Jackson v. City of Columbus
| Citation | 67 F.Supp.2d 839 |
| Decision Date | 28 July 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. C2-97-1113.,C2-97-1113. |
| Parties | James G. JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF COLUMBUS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
William C. Wilkinson, Thompson, Hine & Flory, Columbus, OH, for plaintiff.
Defendant City of Columbus, Glenn S. Redick, Assistant City Attorney, Columbus, OH, Defendant Gregory Lashutka, John R. Gall, Squire Sanders & Dempsey, Columbus, OH, Defendant Thomas W. Rice, Sr., Kathleen M. Trafford, Columbus, OH, for defendants.
This is an action filed by plaintiff James G. Jackson, Chief of the Columbus, Ohio Division of Police, against the city of Columbus, Ohio, Gregory S. Lashutka, Mayor of the city of Columbus, and Thomas W. Rice, Sr., Director of Public Safety. Plaintiff alleges that the defendants deprived him of various constitutional rights during the course of a mayoral investigation into allegations of misconduct on the part of plaintiff in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, § 1985(3) and the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Plaintiff, who is African-American, further alleges that the defendants discriminated against him on the basis of race in matters relating to the terms and conditions of his employment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Plaintiff also asserts claims under the Ohio Constitution, Ohio Revised Code Chapter 4112 and Ohio tort law.
This matter is before the court on the motions of the defendants to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted. A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim only where it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). The court must construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) will be granted if the complaint is without merit due to an absence of law to support a claim of the type made or of facts sufficient to make a valid claim, or where the face of the complaint reveals that there is an insurmountable bar to relief. Rauch v. Day & Night Mfg. Corp., 576 F.2d 697 (6th Cir.1978).
A complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations with respect to all material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory. Weiner v. Klais & Co., Inc., 108 F.3d 86, 88 (6th Cir.1997). The court is not required to accept as true unwarranted legal conclusions or factual inferences. Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10 (6th Cir.1987).
The first issue before the court is whether certain documents attached to defendant Rice's motion to dismiss may be considered in ruling on the motions to dismiss. As a general rule, matters outside the pleadings may not be considered in ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss unless the motion is converted to one for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Weiner, 108 F.3d at 88. However, there are exceptions to this rule. Documents attached to a motion to dismiss are considered a part of the pleadings if they are referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to the plaintiff's claim. Id. at 89; Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453-454 (9th Cir.1994)(deposition and affidavit properly considered where complaint refers to document and authenticity of exhibits is not questioned); Teagardener v. Republic-Franklin Inc. Pension Plan, 909 F.2d 947 (6th Cir.1990)(pension plan properly considered). A court may consider an undisputedly authentic document attached to a motion to dismiss if plaintiff's claims are based on the document. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. White Consolidated Industries, Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir.1993).
Courts may also consider public records, including court records in related cases, see In Re American Continental Corp./Lincoln Sav. & Loan Securities Litigation, 102 F.3d 1524 (9th Cir.1996) rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes and Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 118 S.Ct. 956, 140 L.Ed.2d 62 (1998); Henson v. CSC Credit Services, 29 F.3d 280 (7th Cir.1994); or letter decisions of government agencies and published reports of administrative bodies, see White Consolidated Industries, 998 F.2d at 1197; Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors, Inc., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir.1986). Courts may also consider matters of which they may take judicial notice. Lovelace v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 78 F.3d 1015, 1018 (5th Cir.1996) ()
The above exceptions for documents of undisputed authenticity, official public records, documents central to plaintiff's claim, or documents sufficiently referred to in the complaint are recognized because in such cases, the problem of lack of notice to the plaintiff is abated and the necessity for the conversion of the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment is dissipated. Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1993).
Exhibit 1 to defendant Rice's motion to dismiss is the December 30, 1996 decision of the Columbus Municipal Civil Service Commission. This decision is a matter of public record and was referred to in plaintiff's amended complaint, and this document may properly be considered a part of the pleadings. Exhibit 6 is a copy of the Rules and Regulations of the Municipal Civil Service Commission, of which this court may take judicial notice. Exhibit 7 is a petition for writ of mandamus filed by plaintiff in the Franklin County Court of Appeals. It is a public record in a related case which may be considered on a motion to dismiss. Exhibit 9 is a letter which is also attached to the amended complaint as Exhibit A, and it is therefore properly before the court. The court will not consider Exhibits 2 through 5, 8 and 10, as these exhibits have not been sufficiently authenticated or shown to be public records.
Plaintiff alleges in his amended complaint that on October 10, 1996, he was suspended from his position and reassigned to his home pending a mayoral investigation into allegations of misconduct on his part. Plaintiff alleges that following this suspension, Deputy Chief Kern, who is white, was appointed by defendant Rice as acting Chief of Police. Plaintiff contends that defendants Rice and Lashutka conspired to remove plaintiff from his position because of plaintiff's race, African-American. Plaintiff further alleges that he was instructed in letters from defendant Rice dated October 10, 1996 (the so-called "gag" and "banishment" orders) not to discuss the investigation with the media and not to enter his office or any city facilities while the investigation was pending. Plaintiff alleges that he was instructed not to talk to the media because defendant Rice did not want plaintiff to raise the issue of his race during the investigation. Plaintiff further alleges that following his suspension, his office was searched.
Plaintiff further alleges that after being advised by City Attorney Ron O'Brien that the plaintiff's reassignment to his residence constituted a "suspension" which triggered the requirement for referring charges to the Civil Service Commission, defendant Rice advised plaintiff by letter dated October 14, 1996 that he was being assigned to perform his duties as Chief of Police at the administrative offices of the Columbus Division of Fire. Plaintiff was instructed in this letter not to enter any police facilities without the prior approval of defendant Rice.
The amended complaint further indicates that after October 10, 1996, plaintiff used his accrued vacation time while contesting defendants' actions. On November 29, 1996, plaintiff was formally suspended for alleged incompetence, gross neglect of duty or other just cause for violation of the laws of the state of Ohio, the city of Columbus, and the rules of the Columbus Division of Police, Department of Public Safety. Pursuant to Section 107 of the Columbus City Charter and Rule XIII of the Columbus Municipal Civil Service Commission, a number of charges were referred to the Commission for review. These allegations included plaintiff's failure to impose fair discipline in the case of Commander Walter Burns regarding Burns's handling of a prostitution investigation, plaintiff's failure to efficiently manage the operations of the vice bureau, plaintiff's failure to maintain police records concerning a homicide investigation and the Burns prostitution investigation, plaintiff's use of his position to influence hiring decisions for friends and family, and plaintiff's failure to protect the integrity of the division of police. On December 30, 1996, the Commission rendered a decision finding that two of the charges against plaintiff had been proved, and dismissing the remainder of the charges. The Commission sustained Charge I, concerning plaintiff's deviation from disciplinary procedures in the investigation into Commander Burns's conduct, and Charge II, Specification 1, relating to the destruction of police records in a homicide investigation. The Commission imposed a sanction of a five-day suspension without pay or the forfeiture of five vacation days on these two charges. Plaintiff does not challenge the November 29, 1996 suspension or the decision of the Commission.
Plaintiff further alleges...
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