Papagolos v. Lafayette Cnty. Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 13 November 2013
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:11–CV–00158–GHD–SAA.
• Citation: 972 F.Supp.2d 912
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi
• Parties: Catherine PAPAGOLOS, Plaintiff v. LAFAYETTE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT; Michael McPhail, Board Member in His Official and Individual Capacities; and Jeff Nelson, Athletic Director, in His Official and Individual Capacities, Defendants.

972 F.Supp.2d 912

Catherine PAPAGOLOS, Plaintiff

v.LAFAYETTE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT; Michael McPhail, Board Member in His Official and Individual Capacities; and Jeff Nelson, Athletic Director, in His Official and Individual Capacities, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:11–CV–00158–GHD–SAA.

United States District Court,

N.D. Mississippi,

Oxford Division.

Sept. 16, 2013.

Opinion Amending on Reconsideration Nov. 13, 2013.

Joseph Robert Murray, II, Murray Law Firm, PLLC, Ripley, MS, for Plaintiff.

Richard Jarrad Garner, Benjamin B. Morgan, Adams and Reese LLP, Ridgeland, MS, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART ALL DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AND DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANTS' McPHAIL AND NELSON'S MOTION FOR QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

GLEN H. DAVIDSON, Senior District Judge.

Presently before the Court is a motion to dismiss [9] pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure filed by Defendants Lafayette County School District, Michael McPhail, and Jeff Nelson, as well as a motion for qualified immunity [13] filed by Defendants Michael McPhail and Jeff Nelson. Upon due consideration and for the reasons stated below, the Court finds that the motion to dismiss [9] filed by Defendants Lafayette County School District, Michael McPhail, and Jeff Nelson should be granted in part and denied in part, and that the motion for qualified immunity [13] filed by Defendants Michael McPhail and Jeff Nelson should be denied as moot.¹

A. Factual and Procedural Background

On December 13, 2011, Plaintiff Catherine Papagolos (“Plaintiff”), former head coach for the Lafayette County School District's girls' softball team and advanced fitness teacher, filed this action against Defendants Lafayette County School District (“LCSD”); Michael McPhail, a member of the LCSD school board (“Defendant McPhail”), in his individual and official capacities; and Jeff Nelson, athletic director of LCSD (“Defendant Nelson”), in his individual and official capacities. Plaintiff asserts causes of action for discrimination under Title IX; retaliation under Title IX; gender discrimination under Title VII; Equal Pay Act violations; age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (the “ADEA”); First Amendment free speech retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; First Amendment free speech violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Fourteenth Amendment procedural and substantive due process violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985; malicious interference with employment under state law; and wrongful termination under state law.

In lieu of answering the complaint, Defendants LCSD, McPhail, and Nelson have filed a motion to dismiss [9] under Rule 12(b)(6) challenging the viability of all claims asserted against LCSD except the Title IX claims and the Title VII claims, as well as the viability of all claims asserted against Defendants McPhail and Nelson in their individual and official capacities.

Additionally, Defendants McPhail and Nelson have filed a motion for qualified immunity [13] on the First Amendment free speech violation, First Amendment free speech retaliation, and Fourteenth Amendment due process violation claims under Section 1983, as well as the Section 1985 conspiracy claims of First Amendment free speech violation and equal protection violation. Because the Court finds that the Section 1983 and Section 1985 claims must be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court need not address the separate arguments for dismissal on qualified immunity grounds.

B. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard

Motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) “are viewed with disfavor and are rarely granted.” Kocurek v. Cuna Mut. Ins. Soc'y, 459 Fed.Appx. 371, 373 (5th Cir.2012) (citing Gregson v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 322 F.3d 883, 885 (5th Cir.2003)). “The ultimate question in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is whether the complaint states a valid claim when all well-pleaded facts are assumed true and are viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir.2010) (citing In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir.2007)).

The complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A claim is facially plausible when the pleaded factual content “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). “Under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, all well-pleaded facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, but plaintiffs must allege facts that support the elements of the cause of action in order to make out a valid claim.” Webb v. Morella, 522 Fed.Appx. 238, 241 (5th Cir.2013) (per curiam) (quoting City of Clinton, Ark. v. Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 632 F.3d 148, 152–53 (5th Cir.2010)). “[C]onclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.” Id. (quoting Fernandez–Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir.1993)). “Threadbare recitals of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. In a Rule 12(b)(6) determination, the court must not evaluate the likelihood of the claim's success, but instead ascertain whether the plaintiff has stated a legally cognizable claim that is plausible. Lone Star Fund, 594 F.3d at 387 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937).

C. Analysis and Discussion

1. Title IX Claims Against Defendants McPhail and Nelson

Defendants first challenge the viability of the Title IX claims asserted against Defendants McPhail and Nelson. Plaintiff concedes that she is not asserting her Title IX claims against Defendants McPhail and Nelson. See Pl.'s Mem. Br. Supp. Resp. Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. Dismiss [16] at 8. The Court thus finds that the Title IX claims against Defendants McPhail and Nelson shall be dismissed. In their Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Defendants do not challenge the Title IX claims brought against the LCSD. Thus, the Title IX claims against Defendants McPhail and Nelson shall be dismissed, but the Title IX claims against LCSD shall remain viable.

2. Title VII Claims Against Defendants McPhail and Nelson

Defendants next challenge the viability of the Title VII claims asserted against Defendants McPhail and Nelson. Plaintiff alleges under Title VII unlawful discharge based on gender discrimination and retaliation suffered for reporting discriminatory activity. Defendants contend that Title VII claims can only be made against an employer, and that because fellow employees are not subject to suit on Title VII, such claims must be dismissed against Defendants McPhail and Nelson. Plaintiff recognizes that this is a correct statement of the law as it pertains to gender and retaliation claims brought under Title VII, but argues that controlling Fifth Circuit precedent is erroneous. See id.The Court is bound by Fifth Circuit precedent and thus finds that Defendants' argument that the Title VII claims for gender discrimination and retaliation against Defendants McPhail and Nelson is well taken and such claims shall be dismissed. See, e.g., Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 652 (5th Cir.1994) (“The definition of the term ‘employer’ in [42 U.S.C.] § 2000e(b) does not include individuals who do not otherwise qualify as employers under the statute.”). Defendants do not challenge the Title VII claims brought against the LCSD. Thus, although the Title VII claims for gender discrimination and retaliation against Defendants McPhail and Nelson shall be dismissed, the Title VII claims for gender discrimination and retaliation against LCSD shall remain viable.

3. Equal Pay Act Violation Claim Against Defendants McPhail and Nelson

Defendants next challenge the viability of the Equal Pay Act violation claim asserted against Defendants McPhail and Nelson. Defendants contend that such claim must be dismissed against Defendants McPhail and Nelson, as Defendants McPhail and Nelson are not employers for purposes of the Equal Pay Act, which imposes liability only on employers for gender-based salary discrepancies. For the reasons stated below, the Court finds this argument is well taken.

The United States Supreme Court has stated

Title VII and the Equal Pay Act primarily govern relations between employees and their employer, not between employees and third parties. We do not suggest, of course, that an employer can avoid his responsibilities by delegating discriminatory programs to corporate shells.... [T]he Equal Pay Act applies to “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).

City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 718 n. 33, 98 S.Ct. 1370, 55 L.Ed.2d 657 (1978). To determine whether an employer/employee relationship exists, the Fifth Circuit utilizes the “economic reality” test. Gray v. Powers, 673 F.3d 352, 354–55 (5th Cir.2012); see Williams v. Henagan, 595 F.3d 610, 620 (5th Cir.2010); Watson v. Graves, 909 F.2d 1549, 1553 (5th Cir.1990); see also Goldberg v. Whitaker House Co-op., 366 U.S. 28, 33, 81 S.Ct. 933, 6 L.Ed.2d 100 (1961).

In the economic reality test, the Court must consider whether the alleged employer “(1) possessed the power to hire and fire the employees, (2) supervised and controlled employee work schedules or conditions of employment, (3) determined the rate and method of payment, and (4) maintained employment records.” Gray, 673 F.3d at 355 (quoting Williams, 595 F.3d at 620). “Under that test, the right to control the details and means by which the work is to be performed is the most important factor.”...