996 P.2d 416 (Nev. 2000), 33172, Lee v. GNLV Corp.

Docket Nº33172.
Citation996 P.2d 416, 116 Nev. 424
Party NameAhiliya LEE, Widow of Bobby Lee Sturms, a/k/a Bobby Lee, Deceased; Ahiliya Lee, as Guardian Ad Litem for Aaron Cody Lee, a Minor, Appellant, v. GNLV CORP., d/b/a Golden Nugget Hotel and Casino, Respondent.
Case DateApril 05, 2000
CourtSupreme Court of Nevada

Page 416

996 P.2d 416 (Nev. 2000)

116 Nev. 424

Ahiliya LEE, Widow of Bobby Lee Sturms, a/k/a Bobby Lee, Deceased; Ahiliya Lee, as Guardian Ad Litem for Aaron Cody Lee, a Minor, Appellant,

v.

GNLV CORP., d/b/a Golden Nugget Hotel and Casino, Respondent.

No. 33172.

Supreme Court of Nevada

April 5, 2000.

[116 Nev. 425] Law Offices of Gus W. Flangas, Las Vegas, for Appellant.

Carolyn Ellsworth, Paula C. Gentile, and Nikki D. Wilson-Thomas, Las Vegas, for Respondent.

Before YOUNG, AGOSTI and LEAVITT, JJ.

Page 417

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Respondent GNLV Corporation has moved to dismiss the underlying appeal on the ground that the order appealed from was neither a final judgment nor an appealable order pursuant to NRAP 3A. We conclude that an order granting summary judgment, which disposes of all claims and parties before the district court, is final and appealable, and we therefore deny respondent's motion.

Appellant Ahiliya Lee, individually and as guardian ad litem for Aaron Cody Lee, a minor, filed an action for wrongful death against GNLV on August 1, 1995. On July 27, 1998, GNLV moved for summary judgment. On September 10, 1998, the district court entered a written order granting the motion for summary judgment, thereby disposing of all claims and all parties in the action. Appellant filed her notice of appeal from this order on [116 Nev. 426] October 9, 1998. Thereafter, on October 16, 1998, the district court entered a formal "judgment," which directed entry of judgment in favor of GNLV in the sum of $876.60, the amount of GNLV's costs. The notice of entry of the judgment was served on October 19, 1998, and appellant did not file a second notice of appeal.

GNLV has moved to dismiss this appeal, contending that an order granting summary judgment is not an appealable order because it is neither a "judgment" nor an order from which an appeal will lie pursuant to NRAP 3A(b). See NRAP 3A(b)(2) (specifically listing certain types of orders as appealable). According to GNLV, the district court's "judgment" filed on October 16, 1998, constituted the final judgment in this matter. Hence, GNLV maintains that appellant's notice of appeal was prematurely filed on October 9, 1998, and failed to vest jurisdiction in this court. See Rust v. Clark Cty. School District, 103 Nev. 686, 747 P.2d 1380 (1987) (noting that a premature notice of appeal is ineffective to vest jurisdiction in this court). We disagree.

As an initial matter, we observe that a final judgment has been described as one "that disposes of the issues presented in the case, determines the costs, and leaves nothing for the future consideration of the court." See, e.g., Alper v. Posin, 77 Nev. 328, 330, 363 P.2d 502, 503 (1961); Magee et al. v. Whitacre et al., 60 Nev. 202, 96 P.2d 201 (1939); Perkins v. Sierra Nevada S.M. Co., 10 Nev. 405 (1876). This definition suggests that an order of the district court is not a final judgment unless the court has also determined costs. 1 Such an interpretation, however, is inconsistent with NRCP 58(c), which specifies that the entry of a "judgment shall not be delayed for the taxing of costs." To avoid any confusion regarding this matter, we clarify that a final judgment is one that disposes of all the issues presented in the case, and leaves nothing for the future consideration of the court, except for post-judgment issues such as attorney's fees and costs. A post-judgment order awarding attorney's fees and/or costs may be appealed as a special order made after final judgment, pursuant to NRAP 3A(b)(2). See Smith v. Crown Financial Services, 111 Nev. 277, 280 n. 2, 890 P.2d 769, 771 n. 2...

To continue reading

FREE SIGN UP