Davis v. Beko
| Decision Date | 19 March 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-15483,92-15483 |
| Citation | 990 F.2d 1256 |
| Parties | NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. Harold A. DAVIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William P. BEKO, former District Judge; Philip H. Dunleavy, Nye County District Attorney; George B. Devel, former Nye County Deputy District Attorney; Jeffrey D. Morrison, former Nye County Deputy District Attorney; NYE COUNTY; Ronald E. Floyd; John F. Smith, et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Before GOODWIN, NOONAN and T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
Harold Davis (Davis) appeals the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 claims against various defendants, including Judge William Beko (Beko), individual members of the grand jury, the prosecuting attorney, Philip Dunleavy (Dunleavy) and an investigator for the district attorney's office, John Adams (Adams). The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3). We have jurisdiction over this timely appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
During all relevant times related to this appeal, Davis was the Sheriff for Nye County, Nevada. His complaint alleged that Beko and Dunleavy conspired to deprive him of his constitutional rights. He claims that they demanded his resignation as sheriff under threat of prosecution for his alleged misconduct in obtaining travel compensation by false pretenses. Davis further alleges that because he refused to resign, the district attorney's office filed a criminal complaint against him and that Judge Beko impaneled a limited grand jury to inquire into the misconduct.
After the Nye County District Court dismissed the grand jury indictment, Davis instituted this civil rights action against Beko, the grand jurors, Dunleavy and Adams. 1 Davis now appeals the district court's orders dismissing his action against each of the defendants. He contends that none of the appellees are immune from this civil rights action. 2
A dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is a question of law reviewed de novo. Oscar v. University Students Co-operative Ass'n, 965 F.2d 783, 785 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 655 (1992). Review is limited to the contents of the complaint. Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir.1989). A complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Id. (internal quotations omitted). The issue of whether a judge is entitled to judicial immunity is reviewed de novo. Crooks v. Maynard, 913 F.2d 699, 700 (9th Cir.1990).
Davis argues that Judge Beko violated his constitutional rights in that he conspired with other officials to force Davis's resignation and that he impaneled a limited grand jury because Davis refused to resign. We reject this contention.
"Judges and those performing judge-like functions are absolutely immune from damage liability for acts performed in their official capacities." Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir.1986) (en banc). Furthermore, judicial immunity applies to § 1983 claims. O'Neil v. City of Lake Oswego, 642 F.2d 367, 368 n. 3 (9th Cir.1981). A judge is protected if: (1) he performed a "judicial act," and (2) he did not act in "clear absence of jurisdiction." Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57, 360 (1978).
In determining whether an act is "judicial," we consider "the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge." Crooks, 913 F.2d at 700 (internal quotations omitted) (judge protected by absolute judicial immunity when he used his contempt power to enforce administrative order he had previously issued). Although absolute judicial immunity does not extend to administrative, legislative and executive functions that a judge may perform, id. (citing Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227-29 (1988)), immunity applies "[a]s long as the judge's ultimate acts are judicial actions taken within the court's subject matter jurisdiction...." Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1078 (emphasis added) (focus is upon the judge's ultimate acts rather than his underlying actions). In Ashelman, this court concluded that although the actions of the judge and prosecutor in conspiring to predetermine the outcome of a judicial proceeding were improper, they were nonetheless entitled to immunity. Id.
"Jurisdiction is construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of a judge." Crooks, 913 F.2d at 701; see also Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1076. Furthermore, acts performed in "excess" of judicial authority do not deprive the judge of immunity. Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 995 (1988).
In the present case, the ultimate acts Judge Beko performed were "judicial" in nature and were not in clear absence of jurisdiction. He had authority pursuant to Nev. Const. Art. 6, § 5 and Nev.Rev.Stat. §§ 6.110-6.145 and § 172.047 to impanel the grand jury. "A district judge may impanel a grand jury to inquire into a specific limited matter among those set forth in NRS 172.175." Nev.Rev.Stat. § 172.047. 3
Davis refused to resign as Nye County Sheriff in response to threats of prosecution for obtaining travel compensation by false pretenses. Judge Beko impaneled a grand jury to investigate Davis's alleged misconduct. Judge Beko was acting within his authority and jurisdiction. Even were he acting in excess of his jurisdiction, he is protected because there was not a clear absence of jurisdiction. See Schucker, 846 F.2d at 1204 ().
Judge Beko is entitled to immunity regardless of his intent. See O'Neil, 642 F.2d at 370 (). "Moreover, allegations that a conspiracy produced a certain decision should no more pierce the actor's immunity than allegations of bad faith, personal interest or outright malevolence." Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1078. We conclude that Judge Beko is entitled to immunity because he performed ultimate judicial acts and properly exercised jurisdiction.
Davis also argues that Judge Beko conspired with Dunleavy to draft an anonymous letter requesting a Nye County Commissioner to persuade Davis to resign and that Judge Beko is not entitled to immunity for that act. However, Davis has failed to allege a causal connection between drafting the letter and any injury he suffered. Furthermore, Judge Beko's alleged conduct was purely private. Because private conduct does not create a cognizable claim under § 1983, District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 424 (1973), Davis is precluded from maintaining this action.
Although Davis concedes that grand jurors are entitled to the same immunity as judges, he nonetheless contends that they are not protected in this case because they acted without jurisdiction when they indicted him for acts which occurred outside Nye County. This argument is without merit.
Grand jurors perform quasi-judicial functions; therefore, they are entitled to immunity. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 n. 20 (1976); see Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 509-10 (1978); see also Schlegel v. Bebout, 841 F.2d 937, 942 (9th Cir.1988) ().
The Nye County grand jury acted within its jurisdiction. "The grand jury may inquire into all public offenses triable in the district court or in a justice's court, committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the district court for which it is impaneled." Nev.Rev.Stat. § 172.105 (emphasis added). Even if we accept the rule Davis posits, i.e., a grand jury has no jurisdiction over acts that occur outside the county for which the jury is impaneled, the Nye County grand jury had jurisdiction, and is therefore entitled to immunity. In his complaint, Davis states that his alleged misconduct was the result of "travel from Beatty, Nevada, ... to Tonopah where [he] had official business to conduct...." Because both towns are located in Nye County, and because the travel vouchers were submitted in Nye County, the grand jury acted within its jurisdiction.
We also reject Davis's argument that the grand jury acted in excess of its jurisdiction. "A grand jury that is impaneled for a specific limited purpose shall not inquire into matters not related to that purpose." Nev.Rev.Stat. § 172.047. Neither Davis's complaint nor his brief alleges facts to support this claim.
Indeed, Davis does not dispute the grand jury's responsibility to investigate whether a crime was committed and its duty to investigate his past activities. Rather, he claims the grand jury failed in its responsibility to protect him from "unfounded and arbitrary criminal prosecution." The case he cites in support of that proposition, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974), does not hold grand jurors liable for returning an unfounded indictment. Calandra merely states that one of the grand jury's responsibilities is to help ensure that unfounded prosecutions do not occur. Id. A grand jury may return an unfounded indictment on occasion. That does not mean, however, that the grand jury is subject to civil liability.
Therefore, because the grand jury fulfilled the duty for which it was impaneled, we affirm dismissal of the complaint against...
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