Enterprise Bank v. Carolina Inv. Co.

• Decision Date: 14 April 1919
• Docket Number: 10190.
• Citation: 99 S.E. 25,112 S.C. 52
• Parties: ENTERPRISE BANK v. CAROLINA INV. CO.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

99 S.E. 25

112 S.C. 52

ENTERPRISE BANK v. CAROLINA INV. CO.

No. 10190.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

April 14, 1919

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court, of Richland County; M. L Smith, Judge.

Action by the Enterprise Bank against the Carolina Investment Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed.

Lyles & Lyles, of Columbia, for appellant.

T Moultrie Mordecai, of Charleston, and Barron, McKay, Frierson & Moffatt, of Columbia, for respondent.

GARY C.J.

This is an action upon a promissory note of which the following is a copy:

"$4,500.00. Charleston, S. C., June 23, 1914.

"Four months after date we promise to pay to Enterprise Bank, Meeting and Market Sts., Charleston, S. C., forty-five hundred no/100 dollars at their banking house, and also 10 per cent. additional attorney's fees, if placed with an attorney for collection. Value received.

"Carolina Investment Company.

"By D. Sam Cox, Pres."

The complaint alleges presentment of the note, nonpayment, and that the plaintiff is the holder thereof, and demands judgment for $4,500, with interest from the 21st of October 1914, with 10 per cent. attorney's fees.

The defendant, by its answer:

Denied "that it made the note, but on the contrary alleged that while it is informed and believes that such a note was made by Mr. D. Sam Cox, the president of the defendant corporation, it denies that said D. Sam Cox had the authority of the defendant corporation, or of its board of directors or any of the officers thereof, for the making of said note, and denies that said note was executed for the benefit of the defendant corporation, in any wise."

The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, for the full amount of principal and interest claimed and for $225 additional, as attorney's fees.

The defendant appealed upon exceptions.

The vital question is whether there was error on the part of his honor, the presiding judge, in refusing the motion for the direction of a verdict.

The only reasonable inference to be drawn from the testimony is that Cox was not authorized to make the note in question; that it was not made for the benefit of the defendant, or in the usual course of its business, but, on the contrary, was made to settle the personal indebtedness of Cox to the plaintiff bank; that these facts were well known to the plaintiff through its president, who wrote on the margin of the note, "Cr. D. S. C.,"...