Albert v. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp.
| Decision Date | 20 July 1993 |
| Docket Number | 91-3835,Nos. 91-3685,91-3957 and 92-3702,s. 91-3685 |
| Citation | 999 F.2d 539 |
| Parties | NOTICE: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Sixth Circuit. Robert ALBERT, Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross Appellee, v. The EDWARD J. DeBARTOLO CORPORATION, d/b/a Southern Park Mall, Martin J. Plocica, Jack Petruska, and Dana Lowe, Defendants-Appellees and Cross Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Before: KENNEDY and MARTIN, Circuit Judges, and FORESTER, District Judge. *
Plaintiff Robert Albert was discharged from his job following reports that he sexually harassed a fellow employee. Albert and his wife Rhonda Albert brought claims for sexual discrimination under Title VII and various state law claims against defendants. Rhonda Albert's claims were dismissed without prejudice. This order is not appealed from. The District Court also dismissed plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff appeals this dismissal. The plaintiff and defendants appeal the denial of their respective motions for sanctions and attorneys' fees. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
Robert Albert worked as a security guard at the Southern Park Mall, which is owned and operated by defendant Edward J. DeBartolo Corporation, d/b/a Southern Park Mall ("DeBartolo"). Defendant Dana Lowe also worked at the Mall as a frequent shopper hostess. Lowe accused plaintiff of sexually harassing her. Lowe alleged that plaintiff made unwanted advances and pulled her close to him. Plaintiff denied the allegations. Plaintiff also alleged that Lowe and other hostesses inappropriately flirted with the security guards and touched them affectionately in public. As a result of Lowe's accusations, plaintiff was terminated.
On October 19, 1990, plaintiff sued DeBartolo, Lowe, Martin J. Plocica, the mall manager, Jack Petruska, the head of security, and the Southern Park Merchants Association (the "Association") for defamation and for Title VII violations. He claimed that defendants discriminated against him because of his sex in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 1 Plaintiff's wife, Rhonda Albert, sued defendants for loss of consortium, emotional distress, damage to her reputation and other unspecified rights arising from her husband's termination. Defendant Lowe counterclaimed with a suit for battery and severe emotional distress against Albert.
On December 12, 1990, the Alberts voluntarily dismissed the Association from the suit. On May 2, 1991, Mrs. Albert's claims were dismissed against all defendants without prejudice. On the same day, plaintiff's Title VII claim against defendant Lowe was dismissed with prejudice and his state claims dismissed without prejudice. The case proceeded with plaintiff's Title VII and pendent state law claims against DeBartolo, Plocica and Petruska and Lowe's counterclaim against Albert.
In an order entered June 27, 1991, the District Court dismissed plaintiff's Title VII claims against the remaining defendants with prejudice. It is this order that plaintiff is appealing. The court had contemplated dismissing plaintiff's complaint sua sponte under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, but anticipated that defendants would file a 12(b)(6) motion. However, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The court treated the motion as one for dismissal for failure to state a claim.
The court found that plaintiff had attempted and failed to allege sufficient facts to support a "disparate treatment" or "hostile work environment" Title VII violation. The court believed that plaintiff was really complaining that he was wrongfully discharged because Lowe's accusations were false. "That the plaintiff was fired as a result of this allegation is not cognizable under Title VII."
Subsequent to the court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint, defendants filed a motion for sanctions, attorneys' fees and costs. By marginal entry order, the court denied the motion as to sanctions and fees, but awarded defendants costs. DeBartolo moved the court to clarify the order denying the motion for sanctions and fees. The court referred the issue to a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), (3) and Local Civil Rule 19.5-19.12. He found that neither Rule 11, Title VII, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, nor the court's inherent power to sanction bad faith conduct entitled defendants to sanctions or attorneys' fees. Plaintiff also filed a motion for Rule 11 sanctions that was similarly denied by marginal entry.
Plaintiff first claims that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to defendants. The court treated defendants' motion for summary judgment as one for dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). However, where, as here, matters outside of the pleadings are considered by the court, a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim will be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56. We review the lower court's decision to grant summary judgment on a de novo basis, making all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. EEOC v. University of Detroit, 904 F.2d 331, 334 (6th Cir.1990). Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). There is no genuine issue of material fact where the "nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof." Id. at 323. With these standards in mind, we hold that the District Court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's complaint.
A plaintiff bringing a disparate treatment claim under Title VII bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination by the defendant. "To prevail under the disparate treatment theory, a plaintiff must show that he has been the victim of intentional discrimination [because of his sex]." Daniels v. Board of Educ., 805 F.2d 203, 206 (6th Cir.1986) (citing United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983); International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15 (1977)). The District Court found that plaintiff did not satisfy even this threshold issue:
The plaintiff was fired because he allegedly sexually harassed defendant Lowe, not because of his gender. More specifically, defendant DeBartolo's decision to terminate the plaintiff's employment did not contemplate his gender. Instead, it concerned only the allegations of sexual harassment lodged against him by defendant Lowe. While another avenue may exist for the plaintiff to seek redress for his dismissal, Title VII provides no remedy under these circumstances.
Joint App. at 22-23. Similarly, the court found that plaintiff had failed to allege facts sufficient to support his claim of a hostile work environment. Plaintiff summarily alleged that the public signs of affection by the frequent shopping hostesses towards the security guards and DeBartolo's failure to put an end to it resulted in a violation of Title VII. The court found that "plaintiff neither alleges nor submits any evidence that the conduct of defendant Lowe and the other 'frequent shopping girls' created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment or that such an environment seriously influenced the psychological well being of the plaintiff" (citing Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987) ()).
Likewise, our review of the record leads us to conclude that plaintiff has failed to state a claim for disparate treatment under Title VII. Plaintiff has nowhere even alleged that he was fired because of his gender. We also conclude that plaintiff's claim under the hostile work environment theory is meritless and borders on frivolous. Plaintiff's true complaint is that he was wrongfully discharged because of false accusations of sexual harassment, a claim that is not cognizable under Title VII. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the District Court's dismissal of plaintiff's Title VII claims against defendants.
Plaintiff's next assignment of error is the District Court's refusal to grant plaintiff's motion for Rule 11 sanctions against defendants. Plaintiff alleged that the attorneys for DeBartolo had misrepresented a material fact to the court when they asserted that plaintiff admitted touching defendant Lowe. We review a district court's determination of Rule 11 sanctions for abuse of discretion. Homico Constr. & Dev. Co. v. Ti-Bert Systems, Inc., 939 F.2d 392, 394 (6th Cir.1991) (citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990)). While Albert never admitted that he touched Lowe's body, he did admit that he touched Lowe's coat while she was in it. We do not believe defendants' assertion was a material misrepresentation of Albert's statement. We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion is denying plaintiff's motion for Rule 11 sanctions.
Defendants' cross-appeal involves the denial of sanctions and attorneys' fees sought against plaintiff under Rule 11, Title VII, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and the court's inherent powers. The magistrate judge denied defendants' motion under all four theories.
Rule 11 provides in pertinent part:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record.... The signature of an attorney ... constitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best...
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