Quick v. Peoples Bank of Cullman County
| Decision Date | 21 June 1993 |
| Docket Number | 92-6566,Nos. 91-7446,s. 91-7446 |
| Parties | , RICO Bus.Disp.Guide 8339 Jimmy W. QUICK and Wanda J. Quick, individually, Plaintiffs-Counterclaim Defendants-Appellees, Cross-Appellants, Jimmy W. Quick and Wanda J. Quick, d/b/a Jimmy Quick Motors, a partnership, Plaintiffs-Appellees, Cross-Appellants, v. PEOPLES BANK OF CULLMAN COUNTY, Defendant-Counterclaim Plaintiff-Crossclaim Plaintiff-Third Party Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, James Arthur Buckelew, Defendant-Crossclaim Defendant-Third Party Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellee. Jimmy W. Quick, individually; Wanda J. Quick, individually, Plaintiffs-Counterclaim Defendants-Appellants, Jimmy W. QUICK, a partnership d/b/a Jimmy Quick Motors; WANDA J. QUICK, a partnership d/b/a Jimmy Quick Motors, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. PEOPLES BANK OF CULLMAN COUNTY, Defendant-Counterclaim Plaintiff-Crossclaim Plaintiff-Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellee, James Arthur Buckelew, Defendant-Crossclaim Defendant-Third-Party Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
John S. Key, James G. Adams, Jr., Eyster, Key, Tubb, Weaver & Roth, Decatur, AL, Tom Drake, Drake & Drake, Cullman, AL, for appellants in Case No. 91-7446.
Richard W. Lewis, Thomas Elliott, Jr., London, Yancey & Elliott, Birmingham, AL, for appellees in No. 91-7446.
Thomas R. Elliott, Jr., Richard W. Lewis, Birmingham, AL, for appellants in No. 92-6656.
John S. Key, Decatur, AL, Thomas E. Drake, Cullman, AL, James G. Adams, Jr., Decatur, AL, for appellees in No. 92-6656.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.
Before DUBINA, Circuit Judge, CLARK and ESCHBACH *, Senior Circuit Judges.
After a trial in this federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 1 ("RICO") suit, the jury returned a verdict for $15,000.00 in favor of Jimmy W. and Wanda J. Quick (collectively, the "Quicks") and their partnership, Jimmy Quick Motors ("Quick Motors"). On the basis of the jury's verdict, the district court entered judgment against both the People's Bank of Cullman County (the "Bank") and James Arthur Buckelew ("Buckelew") for $45,000.00. The Bank moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV") or, in the alternative, for a new trial. The Bank is now appealing the district court's denial of that motion, arguing that respondeat superior does not apply to RICO actions and that even if it were applicable, Buckelew was not acting within the scope of his employment so as to subject the Bank to liability. Buckelew has not appealed the judgment. The Quicks cross-appeal, challenging the district court's order striking their petition for attorney's fees and costs as untimely under the district's Local Rule ("L.R.") 54.1(a). We have jurisdiction to hear both the appeal and the cross-appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm both.
The Quicks own and operate Quick Motors, which purchases vehicles at auction, refurbishes and resells them. Buckelew, a relative of Wanda Quick and a loan officer at the Bank, approached the Quicks with a request to move all of their banking business to the Bank. The Quicks did so, opening a draw-type account with their home as collateral.
Some time later, Buckelew made offers to personally finance the purchase of some vehicles for Quick Motors in exchange for a share of the profits upon their sale. After allegedly being reassured by Buckelew that Bank policy permitted it, the Quicks accepted this arrangement. Eventually, Buckelew began to demand a share in the profits on all vehicles sold by Quick Motors, regardless of whether he had any financial stake in them. Buckelew also made personal use of automobiles purchased with the Quicks' dealer license and financed by the Bank, and then demanded that the Quicks take the automobiles back at no cost to him. In addition, Buckelew insisted that deposits and loan payments be made in cash, for which he refused to give receipts. Finally, Buckelew allegedly told the Quicks that he did not want them to keep any records concerning their transactions. Because deposits and loan payments were not being forwarded to the appropriate accounts, the Quicks continued to incur more debt than would have been necessary in the absence of Buckelew's activities. As a result, the Bank earned additional interest as more money was borrowed. During the period in which Buckelew's activities were occurring and prior to any complaints by the Quicks to Bank personnel, Buckelew was promoted from loan officer to assistant vice president of the Bank. When the Quicks later voiced objections to Buckelew, he allegedly told them that the Bank would cover for him. Eventually, the Quicks notified Bank personnel of Buckelew's activities. No action was taken by the Bank until more than a year later, when the Quicks repeated their complaints after being informed that some of their loans had become delinquent. At that time, Candice Nails ("Nails"), vice president of the Bank, requested that the Quicks meet with her and produce records of the transactions involving Buckelew. The Quicks complied. During a meeting with the Quicks, Nails and Robin Cummings ("Cummings"), president of the Bank, told the Quicks to deal with them exclusively, not to say anything about Buckelew's activities, and the Bank would help them. Shortly thereafter, Cummings and Nails inspected the Quicks' inventory and instructed them to sell several items for whatever they would bring to pay down the loan owed to the Bank. The Quicks did so, losing money on the sales. The Bank then presented the Quicks with a consolidation note. The Quicks disputed the amount, but not the fact that they owed the Bank money. Pursuant to the Bank's request, Jimmy Quick signed the consolidation note despite its alleged inaccuracy because the Quicks could not obtain alternative financing since all of their assets were tied up as collateral by the Bank. At the time of trial, the Quicks were current in making payments on the consolidation note.
Following the meeting with the Quicks, Cummings confronted Buckelew with the Quicks' accusations and asked him to resign because he had violated the Bank's unwritten conflict-of-interest policy. This policy supposedly prohibited Bank employees from doing business with customers absent permission from the Bank's Board of Directors. Buckelew testified that he was unaware of the conflict-of-interest policy. Other evidence presented at trial indicated that the Bank had not enforced the policy in the past.
The Quicks brought suit against Buckelew and the Bank under the federal RICO statute. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict for $15,000.00 in favor of the Quicks. The district court then entered judgment against both the Bank and Buckelew for $45,000.00, trebling the jury's assessment of damages under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). The Bank moved for a JNOV or, in the alternative, for a new trial, which the district court denied. On appeal, the Bank is challenging the district court's denial of that motion, arguing that: (1) respondeat superior is not applicable to RICO actions under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b), and (2) even if respondeat superior were applicable, Buckelew was not acting within the scope of his employment; therefore, the Bank is not subject to liability. Buckelew has not appealed the judgment.
After entry of judgment, the Quicks petitioned for attorney's fees and costs as provided for under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). 2 The Quicks had requested attorney's fees and costs in their complaint and in the Pre-trial Order, but such an award had not been included in the judgment. The district court ordered the Quicks' petition stricken as untimely under L.R. 54.1(a). On cross-appeal, the Quicks are challenging the district court's order striking their petition. The Quicks admit that their petition was untimely under L.R. 54.1(a). 3 In spite of the untimeliness, the Quicks argue on cross-appeal that: (1) the district court should have exercised its discretion to excuse their noncompliance with L.R. 54.1(a) because the noncompliance did not result in prejudice to the Bank, and (2) the application of L.R. 54.1(a) as a statute of limitations conflicts with the enabling statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a), because it abridges the Quicks' substantive rights to attorney's fees and costs under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
We consider first the Bank's challenge to the district court's denial of its motion for a JNOV or, in the alternative, for a new trial. The "[d]enial of a motion for a JNOV is a question of law subject to de novo review." Pinnacle Port Community Ass'n v. Orenstein, 952 F.2d 375, 378 (11th Cir.1992). In undertaking such a review, "[t]he reviewing court considers all evidence but whenever reasonable construes it in favor of the party opposed to the motion." Id. at 378-79. The denial of a motion for a new trial, on the other hand, is reviewed under a clear abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 379. Mindful of these standards, we address the issues raised by the Bank's appeal.
The Bank's first argument on appeal is that employers should not be found vicariously liable for the actions of their employees under the federal RICO statute. Specifically, the Bank is asking this Court to refuse to apply the doctrine of respondeat superior in suits under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b). The Seventh Circuit, which has developed the most extensive jurisprudence extant on this issue, has recognized that care must be taken not to impose respondeat superior liability on enterprises that are the victims of RICO violations perpetrated by their employees while at the same time imposing liability on enterprises that have benefitted from these activities. Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297, 1306 (7th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 917, 109 S.Ct. 3241, 106 L.Ed.2d 588 (1989); accord Landry v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 901 F.2d 404, 425 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 498 U.S. 895, 111 S.Ct. 244, 112...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Mickens v. Polk County School Bd.
...did based on the presented evidence." Davis v. Town of Lake Park, Fla., 245 F.3d 1232, 1237 (11th Cir.2001)(citing Quick v. Peoples Bank, 993 F.2d 793, 797 (11th Cir.1993)). A movant under Rule 50(b) must prevail "if the facts and inferences point overwhelmingly in favor of one party, such ......
-
Cox v. Administrator U.S. Steel & Carnegie
...its order, this Court spelled out the elements of respondeat superior liability for RICO violations in Quick v. People's Bank of Cullman County, 993 F.2d 793 (11th Cir.1993). Although we have rejected the "non-identity" rule, we have expressed concern that enterprises that are merely victim......
-
John Doe I v. Nestle
...agency law cited by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs cite to cases involving an employer-employee relationship, Quick v. Peoples Bank of Cullman County, 993 F.2d 793, 797 (11th Cir.1993), an alleged parent-subsidiary corporate relationship, Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp., 312 F.Supp.2d 1229, 1241–46 ......
-
Margan v. Niles
...the courts of appeal have imposed vicarious liability for violations of other federal statutes. See, e.g., Quick v. Peoples Bank of Cullman County, 993 F.2d 793 (11th Cir. 1993) (RICO); United States v. O'Connell, 890 F.2d 563 (1st Cir.1989) (False Claims Act). In Jones v. Federated Fin, Re......
-
Labor Law - Stephen W. Mooney and Leigh Lawson Reeves
...747 F.2d at 402). 116. Id. at 1406. 117. Id. 118. Id. 119. Id. (citations omitted). 120. Id. 121. Id. at 1408. 122. Id. at 1406 (citing 993 F.2d 793 (11th Cir. 1993)). 123. Id. 124. 993 F.2d at 797 (citations omitted). 125. 17 F.3d at 1407. 126. Id. 127. Id. 128. Id. at 1407-08. 129. Id. at......