Chrysler Grp., LLC v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Dep't of Workforce Dev.

• Decision Date: 19 January 2012
• Docket Number: No. 93S02–1109–EX–565.,93S02–1109–EX–565.
• Parties: CHRYSLER GROUP, LLC, Appellant (Respondent below), v. REVIEW BOARD OF the INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT and T.A., et al., Appellee (Petitioners below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

960 N.E.2d 118

CHRYSLER GROUP, LLC, Appellant (Respondent below),

v.REVIEW BOARD OF the INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT and T.A., et al., Appellee (Petitioners below).

No. 93S02–1109–EX–565.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Jan. 19, 2012.

T.A., et al., Nora L. Macey, Barry A. Macey, Robert A. Hicks, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

Steven F. Pockrass, Robert F. Seidler, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Francis H. Barrow, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee, Review Board of the Indiana Department of Workforce Development.SHEPARD, Chief Justice.

As the U.S. economy collapsed in 2008, Chrysler offered a buyout program to employees in Kokomo, Indiana. Those employees then applied for unemployment benefits under Indiana's Unemployment Compensation Act and their claims were initially denied. The Review Board of the Indiana Department of Workforce Development ultimately awarded benefits under a narrow provision of the Act. While this provision has now been repealed, its application is a matter of real consequence to these parties. We affirm the Board.

Facts and Procedural History

In 2008, Chrysler Group, LLC—like the rest of the country—faced almost unprecedented economic challenges.¹ It closed manufacturing plants in multiple states and offered senior employees in those states the opportunity to relocate to plants still operating elsewhere—including Chrysler's plant in Kokomo. (Appellant's App. at 4.) Chrysler laid off some of its employees in Kokomo due to a decrease in work volume, and these workers received unemployment benefits, along with supplemental unemployment benefit pay (“sub-pay”) and continuing health care coverage from Chrysler. (Appellant's App. at 4–5.)

Late in 2008, Chrysler offered any employee with at least one year of service—even if they were on lay-off—the opportunity to take part in an Enhanced Voluntary Termination of Employment Program (EVTEP). (Appellant's App. at 5.) The EVTEP buyout offered $100,000, plus continued health care benefits for six months, in exchange for the employee's voluntary termination of employment. A second EVTEP buyout in early 2009 offered $75,000, a $25,000 voucher toward the purchase of a new Chrysler, and health care benefits for six months. Employees who participated in either EVTEP relinquished all recall and seniority rights with Chrysler.

The Indiana Department of Workforce Development then terminated unemployment benefits for those employees who had been on lay-off prior to accepting the EVTEP, and it denied unemployment benefits to those employees who had been actively working for Chrysler prior to accepting EVTEP. (Appellant's App. at 13.) Both groups of employees appealed to an administrative law judge, who determined that those employees who were on indefinite lay-off before accepting the EVTEP were entitled to continued unemployment benefits, whereas those who were actively working or on temporary lay-off were not. Chrysler and the employees then appealed to DWD's Review Board.

The Board reversed in part and affirmed in part. It saw no distinction between those employees on temporary lay-off versus indefinite lay-off, saying both were “inactively employed” at the time they accepted the EVTEP. (Appellant's App. at 5–6.) The Board further found that all employees who accepted the EVTEP were eligible for benefits pursuant to Indiana Code § 22–4–14–1(c) (Supp.2011) despite a lack of good cause for leaving their employment.

In a divided opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed and held that the Board's application of Section 22–4–14–1(c) was erroneous and inconsistent with the statute. C.G., LLC v. Rev. Bd. of the Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 946 N.E.2d 599, 603 (Ind.Ct.App.2011). We granted transfer, ––– N.E.2d –––– (Ind.2011) (table), thereby vacating the opinion of the Court of Appeals. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).

Standard of Review

Under Indiana's Unemployment Compensation Act, “[a]ny decision of the review board shall be conclusive and binding as to all questions of fact.” Ind.Code § 22–4–17–12(a) (2007); McClain v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 693 N.E.2d 1314, 1316 (Ind.1998). The Board's conclusions of law may be challenged as to “the sufficiency of the facts found to sustain the decision and the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the findings of facts.” Ind.Code § 22–4–17–12(f); McClain, 693 N.E.2d at 1317. Consistent with appellate review of other administrative adjudications, we categorize the Board's findings three ways: (1) basic, underlying facts; (2) “ultimate facts” derived as inferences or conclusions from basic, underlying facts; (3) and conclusions of law. McClain, 693 N.E.2d at 1317.

We review the Board's findings of basic facts under a “substantial evidence” standard, and we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess its credibility. Id. We consider only the evidence most favorable to the Board's findings and, absent limited exceptions, treat those findings as conclusive and binding. Id. at 1317 n. 2.²

Ultimate facts—typically mixed questions of fact and law—are reviewed to ensure the Board has drawn a reasonable inference in light of its findings on the basic, underlying facts. Id. at 1317–18. Where the matter lies within the particular expertise of the administrative agency, we afford the finding a greater level of deference. Id. at 1318. Where the matter does not lie within the particular expertise of the agency, however, “the reviewing court is more likely to exercise its own judgment.” Id. Regardless, “the court examines the logic of the inference drawn and imposes any rules of law that may drive the result.” Id. The Board's conclusion must be reversed “if the underlying facts are not supported by substantial evidence or the logic of the inference is faulty, even where the agency acts within its expertise, or if the agency proceeds under an incorrect view of the law.” Id.

We are not bound by the Board's conclusions of law, though “[a]n interpretation of a statute by an administrative agency charged with the duty of enforcing the statute is entitled to great weight, unless this interpretation would be inconsistent with the statute itself.” LTV Steel Co. v. Griffin, 730 N.E.2d 1251, 1257 (Ind.2000).

Employees Who Accepted the EVTEP Are Eligible for Benefits

The purpose of Indiana's Unemployment Compensation Act is to “provide for payment of benefits to persons unemployed through no fault of their own.” Ind.Code § 22–4–1–1 (2007); Indiana State Univ. v. LaFief, 888 N.E.2d 184, 186 (Ind.2008). To receive benefits, a person “must be unemployed, have sufficient wage credits in his base period, be able, available, and actively seeking work, and meet certain registration and reporting requirements.” LaFief, 888 N.E.2d at 186 (citing Ind.Code §§ 22–4–14–2, –3, –5(d)–(e) (2007 & Supp.2011)). However, a person can be disqualified from benefits if he voluntarily terminates his employment without good cause. Id. (citing Ind.Code § 22–4–15–1 (2007 & Supp.2011)).

Here, the Board found the employees met the qualification requirements of Sections 22–4–14–2, –3, and –5, but none had good cause to voluntarily terminate their employment. (Appellant's App. at 6.) In most cases this would end the claim, but the Board determined that the specific provisions of Indiana Code § 22–4–14–1(c) trumped the Act's more general disqualification provisions. (Appellant's App. at 6–7.) Subsection (c) provides that,

[e]xcept as provided in IC 22–4–5–1, a person who:

(1) accepts an offer of payment or other compensation offered by an employer to avert or lessen the effect of a layoff or plant closure; and

(2) otherwise meets the eligibility requirements established by this article;

is entitled to receive benefits in the same amounts, under the same terms, and subject to the same conditions as any other unemployed person.

Ind.Code § 22–4–14–1(c).³ The Board concluded that “the Employer offered-and the Claimants accepted-compensation to lessen or avert the effects of a lay-off, and the Claimants are entitled to benefits” pursuant to subsection (c). (Appellant's App. at 7.) Specifically, it said:

Employees who were actively employed when they accepted the EVTEP averted the effects of a lay-off, and those employees who were laid off when they accepted the EVTEP lessened the effects of the lay-off. The Claimants received a cash payment to help them transition to other employment in a period of recession and uncertainty. Likewise, the Employer lessened the effects of the lay-off to itself when employees accepted the EVTEP by reducing its workforce when the recall rights were eliminated. The Employer's obligation to those employees for subpay ended immediately, and its obligation to continue health coverage ended after six months.(Appellant's App. at 7.) Chrysler does not challenge the Board's findings of fact. Instead, Chrysler challenges the Board's interpretation and subsequent application of subsection (c), arguing that it is inapplicable to the employees' claims. (Appellant's Br. at 1.)

We therefore proceed in two steps. First, we examine Section 22–4–14–1(c) to determine whether the Board correctly interpreted the law. Second, we must determine whether the agency properly applied that law to the facts before it.

A. Interpretation of Section 22–4–14–1(c). We review an issue of statutory interpretation de novo. If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we require only that the words and phrases it contains are given their plain, ordinary, and usual meanings to determine and implement the legislature's intent. State v. Am. Family Voices, Inc., 898 N.E.2d 293 (Ind.2008). However, this particular statute is one the Board is charged with enforcing, and we therefore give deference to its interpretation. LTV Steel, Co., 730 N.E.2d at 1257. In particular, we defer to the agency's reasonable interpretation of such a statute even over...