Lopez v. Nights of Cabiria, LLC
Decision Date | 30 March 2015 |
Docket Number | No. 14–cv–1274 LAK.,14–cv–1274 LAK. |
Citation | 96 F.Supp.3d 170 |
Parties | Fermin LOPEZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. NIGHTS OF CABIRIA, LLC, etc., et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Michael Antonio Faillace, Michael Faillace & Associates, P.C., for Plaintiffs.
Alexander Wilde Leonard, Carolyn Diane Richmond, Fox Rothschild, LLP (NYC), for Defendants.
The three named plaintiffs in this case—Fermin Lopez, Cesar Melo, and Armando Ajtun—were employed as tipped delivery workers1 at defendants' restaurant, which operated as “Two Boots Pizza,” in the East Village.2 Notwithstanding their designation as tipped delivery workers, plaintiffs allege that they spent a “considerable part of their work day” performing non-tipped, non-delivery duties without due compensation.3 They bring this suit to enforce their alleged rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”)4 and the New York Labor Law (“NYLL”).5 Plaintiffs claim principally that defendants failed to pay their requisite minimum and overtime wages, that they did not receive “spread of hours” pay as required by the NYLL,6 and that they were compensated improperly at the “tip credit” rate in light of their allegedly substantial non-tipped duties.7 The suit purports to be a collective action under the FLSA and a class action under state law,8 although no request for class certification or collective action status has been made. The matter is now before the Court on the parties' joint request for approval of a proposed settlement.9
The proposed settlement agreement (the “Agreement”) would discontinue the case in exchange for a payment of $27,500.10 Plaintiffs' counsel would retain either $11,000 or $12,000 as its fee, the precise amount being unclear because counsel's submission refers to two different fee amounts on successive pages.11 Whichever figure is correct, counsel's proposed fee is between 40 and 43.6 percent of the total settlement payment. Of the remaining settlement funds, $2,000 would “be paid directly to the Plaintiffs as wages, while the remainder of the settlement amount will be paid by check to Plaintiffs' attorneys,” who would then “distribute $14,500 of that additional amount to the Plaintiffs themselves.”12
Plaintiff's counsel estimates that if plaintiffs had proceeded to trial, their maximum recovery would have been $49,000, “including liquidated damages, and not including a potential attorneys' fees award,” and that “[a]pproximately $12,000 of that sum represents unpaid minimum and overtime wages.”13 Plaintiffs therefore stand to receive $16,500 from the proposed settlement, or approximately 33.7 percent of their alleged $49,000 maximum recovery.
The parties assert that the Agreement is “fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the Parties' mutual best interests.”14 The Court is told that “there were sharply contested factual and legal disputes,” including “a dispute over whether or not the Defendants were allowed to pay Plaintiffs at a lower tip-credit rate” and “disputes over the number of hours Plaintiffs worked each week, and the duration of their employment.”15 Defendants claim that, under their calculations, plaintiffs are entitled to no more than $8,000 in wage and overtime payments and no more than $25,000 in total damages.16 These estimates differ from plaintiffs' calculations by $4,000 and $24,000, respectively. The parties state that the proposed settlement emerged from “arduous arms-length bargaining”17 and vigorous contestation of various factual disputes.
For reasons that will appear, several specific provisions of the Agreement are relevant to the Court's decision whether to approve it.
First, the Agreement contains a number of confidentiality provisions. One would bar the plaintiffs from discussing the settlement with anyone except their “immediate family members, financial advisors and attorneys.”18 Another provision—a gag order, really—states that plaintiffs “shall not directly or indirectly encourage, solicit, or support third party, person or entity ... with respect to any litigation, arbitration, and/or civil action in which Defendants could be implicated or discussed in any way, unless pursuant to subpoena or other compulsory legal process.”19 A similar provision states that plaintiffs and defendants have agreed that, if asked about the status of the pending action or the Agreement, they are to respond “solely by stating that ‘The Parties' dispute has been amicably resolved.’ ”20 The Agreement additionally contains a non-disparagement clause, stating that plaintiffs “will not make any negative statement about the Defendants, or otherwise disparage them, nor will they encourage or direct others to do so.”21
To enforce these confidentiality terms, the Agreement contains a liquidated damages provision. Under this section, defendants can seek “specific performance and injunctive or other equitable relief” for violations of the Agreement's confidentiality and non-disparagement obligations.22 Further, in the event of a “judicial determination”that plaintiffs have violated those obligations, plaintiffs are to pay liquidated damages in the amount of $3,000, plus defendants' attorneys' fees.23
Discussion
The FLSA places “strict limits on an employee's ability to waive claims for unpaid wages or overtime under 29 U.S.C. § 216 for fear that employers would coerce employees into settlement and waiver.”27 The Supreme Court, however, has indicated “that employees may waive FLSA claims pursuant to judicially-supervised settlements.”28
Some disagreement has arisen among district courts in this circuit as to whether such settlements do in fact require court approval, or may be consummated as a matter of right under Rule 41.29 The trend among district courts is nonetheless to continue subjecting FLSA settlements to judicial scrutiny.30 This Court sees no reason at present to deviate from the traditional practice, particularly as the parties have “have requested judicial approval” in this case.31
Examination of whether a proposed FLSA settlement is fair and reasonable, therefore, is an information intensive undertaking. At a minimum, the Court requires evidence as to the nature of plaintiffs' claims, the bona fides of the litigation and negotiation process, the employers' potential exposure both to plaintiffs and to any putative class, the bases of estimates of plaintiffs' maximum possible recovery, the probability of plaintiffs' success on the merits, and evidence supporting any requested fee award.
The parties have not “provide[d] the Court with each party's estimate of the number of hours worked or the applicable wage.”37 The Court therefore has no sense of how the parties' counsel arrived at the opposing maximum recovery figures of $25,000 and $49,000, nor to what extent resolution of the various factual disputes cited in the parties' submission in either side's favor would alter those figures. The parties' submission...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Kim v. Lee
... ... Lopez v. Nights of Cabiria, LLC , 96 F. Supp. 3d 170, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (internal quotation marks ... ...
-
Mason Tenders Dist. Council Welfare Fund v. LJC Dismantling Corp.
... ... See id. at 351 ; see also Lopez v. Nights of Cabiria, LLC , 96 F. Supp. 3d 170, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (in attorney's fee context, ... ...
-
Fisher v. SD Prot. Inc., Docket No. 18-2504-cv
... ... His duties included working in hotel hallways to supervise student tour groups during late nights and early mornings, enforcing curfews, and monitoring noise levels. During his 26 weeks of ... , Lopez v. Nights of Cabiria, LLC , 96 F. Supp. 3d 170, 181-82 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (reviewing FLSA settlement ... ...
-
Selk v. Pioneers Mem'l Healthcare Dist.
... ... for fear that employers may coerce employees into settlement and waiver. Lopez v. Nights of Cabiria, LLC, 96 F.Supp.3d 170, 175 (S.D.N.Y.2015) (internal quotation marks and ... ...
-
Resolution Without Trial
...and the resolution of his lawsuit is “in strong tension with the remedial purposes of the FLSA,” Lopez v. Nights of Cabiria, LLC , 96 F.Supp.3d 170, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), and undermines the public’s “right to know about the terms of such judicially approved settlements.” Armenta v. Dirty Bir......