Eason v. Officer Jeffrey Frye (K-9) & Melvin Brisolara, Civil Action No. 1:12cv241–JMR.

• Decision Date: 18 September 2013
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 1:12cv241–JMR.
• Citation: 972 F.Supp.2d 935
• Parties: Cordale Dijon EASON, Plaintiff v. Officer Jeffrey FRYE (K–9) and Melvin Brisolara, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi

972 F.Supp.2d 935

Cordale Dijon EASON, Plaintiff

v.Officer Jeffrey FRYE (K–9) and Melvin Brisolara, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 1:12cv241–JMR.

United States District Court,

S.D. Mississippi,

Southern Division.

Sept. 18, 2013.

Cordale Dijon Eason, Gulfport, MS, pro se.

Haley Necaise Broom, Shannon A. Ladner, Dukes, Dukes, Keating & Faneca, PA, Gulfport, MS, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JOHN M. ROPER, SR., United States Chief Magistrate Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the motion of the Defendants, Melvin Brisolara [Brisolara] and Officer Jeffrey Frye # 280(K–9) [Frye] for summary judgment [43] filed in this case. The Court, being fully advised in the premises, and after carefully considering the pleadings filed as a matter of record, along with the applicable law, finds as follows.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiff filed this pro se§ 1983 action against Brisolara and Frye alleging that he suffered violations of his constitutional rights while held as a pretrial detainee at the Harrison County Adult Detention Center [HCADC]. [1, p. 4.] Specifically, Eason contends that Frye used excessive force against him on June 9, 2012, while responding to a fight between Eason and another inmate, Kelton Haralson [Haralson]. ( Id.) In addition, Eason contends that he did not receive immediate medical attention after the incident. ( Id.) He also claims that although he was treated for the dog bite a few minutes after the bite happened, the wound continued to bother him and he did not receive further medical treatment for six days. [8, p. 2.] Eason claims he received no warning that the dog would be released and asserts that the officers present on the day of the fight could have stepped in and separated he and Haralson to keep them from fighting, rather than unleashing the dog. [8, p. 3.] He advances claims under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, stated that Frye was not properly trained. [8, p. 1.]

Eason was arrested for a parole violation and was waiting for his preliminary hearing. [43–1, p. 2.] Eason was housed in Housing Block B, B Section, in cell 212 on the date of the incident in question. [43–2.] Eason and three other inmates verbally threatened Deputy Michael Rosenzweig, which resulted in the relocation of these inmates to the disciplinary section of Block B, D Section (hereinafter “BD”.) [43–14.] Eason was placed in a cell with inmate Kelton Haralson. [43–7.]

Frye was assisting on BD when he heard someone say “fight.” [43–3, p. 1.] Frye responded with his K–9 to the second tier of BD and saw Eason and Haralson fighting. [43–3, p. 2.] Frye averred that he ordered the inmates to stop fighting or Frye would release the K–9. ( Id.) Haralson stopped fighting when ordered to stop, but Eason continued to hit at Haralson. ( Id.) Frye released his K–9, because Frye refused to comply with the order to stop fighting, and because of the presence of a threat to both Frye and Haralson's safety. ( Id.) According to Frye, the dog was guided to Eason's buttocks area, and Eason dropped to the floor as soon as he was bitten. ( Id.) Eason stated he had been told at least two times to stop fighting before the dog was released. [43–1, p. 5.]

According to the medical records, Eason first received treatment for the dog bite wound on June 9, 2012. [43–15, pp. 3–4.] The wound was cleaned and covered. ( Id.) Eason was also treated for a dog bite on June 21 and 26, 2012. [43–15, pp. 1–2.]

STANDARD OF REVIEW:

Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). “The requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party resisting the motion. Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 529–30, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 165 L.Ed.2d 697 (2006).

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, liability may be imposed upon any person who, acting under the color of state law, deprives another of federally protected rights. See Harrington v. Harris, 118 F.3d 359, 365 (5th Cir.1997), cert. denied522 U.S. 1016, 118 S.Ct. 603, 139 L.Ed.2d 491 (1997). A suit against a governmental agent or officer in his official capacity is a suit against the office that the employee holds and not against the actual employee. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985).

ANALYSIS

The Court notes that as an alleged probation violator, Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee during his incarceration at the HCADC. See Hamilton v. Lyons, 74 F.3d 99, 106 (5th Cir.1996). Pretrial detainees are protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than by the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Morrow v. Harwell, 768 F.2d 619, 625–6 (5th Cir.1985). The proper inquiry for determining whether the constitutional rights of a pretrial detainee have been violated “is whether conditions accompanying pretrial detention are imposed upon detainees for the purpose of punishment, as the due process clause does not permit punishment prior to an adjudication of guilt.” Cupit v. Jones, 835 F.2d 82, 85 (5th Cir.1987); see also Colle v. Brazos Cnty., TX, 981 F.2d 237, 244 (5th Cir.1993) (noting pretrial detainee's right to be free of punishment). If an adverse condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate governmental goal, that is, if it is arbitrary or purposeless, a court may infer that it is punitive. Grabowski v. Jackson Cnty. Public Defenders Office, 47 F.3d 1386, 1396 (5th Cir.1995). In his Complaint, Plaintiff contends that he was subjected to unconstitutional conditions because he was allegedly denied adequate medical treatment, and subjected to excessive force by Frye with the dog attack. [1, p. 4.]

The Supreme Court has stated the distinction between conditions that may be constitutionally imposed on convicted prisoners and conditions that may be imposed on pretrial detainees as follows:

[T]he State does not acquire the power to punish with which the Eighth Amendment is concerned until after it has secured a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law. Where the State seeks to impose punishment without such an adjudication, the pertinent constitutional guarantee is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671–2, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977) (emphasis added).

The Fourteenth Amendment protects pretrial detainees from the imposition of conditions of confinement that constitute “punishment.” Hamilton, 74 F.3d at 103. “Punishment” may be loosely defined as “a restriction or condition that is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal-if it is arbitrary or purposeless” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). “Reasonably related” means that the restriction is (1) rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose, and (2) not excessive in relation to that purpose. Id. at 561, 99 S.Ct. 1861. “[T]his test is deferential to jail rulemaking; it is in essence a rational basis test of the validity of jail rules.” Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 74 F.3d 633, 646 (5th Cir.1996); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992).

“Constitutional challenges by pretrial detainees may be brought under two alternative theories: as an attack on a ‘condition of confinement’ or as an ‘episodic act or omission.’ ” Shepherd v. Dallas Cnty., 591 F.3d 445, 452 (5th Cir.2009) (citing Hare, 74 F.3d at 644–5). “In an ‘episodic act or omission’ case, an actor usually is interposed between the detainee and the municipality, such that the detainee complains first of a particular act of, or omission by, the actor and then points derivatively to a policy, custom, or rule (or lack thereof) of the municipality that permitted or caused the act or omission.” Scott v. Moore, 114 F.3d 51, 53 (5th Cir.1997).

I. Claims Against Brisolara as Supervisor

Plaintiff asserts that the Defendants are liable in both their individual and official capacities for this alleged incident. [1.] Eason does not allege that Brisolara was personally involved in the incident at issue. “Supervisory officers cannot be held liable under Section 1983 for the actions of subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability.” Hampton v. Oktibbeha Cnty. Sheriff Dept., 480 F.3d 358, 365 (5th Cir.2007) (quoting Thibodeaux v. Arceneaux, 768 F.2d 737, 739 (5th Cir.1985)). Counties are liable for the constitutional violations committed by its employees such as Brisolara only when those violations result directly from a municipal custom or policy. Conner v. Travis Cnty., 209 F.3d 794, 796 (5th Cir.2000). Brisolara cannot be held liable for a claim under § 1983 based on the conduct of his subordinates. See Rios v. City of Del Rio, 444 F.3d 417, 425 (5th Cir.2006), cert. denied549 U.S. 825, 127 S.Ct. 181, 166 L.Ed.2d 43. A plaintiff must show either that the sheriff was personally involved in the constitutional violation or that there is a sufficient causal connection between the sheriff's conduct and the alleged constitutional violation. Id. The evidence in this case is that Brisolara was not personally involved in the incident involving the dog bite.

Eason also argues that Brisolara failed to supervise his employees, yet Eason provided no evidence in support of such a claim. See Thompson v. Upshur Cnty., 245 F.3d 447, 459 (5th Cir.2001) (explaining that supervisory liability under § 1983 requires proof that the supervisor failed to...