Allstate Ins. Co. v. Raynor
| Decision Date | 08 January 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 22414-3-II,22414-3-II |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent, v. Martin E. RAYNOR, individually, as the personal representative of the Estate of Cheryl Raynor, and as the guardian ad litem of Kathryn Raynor, a minor; David Johnson, individually and as the personal representative of the Estate of Candy Johnson, Appellants, and Margie E. King, individually; John Doe, as the personal representative of the Estate of Milton R. King; City of Longview, a municipal corporation; County of Cowlitz, a political subdivision of Washington State; Casey Tilton and Jane Doe Tilton, husband and wife, and their marital community; and Tom Homad and Jane Doe Homad, husband and wife, and their marital community, Defendants. |
R. Daniel Lindahl, Bullivant, Houser, Bailey, Pendergrass & Hoffman, Portland, OR, for Respondent.
Martin E. Raynor, and David Johnson 1, appeal a summary judgment in favor of Allstate Insurance Company. The trial court ruled that Margie and Milton King's homeowners policy did not cover Milton King's criminal acts of shooting to death Martin Raynor's ex-wife and daughter. Raynor argues that: (1) Allstate's policy exclusions for criminal or intentional acts do not apply where the insured lacked the mental capacity to form the requisite intent, about which there is a material issue of fact; (2) the "criminal acts" exclusion does not apply where the insured has been neither convicted of, nor charged with, a crime arising from the incident for which coverage is sought; (3) a material issue of fact remains as to whether Margie King's negligence was the "efficient proximate cause" of the deaths of Martin Raynor's ex-wife and daughter; (4) the trial court improperly denied coverage to Margie King based on the policy's "joint obligations" clause; and (5) the "joint obligations" clause violates public policy. Allstate responds that multiple provisions of the policy preclude coverage because the homicides were intentional, not accidental.
Holding that: (1) the Kings' homeowners insurance policy does not cover Milton's "intentional" and "criminal" acts; (2) Milton's shooting of his neighbors was not an "accident"; (3) Margie's negligence was not a proximate cause of the shootings; (4) the "joint obligations" clause would deny her coverage even if her actions had been a proximate cause of the shootings; and (5) the "joint obligations" clause is not void, we affirm.
David and Candy Johnson and Candy's two daughters, Cheryl and Kathryn Raynor, lived in Longview next door to By July 2, 1992, Milton had completed all conditions of his sentence. He went to his attorney's office and requested his handgun. His attorney refused and instead gave it to Margie. The attorney warned that, as a convicted felon, Milton was not permitted to possess guns, and he advised Margie not to take the gun into the Kings' home. Despite this warning, Margie returned the gun to Milton.
Milton and Margie King. 2 Milton King was a troubled man with a history of violence. In November 1990, he was arrested and convicted for assaulting his wife, Longview police officers, and others with a .22 caliber handgun, which police confiscated. A week after being sentenced, Milton asked his attorney to retrieve his gun from police
On the morning of July 10, 1992, Milton complained to Longview police that the Johnsons had been "illegally" keeping rabbits and dumping rabbit excrement near a fence between their properties. Later that day, Candy Johnson, her daughters, and the girls' friend Shannon Connors were stacking wood on the Johnsons' side of the fence. Milton and Margie began cursing over the fence at Candy and the children. Candy called Cowlitz County Communications (911).
City of Longview Police Officer Casey Tilton stopped at the Johnson home, examined the woodpile, and assured Candy that she had the right to stack wood by the fence. He also spoke with the Kings, who renewed their complaint regarding the rabbits and the woodpile. Officer Tilton noted that Milton was "acting real strange, 10-22, the whole works." 3
When Candy and the children resumed stacking wood near the fence, Margie called the Cowlitz County Communications center. The operator contacted the police department, which informed her that Officer Tilton had The operator next received a call from a woman named "Mary," who reported that she knew Milton and thought that officers Apparently, Milton had tried to contact Mary earlier that day. Having known him for some time, she opined to the 911 operator that The 911 operator agreed, "Well, that's obvious."
been on the scene earlier. As instructed, she told Margie that this was a civil matter and that the police would not be taking action. Margie was upset, despite the operator's attempts to calm her.
After ending her conversation with the operator, Margie informed Milton that the police would not be responding. This made him even angrier than he had been before. Margie went back outside, had more words with Candy and the children, apparently stuck a stick through a gap in the fence in an attempt to knock down the Johnsons' wood pile, then went back inside her home. Moments later Margie observed Milton in the Kings' yard, armed with the .22 caliber handgun and a .38 caliber revolver. 4 He was standing behind the fence watching, through a gap in the fence, Candy and the children stacking wood.
Believing that Milton might harm the family, Margie told him not to do anything because "it wasn't worth it." Milton came back into the house, put the guns in a drawer in his bedroom, and lay down on the bed. Margie went back into the yard and turned on a sprinkler, which sprayed water over the fence onto the children. The children called Margie a name and Margie turned down the water. Minutes later, Margie heard some "pops," went inside, and noticed that Milton was no longer in the house.
Milton had entered the Johnson property and started shooting. He shot Cheryl, aged 12, twice in the chest; he shot Candy once in the mouth. Cheryl collapsed onto a Meanwhile, Candy and Kathryn fled to the bathroom, with Milton in pursuit. Candy wedged her body against the door in an effort to keep Milton out. Kathryn hid in the bathtub and watched her mother die. Unable to enter the bathroom, Milton left the Johnson house and shot himself in the head. Officers found Candy and Milton dead and Cheryl bleeding in the front yard; she died later that day.
lawn chair. Shannon Connors fled to her home across the street. Kathryn, aged 11, and Candy ran into the Johnson house, where Candy called 911. Because she had been shot in the mouth, Candy had trouble speaking. The operator could understand only that Candy had been shot at "2950"; she could not understand the street name. The operator heard a high-pitched scream and gunshots in the background as Milton shot Candy twice more in the chest. The operator advised police that shots had been fired at "2950" but did not yet know the street name. Officer Tilton suggested that it might be "2915 Fir," which he believed to be the Kings' address based on previous dealings with Milton involving firearms. 5 Tilton immediately headed for 2915 Fir; en route, he received confirmation that Fir was the correct street
Martin Raynor, as the personal representative of the Estate of Cheryl Raynor and as Guardian Ad Litem of Kathryn Raynor, and David Johnson, as personal representative of the Estate of Candy Johnson, filed an action for wrongful death and personal injuries in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. They named as defendants: the Kings (Milton's estate and Margie), alleging negligence; and the City of Longview, Officers Tilton and Homad individually, and Cowlitz County, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 6
ANALYSIS
On appeal from summary judgment, we engage in the same inquiry as the trial court. Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wash.2d 434, 437, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982). Summary judgment is proper only if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Public Employees Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 65 Wash.App. 307, 310-11, 828 P.2d 63 (1992). The burden is on the moving party to show that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Butler, 118 Wash.2d "The interpretation of the language in an insurance policy is a question of law subject to de novo review." Fitzgerald, 65 Wash.App. at 311, 828 P.2d 63. Exclusionary clauses contained in insurance policies are strictly construed against the insurer. Fitzgerald, 65 Wash.App. at 311, 828 P.2d 63.
383, 395, 823 P.2d 499 (1992). All reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Degel v. Majestic Mobile Manor, Inc. 129 Wash.2d 43, 48, 914 P.2d 728 (1996). Summary judgment should be granted only if, from all of the evidence before the court, reasonable persons could reach but one conclusion. See ...
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