Melton v. Ind. Athletic Trainers Bd.

• Decision Date: 27 April 2016
• Docket Number: No. 49A05–1508–CT–1123.,49A05–1508–CT–1123.
• Citation: 53 N.E.3d 1210
• Parties: Molly A. MELTON, Appellant–Plaintiff, v. INDIANA ATHLETIC TRAINERS BOARD, David Craig, A.T., in his official and individual capacity, Larry Leverenz, A.T., in his official and individual capacity, Scott Lawrance, A.T., in his official and individual capacity, Jennifer VanSickle, in her official and individual capacity, John Miller, M.D., in his official and individual capacity, and John Knote, M.D., in his official and individual capacity, and the Indiana Professional Licensing Agency, Appellees–Defendants.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

53 N.E.3d 1210

Molly A. MELTON, Appellant–Plaintiff

v.INDIANA ATHLETIC TRAINERS BOARD, David Craig, A.T., in his official and individual capacity, Larry Leverenz, A.T., in his official and individual capacity, Scott Lawrance, A.T., in his official and individual capacity, Jennifer VanSickle, in her official and individual capacity, John Miller, M.D., in his official and individual capacity, and John Knote, M.D., in his official and individual capacity, and the Indiana Professional Licensing Agency, Appellees–Defendants.

No. 49A05–1508–CT–1123.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

April 27, 2016.

Kevin W. Betz, Courtney E. Endwright, Betz + Blevins, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Frances Barrow, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellees.

BROWN

, Judge.

[1] Molly A. Melton appeals orders of the trial court granting a motion to dismiss and a motion for judgment on the pleadings in favor of the Indiana Athletic Trainers Board (the “Board”), David Craig, A.T., Larry Leverenz, A.T., Scott Lawrance, A.T., Jennifer VanSickle, John Miller, M.D., John Knote, M.D., each in their individual and official capacities, and the Indiana Professional Licensing Agency (the “IPLA”, and collectively with the Board and the other named parties, the “Appellees”). The motion was filed following the Board's decision finding Melton in default and ordering that her Indiana athletic training license be indefinitely suspended for a period of at least seven years. Melton raises a number of issues, one of which we find dispositive and revise and restate as whether the court erred in dismissing Melton's complaint filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 12(C). We reverse and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On August 2, 2012, Melton was hired by IU Health Paoli Hospital's Rehab and Sports Medicine Department as an athletic trainer. A few months later, she began a consensual sexual relationship with a patient, who was a nineteen-year-old adult male high school student.¹ On May 10, 2013, the State, through the Indiana Professional Licensing Agency (“IPLA”), filed an administrative complaint before the Board against Melton alleging that she “engaged in a course of lewd or immoral conduct in connection with delivery of services to the public” and “engaged in sexual contact with an athlete in her care” in violation of Ind.Code § 25–1–9–4(a)(5)

and –4(a)(11). Appellant's Appendix at 15. The allegations recited in the complaint caused Melton “a great deal of embarrassment and humiliation....” Id.

[3] On September 17, 2013, the Board held a hearing on the matter, in which Melton received proper notice of the hearing. Due to the embarrassment she felt regarding the allegations, as well as the Deputy Attorney General's intention to display nude photographs she had exchanged with the student, she chose to send her attorney to appear on her behalf at the hearing and admit to the factual basis but not to admit to sanctions. The Board deemed the appearance by only Melton's counsel to be insufficient, and it issued a Notice of Proposed Default.

[4] On September 27, 2013, Melton filed a motion responding to and opposing the Notice of Proposed Default, in which she noted her reason for not appearing in person, including “the direct embarrassment or direct humiliation that would have been caused by such a hearing, particularly as Ms. Melton did not oppose the facts underlying this Complaint but only disputed the proposed punishment, admissions, and sanctions sought by the Board.” Id. at 16. On November 20, 2013, Deputy Attorney General Amanda Elizondo (“DAG Elizondo”) sent Melton's counsel an email “stating that a hearing would ‘probably’ be going forward,” and then on January 16, 2014, DAG Elizondo emailed Melton's counsel “that the hearing was ‘set for Tuesday.’ ” Id. at 16. The next day, Crystal Heard of the IPLA sent an email “which simply stated that ‘[t]he Default is on the agenda for January 21, 2014 at 10am.’ ” Id. Neither Melton nor her counsel received notice from the Board of a hearing.

[5] On the morning of January 21, 2014, the Board held the hearing and, on February 3, 2014, issued its Order stating that it had considered Melton's motion opposing the proposed default and that it found Melton in default by a vote of 5–0. Also by a vote of 5–0, the Board concluded that Melton violated Ind.Code § 25–1–9–4(a)(5)

, –4(a)(11), and it ordered that she be placed on indefinite suspension for at least seven years and that prior to petitioning for reinstatement she provide the Board proof of successful completion of a course related to ethical boundaries in a patient-practitioner relationship.

[6] On March 6, 2014, Melton filed her Verified Complaint and Petition for Review of Administrative Ruling (the “Complaint”) in which she brought, in Count I, an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

that the Board's Order violated her federal constitutional rights, and, in Count II, she petitioned for review of the Board's Order under the Indiana Administrative Orders and Procedures Act (the “AOPA”). On April 28, 2014, the Appellees filed their Answer to Complaint and Statement of Affirmative Defenses. That same day, the Appellees filed a Motion to Dismiss Petitioner's Verified Petition for Judicial Review of the January 21, 2014 Order Entered by the Board, seeking to dismiss Count II, because Melton “failed to file the agency record by April 7, 2014,” which was thirty-two days after Melton filed her Complaint. Id. at 41. On July 1, 2014, the court held a hearing on the Appellees' motion and continued the hearing by agreement of the parties until after the Indiana Supreme Court ruled on “the issue of what needs to be filed in terms of the Agency record.” July 1, 2014 Transcript at 2.

[7] On February 11, 2015, the Appellees filed their Renewed Motion to Dismiss Petition for Review seeking dismissal of Melton's petition for administrative review “[n]ow that the Supreme Court has decided unequivocally that a case must be dismissed when a party fails to file the agency record....”² Appellant's Appendix at 80–81. That same day, the court granted the Appellees' motion with respect to Count II and “ordered that Ms. Melton's petition for judicial review is hereby DISMISSED. ” Id. at 9.

[8] On April 10, 2015, the Appellees filed their motion for judgment on the pleadings (the “12(C) Motion”) seeking dismissal of Melton's § 1983

claim. On April 28, 2015, Melton filed her response in opposition to defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, and on May 4, 2015, she requested a hearing. On May 12, 2015, the court rejected Melton's request for a hearing, in which the court wrote: “case was dismissed 2/2015.”³

Id. at 170. On June 4, 2015, Melton filed her Motion for Reconsideration and/or Motion to Clarify Court's Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Hearing on Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (the “Motion to Reconsider”) which stated that the court “[had] yet to substantively rule on Ms. Melton's Section 1983 claim” and that the court's “February 2015 Order dismissed only Ms. Melton's petition for administrative review (not her Section 1983 claim).” Id. at 171. On June 8, 2015, the court granted Melton's Motion to Reconsider and set the matter for a hearing. On June 25, 2015, the court held a hearing, and on July 16, 2015, it entered a summary order granting the Appellees' 12(C) Motion and dismissing her Section 1983 claim.

Discussion

[9] The dispositive issue is whether the court erred in dismissing Melton's complaint filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 12(C). We review de novo a trial court's ruling on a Rule 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings. Consol. Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Water Servs., LLC, 994 N.E.2d 1192, 1196 (Ind.Ct.App.2013) (citing Murray v. City of Lawrenceburg, 925 N.E.2d 728, 731 (Ind.2010) ), trans. denied. We accept as true the well-pleaded material facts alleged in the complaint, and base our ruling solely on the pleadings. Id. A Rule 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings is to be granted “only where it is clear from the face of the complaint that under no circumstances could relief be granted.” Id. (quoting Murray, 925 N.E.2d at 731 (quoting Forte v. Connerwood Healthcare, Inc., 745 N.E.2d 796, 801 (Ind.2001) (quoting Culver–Union Twp. Ambulance Serv. v. Steindler, 629 N.E.2d 1231, 1235 (Ind.1994) ))).

[10] When reviewing a Rule 12(C)

motion, we may look only at the pleadings and any facts of which we may take judicial notice, with all well-pleaded material facts alleged in the complaint taken as admitted. Id. “The ‘pleadings' consist of a complaint and an answer, a reply to any counterclaim, an answer to a cross-claim, a third-party complaint, and an answer to a third-party complaint.” Id. “Pleadings” also consist of any written instruments attached to a pleading, pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 9.2

. Id.; see also Ind. Trial Rule 10(C) (“A copy of any written instrument which is an exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all purposes.”).

[11] Section 1983

provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress....

42 U.S.C. § 1983

.

[12] Section 1983

creates no substantive right of its own, but acts only as a vehicle to afford litigants a civil remedy for deprivation of their federal rights. Myers v. Coats, 966 N.E.2d 652, 657 (Ind.Ct.App.2012) (citing Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994), reh'g denied ). To prevail on a Section 1983 claim, “the plaintiff must show that (1) the...