Gwynedd Properties, Inc. v. Lower Gwynedd Tp.
| Decision Date | 15 July 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 91-2074,91-2074 |
| Parties | GWYNEDD PROPERTIES, INC., Appellant, v. LOWER GWYNEDD TOWNSHIP, Catherine M. Harper, Edward J. Brandt, Janet H. Kirch, Richard Landis, and Robert McQuade. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
William H. Ewing (argued), William B. Petersen, Hangley, Connolly, Epstein, Chicco, Foxman, & Ewing, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant.
James J. Garrity, Kenneth A. Roos (argued), Wisler, Pearlstine, Talone, Craig, Garrity & Potash, Blue Bell, Pa., for appellees.
Before: GREENBERG, NYGAARD and WEIS, Circuit Judges.
Appellant Gwynedd Properties, Inc. (GPI) appeals from a district court order of December 12, 1991, dismissing its complaint against appellees Lower Gwynedd Township and the five members of the Township's Board of Supervisors, its governing body, sued in both their individual and official capacities. GPI sought injunctive and monetary relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on the ground that the appellees, acting under color of state law, conspired to deprive it of its constitutionally protected property rights. The district court on its own motion dismissed the complaint on Younger abstention grounds in recognition of ongoing state judicial proceedings. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). We conclude that federal adjudication of most of GPI's claims would not interfere with the state proceedings. Thus, we will partially reverse the order of December 12, 1991, though we will affirm the dismissal of two aspects of GPI's claim for relief.
THE DISPUTE
For purposes of this appeal, we accept as true the allegations in the complaint. Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 106 (3d Cir.1989). In 1975, GPI purchased approximately 142 acres of unimproved real estate located within the Township. A railroad line bisects the property into North and South parcels. 1 Apparently, the public has been freely using horse trails located on the South parcel. GPI held the property for ten years without attempting to develop it.
In 1986 and 1987, GPI submitted separate subdivision plans to the appellees to develop the parcels. GPI alleges that the appellees rejected its plans and in doing so, acting in concert with others, maliciously, arbitrarily, capriciously and for their own personal interests, obstructed GPI from making reasonable use of its property. With respect to the appellees' conduct regarding the North parcel, GPI alleges that they:
. refused to approve the initial plan on the ground that it called for a cul-de-sac of more than 1000 feet (which required GPI to build a bridge at great expense), even though other developers did not have such a requirement . required GPI to construct recharge pits on every lot, although this was not required by the applicable ordinance and has not been imposed on other, similarly situated developers;
. prohibited GPI from placing detention basins in yard areas, although other developers have been permitted to place these basins in back and side yards;
. required GPI to grant an "equestrian easement," the location and dimensions of which were subject to approval by a private organization;
. contested before the Township Zoning Board GPI's request for a variance to build in a flood plain area, although the appellees have not opposed other developers' requests for variances to build in flood plain areas;
. delivered to GPI an amendment broadening the definition of "flood plain" which had never been properly adopted. 2
Additionally, GPI claims that the appellees rejected its development plan for the South parcel to prevent it from making any reasonable use of its property, thereby enabling the public to continue to use the property for recreational purposes. GPI further contends that the appellees, by rejecting the plans, intended to minimize the value of the South parcel so that the Township can condemn it at a reduced cost. In addition to urging that the appellees were improperly motivated in rejecting its plans, GPI contends that the criteria they used to justify the rejection were flawed. Thus, GPI asserts that while the appellees purported to base their rejection of the South parcel development plan in part on the presence of "wetlands," the local ordinances did not enumerate this factor for consideration of development plans and the Township never considered it before. Indeed, according to GPI, at a meeting of the Board of Supervisors, one of the individual appellees said to another property owner that the "wetlands" criterion applied only to GPI's property. GPI further contends that while the appellees also claimed to reject the development plan because it did not include the names and widths of existing streets, sanitary sewers, storm drains and water lines within 400 feet of the subject site, they often approved plans omitting these details.
There have been several state court proceedings regarding the property. On December 30, 1987, the Township initiated condemnation proceedings to acquire the South parcel for a park. But GPI filed preliminary objections to the condemnation in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, and ultimately the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that the Township condemned the property improperly. Lower Gwynedd Township v. Gwynedd Properties, Inc., 527 Pa. 324, 591 A.2d 285 (1991). Consequently, in July 1991, title to the South parcel which had been taken by the Township in the condemnation proceedings was revested in GPI.
In addition, GPI filed two germane mandamus petitions in the common pleas court. In the first, filed on August 18, 1987, against the Township and the Board of Supervisors, but only in their official capacities, GPI alleges that the Township failed to render a decision on its subdivision plan for the South parcel within the time required by state law. Accordingly, GPI seeks an order compelling approval of the plan. In the second, filed July 15, 1991, against the Township's Code Enforcement Officer and the Board of Supervisors, GPI asserts that the officials refused to enforce its local sign ordinance evenhandedly against individuals who advocate the taking of the South parcel by displaying signs in violation of that ordinance. Both mandamus petitions are pending.
GPI also filed a zoning appeal in the court of common pleas from the Township's 1987 rejection of the South parcel subdivision plan. Although the appeal was dismissed when GPI lost title to the property There was yet another state court action, this one instituted by the Township. According to the appellees, when the Township rejected amended subdivision plans which GPI attempted to file, GPI began cutting down trees in a large area of the South parcel. In response, on October 17, 1991, the Township filed an action against GPI in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, seeking a temporary restraining order against further tree-cutting. That day the common pleas court issued the temporary restraining order which ordered GPI: (1) to refrain from further cutting down trees on its property; (2) to permit up to ten people from the Township and various other local and federal agencies to enter the land; and (3) to refrain from operating any heavy equipment on the land. On October 21, 1991, that court issued a preliminary injunction with the same terms contained in the temporary restraining order.
in the condemnation, on May 24, 1991, shortly after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued its decision invalidating the condemnation, GPI filed a petition in the common pleas court to reinstate the zoning appeal. This petition is also pending. 3
On November 4, 1991, GPI filed an answer, new matter and counterclaim in the Township's common pleas court action. In the new matter, GPI essentially asserted that the Township lacks authority to prevent it from cutting down trees on its own property and, in the counterclaim, GPI asserted that the Township ordinance which purports to restrict tree-cutting, "constitutes a deprivation of [GPI's] property without due process of law." Additionally, GPI alleged that the Township "has taken affirmative steps to prevent [GPI] from the lawful use of its property in these proceedings." In its counterclaim GPI requested damages in excess of $20,000.
GPI moved in the common pleas court for an order dissolving the preliminary injunction, but on November 13, 1991, the court denied that motion. GPI appealed from that order and we understand that the appeal is still pending.
The last state proceeding was instituted on May 28, 1992, after the district court dismissed this action, when the Township again commenced condemnation proceedings by filing a declaration of taking to acquire the South parcel for use "as a park, playground, play field, public park or recreation center." At oral argument before us GPI indicated that it intends to contest the validity of this condemnation.
On October 21, 1991, four days after the common pleas court issued the temporary restraining order in the tree-cutting case, GPI filed the action now before us in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. As we have already indicated, in its federal complaint GPI alleges that the appellees have acted in concert to prevent it from making full legal use of its property, and to reduce the value of the property and therefore the price the Township will have to pay when the property is condemned. GPI alleges that it is entitled to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the ground that the appellees denied GPI its rights to due process of law and to be free from unreasonable searches, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and that such actions were taken under color of state law. Additionally, GPI advances tort claims under Pennsylvania common law.
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