96-904 La.App. 3 Cir. 2/5/97, Graham v. St. Landry Parish School Bd.
| Decision Date | 05 February 1997 |
| Citation | 689 So.2d 595 |
| Parties | 96-904 La.App. 3 Cir |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
Joshua Jocias Pitre, Opelousas, for Amos Graham.
Michael J. Juneau, Lafayette, for St. Landry Parish School Bd.
Before WOODARD, SULLIVAN and GREMILLION, JJ.
[96-904 La.App. 3 Cir. 1] WOODARD, Judge.
Plaintiff teacher appeals the judgment of trial court dismissing his claim against defendant school board for wrongful termination under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We reverse.
Plaintiff, Amos Graham (Graham), was a certified math and science teacher in the St. Landry Parish school system for 17 years, from 1972 until 1989. Graham took a sabbatical leave for the 1988-1989 school year, and in 1989 applied for, and was granted, a disability retirement. In 1990, after a medical examination, Graham was certified as able to return to teaching. The defendant, St. Landry Parish School Board (the Board), rehired Graham for the 1990-1991 school year to teach at Plaisance High School, substituting for a teacher who was on sabbatical leave for that year. At the end of the 1990-1991 school year, Graham applied for a permanent teaching position with the Board for the 1991-1992 school year but was not re-hired. Graham then [96-904 La.App. 3 Cir. 2] sought employment, and was employed, in the Lafayette Parish School system for the 1991-1992 school year. He continues to teach there.
In August 1992, Graham filed suit against the Board, alleging violations of his constitutional rights under Articles 2 and 3 of the Louisiana Constitution and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. He asserts that under School Board policy, certified teachers are to receive preference over non-certified teachers for teaching positions. Graham asserts that in the 1991-1992 school year the Board employed non-certified teachers in positions for which he, a certified teacher, was qualified. A bench trial was held on February 21 1996, and a judgment was rendered on April 10, 1996. In its written reasons for judgment, the trial court found that Graham had failed to meet his burden of showing that the decision not to hire him was the product of an official policy of the Board. It is from this decision that Graham appeals.
Graham asserts the following assignments of error:
(1) The trial court erred in ruling that Appellant did not have a tort claim in this case.
(2) What damages did Appellant sustain as a result of Defendant's fault.
(3) The trial court erred in finding that Appellant did not have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. 1983.
(4) Whether Appellant is entitled to damages and attorney's fees.
In his first assignment of error, Graham asserts that the trial court erred in ruling that he did not have a tort claim in this case. In support of this assertion, Graham makes two arguments. First, he argues that in failing to notify him by letter that he would not be re-hired for the 1991-1992 school year, the Board violated its own policies regarding notification of separation of teachers from employment. Second, Graham argues that the Board, in failing to hire him for the 1991-1992 [96-904 La.App. 3 Cir. 3] school year, violated its own policy of employing non-certified teachers only if there were no certified teachers available.
Graham correctly states the policies of the Board regarding hiring and notification. However, even if we find that he has a valid tort claim, he requests a remedy to which he has no right; namely, to choose the school at which he would like to work. It was established at trial that teachers in St. Landry Parish have not been entitled to choose their schools. As Graham himself testified, teachers in St. Landry Parish are not employed to work in any particular school. Rather, they are employed by the Board and may be assigned to any school in the parish. At trial, Graham testified that he would return to employment with the Board only if he were assigned to work at one of three schools in Eunice. Graham further testified that the Board had offered him employment for the 1992-1993 school year in St. Landry Parish, but he declined the job because it was not at a school in Eunice. The trial court found that Graham no longer requested to be restored to his former employment, but rather requested to be restored to employment at a school of his choosing. Since this is not a remedy to which Graham has a right, the trial court considered Graham's request to be "restored to his former employment within the St. Landry Parish school system" as abandoned. Based upon the facts and the law before us, we cannot say that this was manifestly erroneous or an abuse of discretion. As such, this assignment has no merit.
In his second assignment, Graham asserts that the trial court erred in finding that he did not have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, Graham asserts that his right to equal protection was violated by the Board's failure to hire him when teaching positions within the school system were staffed with non-certified teachers. In addition, Graham asserts that the trial court erred in finding that the Board's actions did not reflect its official policy.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 reads in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ..., subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or [96-904 La.App. 3 Cir. 4] immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ...
In interpreting this statute, the Supreme Court has held that its language "cannot easily be read to impose liability vicariously on governing bodies solely on the basis of the existence of an employer-employee relationship with a tortfeasor." Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 692, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). For example, in City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985), the Court found that an unjustified shooting by a police officer could not, without more, be thought to result from official policy. The police officer was not a policy-making official, and his actions were not taken pursuant to any policy established by the city. Thus, the city was not liable. Likewise, in City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988), the Court held that the city could not be held liable for the adverse personnel decisions taken by the plaintiff's supervisors because those decisions were not made by individuals with final, policymaking authority, nor were they made pursuant to a policy adopted by those with final, policy-making authority. Finally, in its written reasons for judgment, the trial court cites Guidry v. Broussard, 897 F.2d 181 (5th Cir.1990) for the proposition that "[l]ocal government entities are only liable under § 1983 for acts of local officials pursuant to official government policy." In Guidry, a local school principal censored a valedictory speech to be given by a student. The student filed suit against the school board under § 1983, claiming an infringement of her First Amendment right to free speech. In its holding, the court found that the actions taken by the principal were not representative of the official policy of the board.
In all of the above cited cases, the court was faced with an action by a subordinate of the final, policy-making body which was not in accordance with the policies of that body. The question presented in this case, however, is whether, and if so, when, may a final, policy-making body be found to have acted contrary to the very policies which they themselves adopt?
The Supreme Court has held that, while Congress did doubt its constitutional power to impose such liability in order to oblige municipalities to control the conduct of others, it never questioned its power to impose liability on municipalities for their own illegal acts. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 [96-904 La.App. 3 Cir. 5] 1986) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 665-683, 98 S.Ct. at 2022-2032). The Court further stated that "Monell reasoned that recovery from a municipality is limited to acts that are, properly speaking, acts 'of the municipality' that is, acts which the municipality has officially sanctioned or ordered." Id. at 480, 106 S.Ct. at 1298.
Thus, in order to impose liability on a municipality under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that the body "caused a constitutional tort through 'a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers.' " Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 122, 108 S.Ct. at 923. The Court in Praprotnik went on to state several "guiding principles" for determining when a decision on a single occasion may be enough to establish an unconstitutional municipal policy:
First, a majority of the Court agreed that municipalities may be held liable under § 1983 only for acts for which the municipality itself is actually responsible, "that is, acts which the municipality has officially sanctioned or ordered." Second, only those municipal officers who have "final policy making authority" may by their actions subject the government to § 1983 liability. Third, whether a particular official had "final policy making authority" is a question of state law. Fourth, the challenged action must have been taken pursuant to a policy adopted by the official or officials responsible under state law for making policy in that area of the city's business.
Id. at 123, 108 S.Ct. at 924 (citations omitted).
The Court further stated that the...
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