Dreher v. Columbia Mills Co.

• Decision Date: 07 February 1919
• Docket Number: 10157.
• Citation: 98 S.E. 194,111 S.C. 457
• Parties: DREHER ET AL. v. COLUMBIA MILLS CO.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

98 S.E. 194

111 S.C. 457

DREHER ET AL. v. COLUMBIA MILLS CO.

No. 10157.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

February 7, 1919

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Richland County; M. S Whaley, Judge.

Action by Mamie Dreher and her husband against the Columbia Mills Company. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Wm Elliott and James H. Fowles, both of Columbia, for appellant.

A. W Holman and A. F. Spigner, both of Columbia, for respondents.

FRASER J.

There was evidence that the plaintiff was going along Gist street in the city of Columbia; that Gist street ran through the yard of the defendant mills company; that the street had gates at both the entrance into and exit of the street from the mill yard; that the gate of entrance was open; that as the plaintiff was going through the gate a watchman of the defendant said to the plaintiff, "You can't go through there;" that plaintiff asked permission to go far enough to turn round, and that another watchman ran up brandishing a stick, and ordered the plaintiff to go back; that the second watchman came so close to the horse and used such threatening gestures that it frightened the horse, and it went backwards out of the gate and ran the wagon off of the street and down the embankment, whereby the plaintiff sustained serious injuries. Much of this was denied, but this court cannot consider the preponderance of the testimony.

The defendant made a motion for the direction of a verdict on the ground that there has been no negligence of any agent of the defendant acting within the scope of his authority. The motion was refused, and this refusal constitutes the first exception. The second watchman, Mr. Spigner, said:

"I am employed as watchman at the Columbia Mills, and it is my duty to stop all from coming into the millyard, except employés of the mill."

There is testimony, therefore, that the watchman was acting in the line of employment. Now, did Mr. Spigner wave the stick at the horse? Did he wave it close enough to the horse to frighten him? Was it negligence to do so, in view of the fact that there was a dangerous excavation just in the rear of the wagon? All of these questions were for the jury, and we cannot set aside their findings. This exception cannot be sustained.

The second exception is as follows:

"His honor erred when he charged the jury that if the plaintiff had acquired the right to go upon the defendant's

...