Pinigis v. Regions Bank
Decision Date | 06 July 2007 |
Docket Number | No. 1060474.,1060474. |
Citation | 977 So.2d 446 |
Parties | Elisa Simmons PINIGIS, as executrix of the estate of Doris Porter Coyle, deceased v. REGIONS BANK. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
John W. Haley, Bruce J. McKee, and S. Hughston Nichols of Hare, Wynn, Newell & Newton, L.L.P., Birmingham, for appellant.
Laurence J. McDuff of Adams & Reese, LLP, Birmingham, for appellee.
Elisa Simmons Pinigis, as executrix of the estate of Doris Porter Coyle, deceased, appeals from a summary judgment for Regions Bank ("the Bank") in her action against the Bank for its payment of allegedly unauthorized checks drawn on Coyle's account. We affirm.
This is Pinigis's second appeal from a summary judgment in favor of the Bank. See Pinigis v. Regions Bank, 942 So.2d 841 (Ala.2006) ("Pinigis I"). The facts underlying this dispute are fully developed in that case and will not be repeated here. In Pinigis I, we reversed a partial summary judgment for the Bank, which had been granted on the ground that "the Bank `was not given any specific notification of the unauthorized signatures on checks until the instant lawsuit was filed ... almost nine months after the last unauthorized check was written.'" 942 So.2d at 844. Applying Ala.Code 1975, § 7-4-406(f), the trial court had held that "Pinigis could not `hold the [B]ank liable for checks paid by the [B]ank more than 180 days prior to discovery and reporting.'" 942 So.2d at 844. Section 7-4-406 provides:
(Emphasis added.)
In her first appeal, Pinigis relied in part on the fact that the Bank, in its answer, had asserted that "`[t]he plaintiffs claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations.'" 942 So.2d at 844. She objected to the Bank's reliance on § 7-4-406(f) as a basis for a summary judgment, arguing that the notice provision in § 7-4-406(f) "is not a statute of limitations, but is, in fact, a statute of repose." 942 So.2d at 846. She contended that "`[a] statute of repose, such as § 7-4-406(f), is an [affirmative defense],' which the Bank was required to include in its answer, or it was waived." 942 So.2d at 844. Thus, because the Bank had described its defense as a statute of limitations, rather than as a statute of repose, Pinigis argued, the Bank's answer was insufficient to preserve a defense based on § 7-4-406(f). We agreed with Pinigis that in pleading a statute of limitations, the Bank had not pleaded a statute of repose, and we reversed the summary judgment on the sole ground that the Bank had waived reliance on Ala. Code 1975, § 7-4-406(f), by failing to plead it in its answer.
Following the release of our opinion in Pinigis I, the Bank was allowed to amend its answer and specifically to plead § 7-4-406(f) as an affirmative defense. It then renewed its summary-judgment motion, asserting, once again, that "the customer's failure to notify the Bank in a timely fashion precludes recovery under Ala.Code § 7-4-406(f)." Again, the trial court granted the Bank's motion, and Pinigis appeals.
In this appeal, Pinigis urges us to adopt a bad-faith exception to the notice requirement of § 7-4-406(f). She contends that a bank customer's failure to satisfy the 180-day notice requirement in § 7-4-406(f) bars an action against the bank to recover funds paid over an "unauthorized signature or alteration" only if the bank paid the checks in good faith. In the words of Pinigis: Pinigis's reply brief, at 1 (emphasis added).1
"Ordinarily, this Court reviews a summary judgment de novo." Verneuille v. Buchanan Lumber of Mobile, Inc., 914 So.2d 822, 824 (Ala.2005). In this case, our review is de novo for the additional reason that the dispositive issue is a pure question of law regarding statutory construction. Holsbrooks v. Stacy, 830 So.2d 708, 710 (Ala.2002). The question is one of first impression in Alabama, and, for that matter, in nearly every other state, which, like Alabama, has adopted some version of the Uniform Commercial Code, § 4-406, as revised in 1990. See generally A. Brooke Overby, Check Fraud in the Courts After the Revisions to U.C.C. Articles 3 and 4, 57 Ala. L.Rev. 351, 351 (2005) ( ). We begin where we left off in Pinigis I.
In Pinigis I, we explained that § 7-4-406(f) is variously regarded as a "statutory `non-claim provision,'" 942 So.2d at 847 ( ), or a "`statute[] of repose.'" Id. ( ). "While equitable principles may extend the time for commencing an action under statutes of limitation, nonclaim statutes impose a condition precedent to the enforcement of a right of action and are not subject to equitable exceptions." Estate of Decker v. Farm Credit Servs. of Mid-America, ACA 684 N.E.2d 1137, 1139 (Ind.1997). Similarly, "statutes of repose, unlike statutes of limitations, are not subject to equitable tolling, even under `compelling circumstances,'" Perryman, supra, at 594 n. 86 (quoting Siecinski v. First State Bank of E. Detroit, 209 Mich.App. 459, 464, 531 N.W.2d 768, 770 (1995)).
These authorities accurately describe the concept of a rule of repose in Alabama. The general 20-year rule of repose, for example, "is based solely upon the passage of time," and is "`not affected by the circumstances of the situation, by personal disabilities, or by whether prejudice has resulted or evidence obscured,'" nor is it "based upon concepts of accrual, notice, or discovery." Ex parte Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 825 So.2d 758, 764 (Ala.2002) (quoting Boshell...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 2160823
...payments for time lost and payments for personal injury are included in that definition. 287 So. 3d at 341-47.In Pinigis v. Regions Bank, 977 So.2d 446, 450–52 (Ala. 2007), our supreme court observed, with regard to statutory construction:"We note that ‘[t]he intent of the Legislature is th......
-
Weldon v. Ballow
...beyond just the capacity of the custodial parent or parents to make decisions for the benefit of the child. See Pinigis v. Regions Bank, 977 So.2d 446, 450–51 (Ala.2007) (holding that the polestar of statutory construction is legislative intent as gleaned from the unambiguous language emplo......
-
Ankrom v. State
...to engage in such a review because we hold that § 26–15–3.2(a)(1), Ala.Code 1975, is unambiguous on its face. See Pinigis v. Regions Bank, 977 So.2d 446, 451 (Ala.2007) (holding that “courts may examine extrinsic materials, including legislative history, to determine [legislative] intent” o......
-
Billingsley v. State
...this Court can “ ‘examine extrinsic materials, including legislative history, to determine [legislative] intent.’ ” Pinigis v. Regions Bank, 977 So.2d 446, 451 (Ala.2007) (quoting Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta v. Thomas, 220 F.3d 1235, 1239 (11th Cir.2000)). The legislative history of thi......