Parson v. York

• Decision Date: 28 February 2017
• Docket Number: No. 16-CV-167 (DNH/CFH),16-CV-167 (DNH/CFH)
• Parties: DRAHCIR PARSON, Plaintiff, v. NATHAN YORK, Sheriff, Warren County; et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

DRAHCIR PARSON, Plaintiff, v. NATHAN YORK, Sheriff, Warren County; et al., Defendants.

No. 16-CV-167 (DNH/CFH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

February 28, 2017

CHRISTIAN F. HUMMEL U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

DRAHCIR PARSON

Plaintiff prose

917 Altamont Ave.

Schenectady, New York 12303

Lemire, Johnson Law Firm

P.O. Box 2485

2534 Route 9

Malta, New York 12020

Attorneys for Defendant Nathan York

Hon. Eric T. Schneiderman

Attorney General for the

State of New York

The Capitol

Albany, New York 12224-0341

Attorney for Defendants Anthony J.

Annucci and Christopher Miller

OF COUNSEL:

GREGG T. JOHNSON, ESQ.

APRIL J. LAWS, ESQ.

MARK G. MITCHELL, ESQ.

Assistant Attorney General

REPORT-RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER¹

Plaintiff pro se Drahcir Parson ("Parson"), who at the relevant time in question was in custody at the Warren County Jail ("Warren C.J."), and later at Great Meadow Correctional Facility ("Great Meadow C.F."), brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that defendants Nathan York ("York"), Anthony J. Annucci ("Annucci"), and Christopher Miller ("Miller"), violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Dkt. No. 18 ("Am. Compl."). Presently pending is a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Fed. R. Civ. P.") 12(b)(6) submitted by defendant York, and a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) submitted by defendants Annucci and Miller. Dkt. Nos. 19, 27. Parson submitted a response in opposition to each motion. Dkt. Nos. 25, 29. Defendant York submitted a reply. Dkt. No. 26. Defendants Annucci and Miller also submitted a reply. Dkt. No. 30. For the following reasons, it is recommended that defendant York's motion to dismiss be granted, and that defendant' Annucci and Miller's motion to dismiss be granted in part and denied in part.

I. Background

A. Plaintiff's Recitation of the Facts

The facts are reviewed in the light most favorable to Parson as the non-moving party. See subsection II(A) infra.

Parson was "illegally transferred" to Great Meadow C.F. from Warren C.J. on December 8, 2014. Am. Compl. at 2. This transfer occurred prior to the signing of a substitute jail order, which was signed on January 29, 2015. Id. Upon his transfer to Great Meadow C.F., Parson was immediately placed in administrative segregation (or SpecialHousing Unit, "SHU"). Id. Parson's mother passed away while he was in administrative segregation and he was not allowed to attend her funeral. Id.

Parson alleges that Annucci and York applied New York State regulations "in an arbitrary and capricious fashion" in facilitating Parson's transfer from Warren C.J. to Great Meadow C.F. Compl. at 3. Parson also claims that his transfer was not to exceed thirty days, but Annucci "rubber stamped" multiple thirty day extensions. Id.

Parson also alleges that, once he was transferred to Great Meadow C.F., he was confined in the SHU for twenty-six days without a hearing, and without notice of charges against him. Compl. at 4. He claims that Miller did not conduct a "meaningful review" of his SHU confinement, which is required every sixty days. Id. Parson was also placed under a seven-day shield order, that was renewed twice for a total of twenty-one days. Id. During this time, he was denied hot water and cleaning supplies. Id.

II. Discussion

A. Legal Standard

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for a plaintiff's "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." When considering such a motion, a court must "construe plaintiff['s] complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiff['s] favor." Selevan v. N.Y. Thruway Auth., 584 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Holmes v. Grubman, 568 F.3d 326, 335 (2d Cir. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, this "tenet is inapplicable to legal conclusions, and threadbare recitals of the elements of acause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664 (2009)) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

Accordingly, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must state a claim for relief that is "'plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (explaining that the plausibility test "does not impose a probability requirement . . . it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal [conduct].")); see also Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 569 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that "[o]n a motion to dismiss, courts require enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible . . . .") (internal citations omitted). Determining whether plausibility exists is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

Where, as here, a party seeks judgment against a pro se litigant, a court must afford the non-movant special solicitude. See Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 477 (2d Cir. 2006). As the Second Circuit stated,

[t]here are many cases in which we have said that a pro se litigant is entitled to special solicitude, that a pro se litigant's submissions must be construed liberally, and that such submissions must be read to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest. At the same time, our cases have also indicated that we cannot read into pro se submissions claims that are not consistent with the pro se litigant's allegations or arguments that the submissions themselves do not suggest that we should not excuse frivolous or vexatious filings by pro se litigants, and that pro se status does not exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law . . . .

Id. (internal quotation marks, citations, and footnote omitted); see also Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant #1, 537 F.3d 185, 191-92 (2d Cir. 2008) ("On occasions too numerous tocount, we have reminded district courts that 'when [a] plaintiff proceeds pro se, . . . a court is obliged to construe his pleadings liberally." (internal citations omitted)).

B. Personal Involvement

"[P]ersonal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983." Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Moffitt v. Town of Brookfield, 950 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1991) (additional citations omitted)). Thus, supervisory officials may not be held liable merely because they held a position of authority. Id.; Black v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 72, 74 (2d Cir. 1996). However, supervisory personnel may be considered "personally involved" if:

(1) the defendant participated directly in the alleged constitutional violation;

(2) the defendant, after being informed of the violation through report or appeal, failed to remedy the wrong;

(3) the defendant created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed the continuance of such a policy or custom;

(4) the defendant was grossly negligent in supervising subordinates who committed the wrongful acts; or

(5) the defendant exhibited deliberate indifference to the rights of inmates by failing to act on information indicating that unconstitutional acts were occurring.

Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994) (additional citation omitted)).² Assertions of personal involvement that aremerely speculative are insufficient to establish a triable issue of fact. See e.g., Brown v. Artus, 647 F. Supp. 2d 190, 200 (N.D.N.Y. 2009). Defendants allege that they were not personally involved in the alleged constitutional violations.

Parson contends that defendants Annucci and York facilitated Parson's transfer from Warren C.J. to Great Meadow C.F. without due process. Am. Compl. at 3. The Court finds that Parson has alleged sufficient personal involvement in the transfer for both Annucci and York. Parson has submitted with his complaint documents that show communication between Annucci and York meant to facilitate his transfer. See Dkt. No. 18-1 at 5-6, 12. The complaint also includes letters from Annucci to York pertaining to Parson's continued incarceration at Great Meadow C.F. See id. at 13-17. Thus, Parson has alleged sufficient personal involvement of both Annucci and York at this stage in the proceedings. See Thomas v. Ashcroft, 470 F.3d 491, 497 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding sufficient personal involvement where prison officials "ordered or acquiesced in [the plaintiff's] transfer").

As to defendant Miller, Parson alleges that Miller placed him in administrative segregation upon his transfer to Great Meadow C.F. and subjected him to unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Am. Compl. at 4. Although Parson clearly alleges that Miller placed him in administrative segregation, Parson does not identify any defendant that subjected him to unconstitutional conditions of confinement, namely a cell shield order, lack of hot water, and lack of cleaning supplies. See Am Compl. at 4. As such, the Court recommends that the unconstitutional conditions of confinement claims be dismissed as toMiller for lack of personal involvement. See Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 2013) (dismissing unconstitutional conditions of confinement claims against prison officials where there were no "direct" or "indirect allegations sufficient to permit an inference the [prison officials] had acted or failed to act in any of the ways that would subject [them] to personal liability for the deprivations alleged by [the plaintiff]").

The Court reaches a different conclusion in regard to Parson's claim against Miller regarding his initial and continued placement in administrative segregation. Parson alleges that Miller placed him in...