Port Authority Police Benev. Ass'n, Inc. v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey Police Dept., s. 91-5921

• Citation: 973 F.2d 169
• Decision Date: 07 August 1992
• Docket Number: Nos. 91-5921,91-5922,s. 91-5921
• Parties: PORT AUTHORITY POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC.; John Trotter, Ltd., a New York Corporation, v. PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY POLICE DEPARTMENT; Port Authority of New York and New Jersey; Charles Knox, as Superintendent of Police of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, John Trotter, Ltd., Appellant in 91-5921, Port Authority Police Benevolent Association, Inc., Appellant in 91-5922.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)

Page 169

973 F.2d 169

PORT AUTHORITY POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC.; John

Trotter, Ltd., a New York Corporation, v. PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY POLICE DEPARTMENT;

Port Authority of New York and New Jersey;

Charles Knox, as Superintendent of

Police of the Port Authority

of New York and New Jersey,

John Trotter, Ltd., Appellant in 91-5921,

Port Authority Police Benevolent Association, Inc.,

Appellant in 91-5922.

Nos. 91-5921, 91-5922.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued May 18, 1992.

Decided Aug. 7, 1992.

Joseph B. Fiorenzo (argued), Sokol, Behot and Fiorenzo, Hackensack, N.J., for appellant John Trotter, Ltd.

Philip P. Scalo, Fort Lee, N.J., for appellant Port Authority Police Benev. Ass'n, Inc.

Donald F. Burke (argued), Hugh H. Welsh, Arthur P. Berg, Tirza S. Wahrman, Newark, N.J., for appellees Port Authority Police Dept. and Knox.

Before: HUTCHINSON, COWEN and GARTH, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

GARTH, Circuit Judge:

On this appeal, we review the district court's order which dismissed, on Younger abstention grounds, the complaint of the Port Authority Police Benevolent Association ("PBA") and Trotter, a fundraising organization employed by the PBA. In their complaint, the PBA and Trotter had, essentially, requested the district court to review the order of a New York state trial court. The order of the New York state court had enjoined the PBA and Trotter from soliciting contributions from Port Authority tenants.

Because the requirements for Younger abstention are satisfied in this case, and because federal district courts may not exercise appellate jurisdiction over orders issued by state courts, we will affirm the district court's dismissal of the complaint of the PBA and Trotter. ¹

I.

The PBA, a non-profit organization of police officers employed by the New York/New Jersey Port Authority, hired Trotter, a fundraising organization, to solicit contributions. Trotter commenced solicitations on PBA's behalf in January 1991.

Soon thereafter, Donald Lee, the Acting Director of the Port Authority's Public Safety Department, requested the PBA and Trotter to halt its solicitation of donations. Lee based his directive on the Port Authority's General Rules and Regulations, which prohibit unauthorized solicitations by Port Authority employees of Port Authority tenants. The relevant Rule provided in pertinent part:

No employee shall, without the express written approval of the Office of the Executive Director, solicit or accept from any Port Authority patron, tenant or other person doing business with the Port Authority, either for himself or any organization or group, any of the following: a contribution, gift, subscription, or other thing of value--either directly or through the medium of tickets to benefits or other functions, advertising space in programs, or any device whatever. Application for this approval is made through the Personnel Department. Application from departmental organizations must first pass through department channels.

Port Authority Instruction 15-5.01. The PBA, however, rejected Mr. Lee's request and continued to solicit contributions from Port Authority tenants in violation of the Port Authority's Rules and Regulations.

On June 12, 1991, the Port Authority, seeking to enjoin further solicitations of contributions from Port Authority tenants by the PBA and Trotter, filed a complaint and order to show cause in the Supreme Court of New York, New York County. On July 3, 1991, the PBA filed papers in opposition to the Port Authority's request for injunctive relief. In their papers, the PBA argued that its solicitation of donations constituted protected speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and that the Port Authority's rules regulating solicitation of tenants by Port Authority employees therefore violated the PBA's First Amendment rights.

On July 12, 1991, Judge Tompkins of the New York Supreme Court granted the Port Authority's requested preliminary injunction against PBA and Trotter. The judge enjoined the PBA and Trotter from:

soliciting funds of any kind, including but not limited to, contributions or donations for a PBA Yearbook and Buyers' Guide from Port Authority tenants, patrons, or other persons doing business with the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey....

(A. 23a). On July 23, 1991, the PBA filed a timely notice of appeal to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York from the trial court's grant of a preliminary injunction.

On September 16, 1991, the PBA and Trotter filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, seeking a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction which would enjoin the Port Authority from enforcing its regulation prohibiting employee solicitations. The PBA and Trotter raised the same constitutional argument that the PBA had previously raised unsuccessfully in the New York state court. At a September 17, 1991 hearing before the district court, Trotter's counsel conceded that an injunction against the Port Authority would, if granted, effectively enjoin the enforcement of the earlier order of the New York state court which had entered a preliminary injunction against the PBA and Trotter:

THE COURT: The application you have made to the Court in effect is to enjoin the enforcement of a State Court preliminary injunction. That is really what you are looking for, is it not?

COUNSEL FOR TROTTER: That is the net effect of the ruling, and there is no question about it.

(A. 72-73).

At the September 17, 1991 hearing, the district court denied the motion of the PBA and Trotter for a temporary restraining order. The district court noted that the PBA and Trotter had been on notice since January, 1991 that their conduct violated the Port Authority's internal rules, and that their "dilatoriness in asserting their rights was inconsistent with their allegation of irreparable harm." (A. 121).

On October 11, 1991, the district court, citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), abstained from exercising jurisdiction over the PBA's complaint. The court held that an exercise of federal jurisdiction over the PBA's complaint would unnecessarily interfere with New York State's substantial interest in enforcing the New York state court order which had enjoined the PBA from soliciting Port Authority tenants.

PBA and Trotter filed a timely notice of appeal from the district court's decision to abstain from exercising jurisdiction.

II.

We review for abuse of discretion the district court's decision to abstain from exercising jurisdiction. However, the district court's discretion to abstain is quite narrow, and is limited to those cases that meet the abstention requirements established by the Supreme Court. See United Services Auto. Ass'n v. Muir, 792 F.2d 356, 361 (3d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S 1031, 107 S.Ct. 875, 93 L.Ed.2d 830 (1987) ("[A] district court has little or no discretion to abstain in a case that does not meet traditional abstention requirements.").

III.

A.

In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), the Supreme Court held that principles of federalism and comity require district courts to abstain from enjoining pending state criminal proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances. Younger thus significantly limited the power of the federal courts to interfere with state judicial proceedings. The Supreme Court has since expanded the reach of this doctrine such that federal courts now must also abstain from enjoining, explicitly or implicitly, state civil proceedings that implicate important state interests. See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987); Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 97 S.Ct. 1211, 51 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977).

On the basis of the Supreme Court's analysis in Middlesex, we have articulated three requirements which must be met before a federal court may properly invoke the Younger abstention doctrine:

(1) there are ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims.

Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 106 (3d Cir.1989). Whenever all three of these requirements are satisfied, abstention is appropriate absent a showing of bad faith prosecution, harassment, or a patently unconstitutional rule that will cause irreparable injury to the plaintiff. See id.

Application of the three Middlesex requirements to the facts in the present case demonstrates that the district court properly exercised its discretion in abstaining from exercising jurisdiction over the complaint of the PBA and Trotter. First, proceedings are pending in New York on the very issue raised by the PBA and Trotter in their district court complaint. The PBA and Trotter wish to argue in federal court, as they did before the New York state court, that the Port Authority regulation prohibiting unauthorized solicitations by Port Authority employees of Port Authority tenants violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. This constitutional argument, raised by the PBA and Trotter in their federal complaint, was resolved by the New York state court in its order granting a preliminary injunction to the Port Authority. That preliminary injunction order is currently being appealed within the New York state court system. Because litigation is currently pending in the New York state court concerning the very same parties and the very same issues as in the present federal suit, the first requirement for Younger abstention--ongoing state proceedings of a judicial nature--is satisfied in the present case. ²

Similarly, the PBA and Trotter had, and continue to have, an...