Estate of Sneed, Matter of

• Decision Date: 27 January 1998
• Docket Number: No. 86054,86054
• Parties: In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Lorita J. SNEED, Deceased. Kay Donna HALL, Appellant, v. Michael JESTES, Appellee.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Page 1111

953 P.2d 1111

1998 OK 8

In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Lorita J. SNEED, Deceased.

Kay Donna HALL, Appellant, v. Michael JESTES, Appellee.

No. 86054.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

Jan. 27, 1998.

Drew Campo, Oklahoma City, for appellant.

Conner L. Helms of Woska, Hasbrook, Dowd, Underwood & Helms, Oklahoma City, for appellee.

LAVENDER, Justice.

¶1 The primary question before us is whether the district court's decision--to incorporate an exhibit by reference into Lorita J. Sneed's [Sneed or deceased] earlier-admitted

last will and testament--is against the clear weight of the evidence. Also at issue is whether Donna Kay Hall [Hall, contestant or appellant] is entitled to a new hearing to decide whether Michael Jestes ¹ [Jestes, proponent or personal representative] unduly influenced Sneed in the making of the incorporated exhibit.

I PROCEDURAL FACTS AND HISTORY

¶2 On August 22, 1990 Lorita Sneed executed a last will and testament. She died in March 1992. Under her will's terms all of her property, both real and personal, was devised to Michael Jestes, as trustee, with instructions that he distribute the same under the terms of Exhibit "A" to the will.

¶3 Although the exhibit attached to the will was dated August 20, 1990, there is evidence that its "trust" provisions were originally drafted on August 17, 1990. The exhibit purports to reflect the testatrix's "living will wishes." Jestes testified that he acted as Sneed's scrivener in the exhibit's preparation and did nothing more than record her decisions about how her assets were to be distributed. ²

¶4 The testatrix died without issue. Under the dispositive provisions [as found in Exhibit "A"] of the Sneed will her estate is devised to (a) the heirs of her deceased brother [Kenneth Hall], i.e., the contestant and her two children, (b) the children of her deceased step-brother [Marlin Marsh], (c) Jestes and his sister and (d) various other friends and her church. The contestant and her children were the principal beneficiaries under the decedent's will, although the devises to Marlin Marsh's children and Jestes and his sister were each close in amount to the quantum given the contestant and her children.

¶5 The decedent's will was prepared by her lawyer of many years and was executed in his office. Although Jestes was present when the will was executed, he did not serve as one of its witnesses. Since Exhibit "A" to the will contains the dispositive provisions for Sneed's estate and it is specifically referenced in the will, her lawyer obviously reviewed the exhibit's terms when he drafted the document. Nonetheless, the record does not reflect any discussions between the lawyer and the testatrix about the will or its exhibit's provisions except on the day of the will's execution when the testatrix acknowledged before its witnesses that the document represented her dispositive wishes. ³

¶6 On October 19, 1993 Jestes petitioned the district court to probate Sneed's will. Hall objected to its admission urging (1) that her aunt was of diminished mental capacity and suffered from insane delusions and (2) that Sneed's free agency had been overborne by Jestes' undue influence. In the summer of 1994 the trial court, sitting in probate, conducted a hearing on Sneed's testamentary capacity and the issue of undue influence. This hearing was held before the exhibit in issue was bifurcated from the will. During this proceeding the contestant examined Jestes about (a) his relationship with Sneed, (b) his role in the preparation of Exhibit "A", and (c) the execution of the decedent's last will and testament. It was also at this time that Jestes' counsel requested that Exhibit "A" be severed from the will and transferred to a division of the district court with the authority to determine if its provisions satisfied the requirements for the establishment of a valid inter vivos trust. In its August 30, 1994 order the trial court (sitting in probate) found that Exhibit "A" was "not being offered as either a testamentary disposition [or] as a residuary disposition under the residuary clause" of Sneed's will. Also, it found that Exhibit "A" was not being offered as a testamentary trust under the will's terms and that it [the court sitting in probate] did not have the remedial capacity to ascertain the instrument's validity as an inter vivos trust. At ¶7 After the district court ruled that the exhibit's provisions failed to create an inter vivos trust, the will's proponent moved to incorporate by reference the document's terms into Sneed's will. By its August 11, 1995 order the court allowed the requested incorporation and denied the contestant's motion for a hearing on the issue of the proponent's undue influence in the exhibit's preparation. It is from this latter order that Hall brings her appeal. The Court of Civil Appeals upheld the district court's decision. The appellant then sought certiorari which was granted.

the conclusion of the July 1994 hearing the latter issue was severed from the probate proceedings and transferred to the Chief Judge, Civil Division, Oklahoma County District Court. The district court--in an exercise of its remedial powers--concluded that the exhibit's provisions did not meet the statutory requirements necessary to establish an inter vivos trust.

II THE STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶8 Probate proceedings are of equitable cognizance. ⁴ While the Court will examine the whole record and weigh the evidence, the trial court's findings will not be disturbed on review unless they are clearly against the weight of the evidence or some governing principle of law. ⁵ We are mindful that when a will is offered for probate, the factum of the will--i.e., (a) whether the will has been executed with the requisite statutory formalities, (b) whether the testatrix was competent to make a will at the time it was made, and (c) whether it was the product of undue influence, fraud or duress--becomes the singular concern of the court. ⁶ The emphasis of this entire process is to discern and effectuate the decedent's dispositive intentions. ⁷

III SNEED WAS POSSESSED OF TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY

¶9 Testamentary capacity exists when a person possesses, in a general way, the ability to appreciate the character and extent of the devised property, understands the nature of the relationship between themselves and the objects of their bounty and apprehends the nature and effect of the testamentary act. ⁸ Whether one possesses testamentary capacity is a question of fact. When a person contests a testator's soundness of mind, the burden of persuasion associated with the issue rests upon them. ⁹ When a court ascertains a decedent's testamentary capacity, it is appropriate for it to consider evidence of the testator's mental capacity, appearance, conduct, habits and conversation both before and after the will is executed--if these factors are relevant to his/her mental condition at the time the will was executed. ¹⁰

¶10 From the record it is apparent that until the very end of Sneed's life she was a self-reliant person with an independent will. She lived alone, drove her own car until the time of her death, mowed her own lawn, managed rental properties which she owned, and on occasions--contemporaneous to the execution of her will--managed a dentist's business office while he was out of town. The conveyances, ¹¹ which Sneed made after executing her will, amply demonstrate that

                she understood the character of her property and further that she understood the intended effect of her testamentary acts--even though the district court later determined that the provisions of Exhibit "A" were not legally sufficient to create an inter vivos trust.  No evidence indicates any desire on the testatrix's part to change, alter or revoke the will during the almost two years between its execution and her demise. 12  From review of the record it cannot be said that the district court's decision that Lorita Sneed was possessed of testamentary capacity is clearly against the weight of the evidence
                

IV THE DOCTRINE OF CLAIM PRECLUSION (RES JUDICATA) CANNOT BE BASED ON THE DISTRICT COURT'S JULY 6, 1994 ORDER SINCE THAT ORDER WAS NOT FINAL

¶11 Sneed's last will and testament, when proffered to the district court for admission, consisted of two pages plus Exhibit "A". When it was suggested by the will's proponent that the district court, sitting in probate, did not have "jurisdiction" to determine whether the terms of Exhibit "A" actually created an inter vivos trust, the district court by its July 6, 1994 order bifurcated the exhibit from the will--concluding that Exhibit "A" was not then being "offered" as a testamentary disposition, a residuary disposition or as Sneed's will. In this same order the district court judge, in reference to Exhibit "A", stated, "[A]ny rulings thereon will be reserved pending a[n] adjudication by the district bench as to its validity and operational effect of the instrument itself...." ¹³ The contestant asserts that because Jestes sought severance of the critical exhibit from the probate court's consideration, he was barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion (res judicata ) from later seeking incorporation of the exhibit's provisions into the Sneed will.

¶12 The July 6, 1994 order's language makes clear that the district court, sitting in probate, intended to reserve consideration of what effect, if any, should be given Exhibit "A" in the event it should be determined that its provisions did not create an inter vivos trust. This order--insofar as it concerns Exhibit "A"--is interlocutory and not final. By its July 6, 1994 ruling the district court merely found that the proponent was not offering the exhibit as a testamentary disposition. The issue of what legal effect, if any, would be extended to the exhibit's terms was reserved until after the district court had determined if the exhibit's provisions created an inter vivos trust.

¶13 The doctrine of claim...