Allah v. Milling

• Decision Date: 19 November 2013
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:11CV668(SRU).
• Citation: 982 F.Supp.2d 172
• Parties: Almighty Supreme Born ALLAH, Plaintiff, v. Lynn MILLING, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

982 F.Supp.2d 172

Almighty Supreme Born ALLAH, Plaintiff,

v.Lynn MILLING, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 3:11CV668(SRU).

United States District Court,

D. Connecticut.

Nov. 19, 2013.

Almighty Supreme Born Allah, Hartford, CT, pro se.

Steven M. Barry, Office of the Attorney General, Hartford, CT, for Defendants.

RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

STEFAN R. UNDERHILL, District Judge.

Plaintiff Almighty Supreme Born Allah (“Allah”) was incarcerated at Garner Correctional Institution (“Garner”) when he commenced this civil rights action pro se pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Allah's complaint names Director of Offender Classification and Population Management Lynn Milling, Counselor Supervisor Griggs, Warden Quiros, Captain Cahill, Deputy Wardens Powers and Faucher, District Administrator Michael Lajoie and Deputy Commissioner Dzurenda as defendants. Allah is now living in New Britain, Connecticut.

On August 16, 2011, the court dismissed the claims for monetary damages against all defendants in their official capacities. The court concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claims and the Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claims should proceed against the defendants in their individual capacities. The defendants have moved for summary judgment on some of the remaining claims against them. For the reasons that follow, the defendants' motion is denied.

I. Standard of Review

With a motion for summary judgment, the burden is on the moving party to establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The moving party may satisfy this burden by demonstrating the lack of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. PepsiCo, Inc. v. Coca–Cola Co., 315 F.3d 101, 105 (2d Cir.2002) (per curiam).

“Summary judgment is appropriate where, construing all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,” Pabon v. Wright, 459 F.3d 241, 247 (2d Cir.2006), “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2). An issue of fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,” and is “genuine” if “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party” based on it. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. “Unsupported allegations do not create a material issue of fact.” Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 41 (2d Cir.2000).

When a motion for summary judgment is supported by documentary evidence and sworn affidavits, the nonmoving party must do more than vaguely assert the existence of some unspecified disputed material facts or present mere speculation or conjecture. See Western World Ins. Co. v. Stack Oil, Inc., 922 F.2d 118, 121 (2d Cir.1990) (quotations and citations omitted). The mere of existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party's position is insufficient; there must be evidence sufficient to permit the jury to reasonably find for him. See Dawson v. County of Westchester, 373 F.3d 265, 272 (2d Cir.2004). If there is any evidence in the record from which a reasonable factual inference could be drawn in favor of the opposing party on the issue on which summary judgment is sought, summary judgment is improper. See Security Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Old Dominion Freight Line Inc., 391 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir.2004).

Where one party is proceeding pro se, the court reads the pro se party's papers liberally and interprets them to raise the strongest arguments suggested therein. See Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir.1994). Despite this liberal interpretation, however, an unsupported assertion cannot overcome a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Carey v. Crescenzi, 923 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir.1991).

II. Facts¹

In December 2009, Allah was incarcerated at Carl Robinson Correctional Institution(“Carl Robinson”), which is an open dormitory-style correctional facility. Allah was confined in Dormitory Five. There were approximately eighty inmates in Allah's dormitory who were supervised by two correctional officers. There were no cells in the dormitory. Prison officials at Carl Robinson considered any demonstration involving several inmates uniting to challenge staff conduct as a potentially dangerous situation. Past mass demonstrations by inmates at Carl Robinson have led to violent situations during which inmates and prison staff were seriously injured or killed.

During the holiday season every fall and winter, correctional officials at Carl Robinson permit inmates who are not on restrictive status to visit the commissary to purchase items, including food and cosmetic products, that may not be offered for sale during the rest of the year. A “holiday package” consists of an inmate's opportunity to go to the commissary to purchase the items that are only available during the holidays.

On December 22, 2009, Allah was standing with approximately fifty other inmates in Dormitory Five around the control station awaiting distribution of the holiday packages. Another thirty inmates were in other parts of Dormitory Five.

Allah was upset because Carl Robinson prison officials were going to permit inmates in Dormitory Six to go to the commissary to purchase their holiday items before the inmates in Dormitory Five. Allah asked the correctional officer in the control station if he could speak to a lieutenant about the situation. There were only two correctional officers in Dormitory Five at the time. One of the correctional officers perceived the request to talk to a lieutenant as an attempt to incite other inmates to unite and protest the delay in the delivery of the holiday packages. The correctional officer summoned additional prison officials to Dormitory Five. A lieutenant responded to the building with other prison staff and canines. At that time, Allah and the other inmates proceeded back to their bunks in the dormitory. Allah received a disciplinary report for Impeding Order. He later pleaded guilty to the charge.

Prison officials subsequently held a hearing to determine if Allah should be sent to the Administrative Segregation Program at Northern Correctional Institution (“Northern”) due to his conduct in connection with the distribution of holiday packages. After the hearing, prison officials decided to send Allah to Northern to complete the three-phase Administrative Segregation Program.

On March 25, 2010, prison officials discharged Allah from the custody of the Department of Correction. He had completed approximately three months of Phase I of the Administrative Segregation Program at Northern before his release from prison. State of Connecticut Department of Correction Administrative Directive 9.4(17)(A), in effect at the time of the plaintiff's discharge, provided that, if an inmate was discharged from custody while in the Administrative Segregation Program, upon readmission to the Department of Correction, he would be placed on administrative detention pending a determination whether he should be placed back into the Administrative Segregation Program.

On September 10, 2010, New Britain police officers arrested Allah on criminal charges. On September 13, 2010, police officials transferred Allah to Hartford Correctional Center and prison officials recommitted him to the custody of the Commissioner of the Department of Correction.

On September 17, 2010, prison officials transferred Allah to Northern and placed him on administrative detention pending a hearing to determine whether he should be placed into the Administrative Segregation Program. On September 27, 2010, prison officials notified Allah of the basis and date of the hearing. On September 30, 2010, defendant Griggs presided over a hearing during which Allah testified that he had been in Phase I of the Administrative Segregation Program at the time of his discharge in March 2010. On October 4, 2010, defendant Griggs recommended and defendant Milling authorized Allah's placement in the Administrative Segregation Program to enable him to complete the program. On December 1, 2010, defendant Dzurenda denied Allah's appeal of the decision to place him in the Administrative Segregation Program.

On September 26, 2011, in the Connecticut Superior Court for the Judicial District of Hartford at New Britain, Allah pleaded guilty to one count of possession of narcotics with intent to sell in violation of Connecticut General Statutes § 21a–277(a) and one count of violation of probation in violation of Connecticut General Statutes § 53a–32. A judge sentenced him to twenty-five months of imprisonment and a Special Parole term of three years.

Inmates are placed into the Administrative Segregation Program when prison officials determine that they can no longer be safely managed in the general population because their behavior poses a threat to the security of the facility or a risk to the safety of prison staff or other inmates. Thus, the purpose of administrative segregation is to maintain the safety and security of the Connecticut prison system. Administrative segregation provides a secure environment where disruptive inmates can learn the necessary coping skills to permit their safe return to the general population.

The complete three-phase Administrative Segregation Program is designed to last for a minimum of ten months. Phase I of the Administrative Segregation Program lasts for a minimum of 120 days. The plaintiff officially began Phase I of the Administrative Segregation Program on October 4, 2010. At Northern, all inmates in Phase I are handcuffed and placed in leg shackles whenever they leave their cells. This requirement is for the protection of other inmates and prison staff.

Inmates...