People v. Raffington

• Decision Date: 14 July 1950
• Docket Number: Cr. 4441
• Parties: PEOPLE v. RAFFINGTON.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 967

220 P.2d 967

98 Cal.App.2d 455

PEOPLE v. RAFFINGTON.

Cr. 4441.

District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

July 14, 1950.

Hearing Denied Aug. 10, 1950.

Gladys Towles Root, Los Angeles, for appellant.

Fred N. Howser, Atty. Gen., Dan Kaufmann, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.

WILSON, Justice.

Defendant was accused by an information in one count of attempted abortion and in a second count of abortion. Another information was filed charging him with an additional crime of abortion. The cases were consolidated for trial and a jury found him guilty on all three counts. He was sentenced to the state prison on each count and has appealed from the judgments. ¹

Defendant contends that his constitutional rights have been infringed, asserting he was denied due process of law and his privileges and immunities were abridged in that: (1) he was charged by an information filed by the district attorney and not by indictment of the grand jury, and (2) that as to count 2 the testimony of witnesses given at his preliminary examination who were not available at the time of trial was read to the jury over his objection. In connection with the latter ground defendant contends that part of subdivision 3 of section 686 of the Penal Code permitting the reading of such testimony is unconstitutional.

These questions have long since been determined adversely to defendant's contention. Neither the Fifth Amendment, Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 49, 67 S.Ct. 1672, 1674, ff., 91 L.Ed. 1903, 1907, 171 A.L.R. 1223, nor the Sixth Amendment, West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258, 262, 24 S.Ct. 650, 48 L.Ed. 965, 969, nor any other provision of the Bill of Rights, Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 26, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 93 L.Ed. 1782, 1784, places restrictions upon the states in the prosecution of criminal cases. The words 'due process of law' in the Fourteenth Amendment do not require an indictment by a grand jury in a prosecution by a state for a felony and a conviction upon an information filed by the district attorney does not deprive a defendant of life, liberty or property without due process of law, Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538, 4 S.Ct. 111, 292, 28 L.Ed. 232, 239, nor are the privileges and immunities of a citizen abridged by a state law providing for prosecution under an information instead of by indictment by a grand jury. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 587, 20 S.Ct. 448, 44 L.Ed. 597, 599.

Due process of law is not denied by the introduction of the deposition of a witness taken upon the preliminary examination before a committing magistrate in the presence of the defendant where he cross-examined or had the opportunity of cross-examining the witness when such witness is absent from the state or the prosecutor has been unable to procure his attendance. West v. Louisiana, supra; People v. Schwarz, 78 Cal.App. 561, 579, 248 P. 990; People v. Wilson, 26 Cal.App. 336, 338, 146 P. 1048; People v. Hermes, 73 Cal.App.2d 947, 955, 168 P.2d 44; People v. Valdez, 82 Cal.App.2d 744, 749, 187 P.2d 74.

Defendant does not claim he did not cross-examine or at least have the opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses at the preliminary examination. The foundation for the reading of the evidence was sufficiently laid. A witness testified that she was in Minnesota three weeks prior to the trial where she talked to one of the absent witnesses on the telephone and personally saw the other. One of them said she might return to California after the following Christmas but did not know whether she would or not. The other witness did not state when he expected to return, if at all.

The witnesses had appeared when the case was first set for trial and had been instructed to return on the day to which it was continued. In violation of this instruction they departed and remained absent from the state. The prosecution was unable to compel them to return and could not be charged with lack of diligence in procuring their attendance at the trial. Defendant did not offer any evidence to refute that which was offered by the prosecution concerning the absence of the witnesses. In these circumstances the court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the reading of the evidence given at the preliminary examination by the absent witnesses.

Whether it is satisfactorily shown that a witness cannot with due diligence be found within the state is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court from the evidence introduced and an appellate court will not interfere unless there has been an abuse of discretion in holding that due diligence had been used. People v. Stewart, 91 Cal.App.2d 675, 676, 205 P.2d 412; People v. Bernstein, 70 Cal.App.2d 462, 468, 161 P.2d 381; People v. Wohnon, 61 Cal.App.2d 782, 786, 144 P.2d 100; People v. Centers, 56 Cal.App.2d 631, 633-634, 133 P.2d 29; People v. Cavazos, 25 Cal.2d 198, 201, 153 P.2d 177; People v. Hermes, supra.

Contrary to defendant's contention, the evidence is sufficient to sustain the verdict and judgment upon all three counts. As to count one, attempted abortion, a man and woman, operatives of the State Medical Board, visited defendant at his office, told him they were husband and wife and that the woman was pregnant. They discussed the cost of the operation and the manner in which defendant would perform it, whether by a jelly injection or 'D and C.' Upon their objection to the price of $150 named by defendant, he stated he had performed an operation on another woman on the same morning for which he had been paid $600, and showed them cards bearing the names of other girls whom he had aborted. The parties returned on a later date when they handed defendant three $50 bills. He placed the woman on the table, sterilized his instruments and prepared materials for use, which he said would produce an abortion within 24 hours. He manipulated the woman's abdomen, whereupon, by prearranged signal, other officers entered the room. Defendant stated, 'You haven't anything on me, I haven't done a pelvic.' On demand he removed the three $50 bills from his pocket and handed them to one of the officers. The serial numbers of the bills corresponded with those on the money handed to defendant before he began his preparations. One of the officers called defendant's attention to jars of materials and instruments and asked defendant if he was preparing to use them on the woman and he answered in the affirmative.

Section 274 of the Penal Code as originally enacted in 1872 and in effect until 1935 read: 'Every person who provides, supplies, or administers to any [pregnant] woman, or procures any [such] woman to take any medicine, drug, or substance, or uses or employs any instrument or other means whatever, with intent thereby to procure the miscarriage of such woman, unless the same is necessary to preserve her life, is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not less than two nor more than five years.' The words 'pregnant' and 'such' enclosed in brackets in the above-quoted section were deleted by the amendment enacted in 1935. Stats. 1935, ch. 528, p. 1605. Prior to that year proof of pregnancy of the woman operated upon was necessary. People v. DeVaughan, 105 Cal.App. 516, 518, 288 P. 113. It is no longer necessary since the 1935 amendment to prove the pregnancy of the woman upon whom the operation was performed. People v. Ramsey, 83 Cal.App.2d 707, 717, 189 P.2d 802. Evidence of the intent of the accused to procure a miscarriage when not necessary to preserve the woman's life satisfies the requirement of the statute. Defendant's criminal intent is amply established by the foregoing evidence of his acts and admissions.

Defendant's contention that he was entrapped is not sustained by the evidence. Entrapment is available as a defense when the criminal design originates with the officer who, by persuasion or deceit, entices a law-abiding citizen to commit a crime which he would not have committed in the absence of such inducement. People v. Makovsky, 3 Cal.2d 366, 369, 44 P.2d 536. There is no evidence that defendant was lured into the attempt to commit a criminal offense by persuasion or inducement. The conversation was between persons who professed to desire the abortion to be performed and defendant, willing to perform upon the payment of his requested fee. In such case enticement or entrapment is not available as a defense. People v. Cherry, 39 Cal.App.2d 149, 153, 102 P.2d 546; People v. Kennedy, 66 Cal.App.2d 522, 523, 152 P.2d 513. In the instant case defendant had in his office all the instrumentalities with which abortions are produced. He described another abortion he had performed on the same day and stated the amount paid to him for the operation. He placed the woman operative on the table, palpated her abdomen, sterilized his instruments, and prepared to apply aborticides to her. By his own statements he was habitually engaged in the unlawful enterprise. In his own mind he was ready and willing to commit the crime and only awaited the opportunity and payment of his fee to make use of the appliances which he possessed, ready for use whenever called upon.

The overt acts of defendant above described are sufficient to sustain the verdict of guilty of the charge of attempted abortion. Whenever the design of a person to commit a crime is clearly shown, slight acts...