At trial, Wood challenged the introduction of the statement given to Dekker on the ground that his statement regarding consulting an attorney "amounted to a request for counsel, barring any further questioning" by Dekker. Id. at 82. This court held that Wood's reference to an attorney did not amount to an invocation of his right to counsel and that Wood had made a "voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of that right." Id. at 83. We held that Wood's reference to an attorney accompanied by his statement regarding protective custody at least made it "unclear" whether he was invoking his constitutional right to counsel. Id. This court then went on to hold:

[W]hen a defendant makes an ambiguous or equivocal request for an attorney, questioning with respect to the subject matter of the investigation must immediately stop, and any further questioning must be limited to clarifying the request. If the defendant then makes clear that he or she desires to have counsel present, further questioning is prohibited.

Id. at 85. This court determined that Dekker had "complied with this rule," and held that the trial court was correct in not granting Wood's motion to suppress. Id.

B. Davis v. United States

In Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994), defendant Robert L. Davis, a member of the United States Navy, was convicted of murder in connection with the beating death of Keith Shackleford in October 1988. Approximately a month following the beating, Davis was interviewed in connection with the murder at the office of the Naval Investigative Service. Prior to any questioning,

[a]s required by military law, the agents advised [Davis] that he was a suspect in the killing, that he was not required to make a statement, that any statement could be used against him at a trial by court-martial, and that he was entitled to speak with an attorney and have an attorney present during questioning.

Id. at 454, 114 S.Ct. at 2352-53. Davis waived those rights both orally and in writing. About an hour...