Marques v. Fitzgerald

• Decision Date: 11 September 1996
• Docket Number: No. 96-1245,96-1245
• Citation: 99 F.3d 1
• Parties: 12 IER Cases 244 Stephen R. MARQUES, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Kevin J. FITZGERALD, Defendant, Appellee. . Heard
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 1

99 F.3d 1

12 IER Cases 244

Stephen R. MARQUES, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Kevin J. FITZGERALD, Defendant, Appellee.

No. 96-1245.

United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.

Heard Sept. 11, 1996.

Decided Oct. 28, 1996.

Thomas S. Brown with whom Stephen A. Rodio, Providence, RI, was on brief, for appellant.

Kathleen M. Powers with whom Marc DeSisto, Providence, RI, was on brief, for appellee.

Before TORRUELLA, Chief Judge, COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge, and TAURO, ^* District Judge.

COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge.

This case concerns several claims brought by plaintiff-appellant, Stephen R. Marques, against the city of East Providence, Rhode Island, based on his discharge while a probationary employee of the city. Marques, who had refused to continue a work assignment on a boat at a city pond due to his fear of capsizing and was subsequently terminated, sued the city under both state and federal law; the city removed the case to federal court. The district court granted directed verdicts for the city on all claims. We affirm on two claims, and vacate as to Marques' claim under the Rhode Island Whistleblowers' Act.

BACKGROUND

Marques was hired as a laborer by the city of East Providence in June 1993. ¹ On December 22, 1993, several days before the expiration of his six-month probationary period, Marques was assigned to work at Jones Pond, cutting weeds in the pond from an aluminum row boat. Marques, who is unable to swim, expressed some concerns about the assignment to Gregory Gammell ("Gammell"), the Superintendent of the Parks Department, but was told by Gammell not to worry about it. On his arrival at Jones Pond, Marques noticed that there were no On the following day, December 23, 1993, Marques, who had again been assigned to duty in the boat cutting reeds, told lead worker Robert Barlow ("Barlow") that he was nervous about working in the boat, that he would like a life preserver, and that he had asked for one on the prior day but not received it. Barlow questioned the need for a life preserver, given the depth of the water, but said he would call Gammell. Gammell arrived, but sans life preserver, and subsequently left the site. Marques testified that he began to feel nauseous during the morning while working on the boat, which he attributed to motion sickness. At the morning break, he therefore told Barlow that he wasn't going back in the boat because he was feeling sick. Barlow indicated that if Marques didn't return to the boat, Barlow would call Gammell. During subsequent general conversation between workers at the pond site about the safety of the project, Marques and others expressed concerns about the lack of life preservers and other safety devices. Gammell returned to the pond, and instructed Marques and Barlow to get in his car. On their arrival at Gammell's office, Gammell instructed Marques to "punch out" and then terminated him. ³ Marques did not discuss his safety concerns with Gammell during the car trip or at his termination. Gammell informed Marques that he was being terminated because he wouldn't get back in the boat and because of his attitude.

                life preservers in the boat, and asked Gammell for one.  Gammell initially questioned Marques' need for the life preserver, but told him he would get one;  however, this life preserver was not forthcoming. 2  Marques nevertheless performed the assignment
                

Marques subsequently met with City Manager Lemont to discuss his firing. At this meeting, Marques explained his concerns about safety and his physical ills to Lemont; however, Lemont later wrote Marques a letter informing him that the decision to terminate Marques would stand.

Shortly after his termination, Marques began experiencing physical symptoms such as tightness in his chest and difficulty breathing, which his physician attributed to situational anxiety brought on by his firing. His doctor prescribed medications and counseling. Marques also began experiencing marital difficulties.

Marques sued the city in state court, alleging violations of a number of state statutes, including the Rhode Island Whistleblowers' Act, as well as federal claims including the Americans with Disabilities Act. He also claimed that the city's actions constituted negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress, and that the city had violated the Rhode Island Regulation of Boats law. ⁴ The city removed the case to federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. At the close of the evidence, the district court granted a directed verdict for the city on all counts. ⁵ This appeal on three of the claims followed.

DISCUSSION

Our review of the directed verdicts on the appealed claims is plenary; as such we must apply the same criteria used by the district court, with all proof and inferences reasonably drawn therefrom viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Gibson v. City of Cranston, 37 F.3d 731, 735 (1st Cir.1994). To affirm, we must find that the evidence on each count would permit thoughtful factfinders to reach but one conclusion. Fashion House v. K mart Corp., 892 F.2d 1076, 1088 (1st Cir.1989). After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the district court on the intentional infliction of emotional distress and Rhode Island Regulation of Boats claims, but vacate on the appellant's claim under the Rhode Island Whistleblowers' Act. We deal first with the most significant claim.

A. Rhode Island Whistleblowers' Act Claim

The Rhode Island Whistleblowers' Act provides in relevant part that:

An employer shall not discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate against an employee regarding the employee's compensation, terms, location, or privileges of employment

(1) because the employee [ ... ] reports or is about to report to a public body, verbally or in writing, a violation which the employee knows or reasonably believes has occurred or is about to occur, of a law or regulation, or rule promulgated under the law of this state, a political subdivision of this state, or the United States, unless the employee knows or has reason to know that the report is false.... ⁶

Accordingly, an employee must demonstrate that there was a causal connection between the report and the termination.

The statute does not explicitly define what constitutes a "report" or "reporting" a suspected or known violation. However, it does define "public body" as follows:

(4) "Public body" means all of the following:[ ... ]

(iii) A county, city, town, or regional governing body, a council, school district, or a board, department, commission, agency, or any member or employee thereof. ⁷

The district court concluded that this statute is inapplicable in the circumstances of this case because Marques' statements could not be construed as "reports" to a "public body." The district court reasoned that the statute contemplates a situation in which an employee reports or threatens to report a violation of a law to a third party with jurisdiction over the violation. For the district court, Marques' statements were merely explanations for his refusal to return to the boat, rather than reports to an appropriate individual or body of known or suspected violations.

Marques argues on appeal that the district court gave an overly narrow interpretation to the statute's provisions. He claims that his statements to Barlow could fall within the statute and that both caselaw (albeit from other jurisdictions) and public policy support his view. The city, on the other hand, contends that the district court properly construed the provision; it maintains that Marques made no statements to Barlow or other supervisors that reasonably could be construed as reports of violations to a public body.

Our task is complicated by the lack of guideposts. There is no relevant legislative history indicating the intent of Rhode Island lawmakers concerning the interpretation of these terms. Furthermore, Rhode Island courts have not directly interpreted "report" or "public body" under the statute. We do, however, have the statutory language, which We begin with principles of statutory construction. Where the terms of a statute are clear, a court must give the words their plain and obvious meaning. See Ellis v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority, 586 A.2d 1055, 1057 (R.I.1991); O'Connell v. Shalala, 79 F.3d 170, 176 (1st Cir.1996) (courts are bound to give statutes a practical, commonsense reading). Furthermore, a statute may not be construed in a manner that results in absurdities or defeats its underlying purpose. In re Falstaff Brewing Corp., 637 A.2d 1047, 1050 (R.I.1994). As noted, the statute explicitly includes municipal employees in the definition of "public body"; however, the boundaries of the definition of "report" are still unclear. Therefore, we turn to Rhode Island's sister states in search of further clarification. ⁸

must be construed consistently with its purpose. Our review of the language of the statute, together with an examination of similar statutes from other jurisdictions, with an eye to the public policy underlying such whistleblowers' statutes, counsels a broader view of the statute than that adopted by the district court.

Similar whistleblowers' statutes are found in Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, and Connecticut. Of these, the Connecticut statute bears the closest resemblance to the Rhode Island statute at hand, although it, too, has not been the focus of relevant caselaw. ⁹ Generally, these whistleblowers' statutes appear to fall into two broad categories: statutes like Rhode Island's and Connecticut's, which are broadly drafted, and do not explicitly include statements to an employee's supervisor within the rubric of reports to a public body, and more detailed statutes like those of Massachusetts, Maine and New Hampshire. The statutes in this second category are considerably more complex than those of the first type; these explicitly include statements to a supervisor within...