Lewis v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.

• Decision Date: 16 July 2013
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 12-747-BAJ-RLB
• Parties: BRIAN LEWIS v. JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana

BRIAN LEWIS v. JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 12-747-BAJ-RLB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

Signed: July 16, 2013

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE

Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint, Proceed In Forma Pauperis, Issue Subpoenas and Expedite the Court's ruling by or before June 28, 2013. (R. Doc. 33). Although seeking multiple forms of relief, these are all raised in a single filing. Plaintiff seeks leave to amend his Complaint to include a cause of action for discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, against existing Defendant, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. ("Chase") and two potential defendants, Jennifer Sikes and Chanel A. Robertson, both employees of Chase. (R. Doc. 33-1).¹ Additionally, Plaintiff wishes to proceed in forma pauperis for service of his Amended Complaint. Finally, Plaintiff moves the Court to subpoena or otherwise issue discovery "to find out women's names of who accuse[d]" him of sexual harassment and assault. (R. Doc. 33 at 1). Finally, Plaintiff asks that theCourt expedite its ruling on or before June 28, 2013.² For the reasons given below, Plaintiff's Motion for Leave is DENIED on all grounds.

I. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Leave to Amend Complaint and to Proceed In Forma Pauperis for Service

Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination against Chase with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). (R. Doc. 33-1 at 6). Because Plaintiff failed to attach his actual charge of discrimination, it is unclear when he filed the charge and what conduct the charge alleged. Nonetheless, Plaintiff has provided his Notice of Right to Sue Letter, dated May 16, 2013. (R. Doc. 33-1 at 6). Within 90 days of receiving his Right to Sue, Plaintiff moved for leave to file his Amended Complaint. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) ("within ninety days after the giving of such notice a civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the charge"). In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Chase and its employees, Jennifer Sikes and Chanel A. Robertson, engaged in bias and discriminatory conduct by closing his bank account. (R. Doc. 33-1 at 1).

Amendments to pleadings are generally governed by Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under Rule 15, after the period for amending as a matter of course elapses, "a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave" and a "court should freely give leave when justice so requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The rule "evinces a bias in favor of granting leave to amend." Martin's Herend Imports, Inc. v. Diamond & Gem Trading U.S.A. Co., 195 F.3d 765, 770 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 597 (5th Cir. 1981)). Although leave to amend should not be automatically granted, "[a] district court must possess a substantial reason to deny a requestfor leave to amend[.]" Jones v. Robinson Prop. Grp., L.P., 427 F.3d 987, 994 (5th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations omitted).

In determining whether to grant leave, the court may consider several factors, including "undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of amendment . . . ." Rhodes v. Amarillo Hosp. Dist., 654 F.2d 1148, 1153 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).

Denial of leave to amend on the basis of futility is "premised . . . on the court's evaluation of the amendment as insufficient to state a claim" upon which relief could be granted. Jamieson v. Shaw, 772 F.2d 1205, 1209 (5th Cir. 1985). In other words, "the same standard of legal sufficiency as applies under Rule 12(b)(6)," applies to determining futility. Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., LLC, 234 F.3d 863, 873 (5th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (defendant may move to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted"). A proposed complaint is legally insufficient "only if there is no set of facts that could be proven consistent with the allegations in the complaint that would entitle the plaintiff to relief." Power Entm't, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League Props., Inc., 151 F.3d 247, 249 (5th Cir. 1998).

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). By its very terms, Title VII applies only in the employment context. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 74 (1984) ("Once a contractual relationship of employment is established, the provisions of Title VII attach and govern certain aspects of that relationship."). Therefore, in order to state a causeof action, the legal relationship between Plaintiff and Defendant must be one of employer-employee.

Title VII defines "employer" as a "person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).³ The statute defines "employee" as "an individual employed by an employer." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). Assuming Chase generally qualifies as an "employer" under the statute, the deciding question before the Court is whether Plaintiff is "an individual employed" by Chase—i.e., whether an employment relationship exists to trigger the provisions of Title VII. Muhammad v. Dallas Cntty. Cmtty. Supervision & Corr. Dep't, 479 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 2007) (court must first determine if defendant meets statutory definition of employer and then must "analyze whether an employment relationship exists between the plaintiff and the defendant").

Plaintiff does not suggest, argue or represent that Chase is his employer. Throughout this litigation, Plaintiff has represented that he is or was a banking customer of Chase. In fact, the discriminatory conduct described in his Amended Complaint includes allegations that Chase "close[d] down [his] bank account" and will no longer allow him to bank with Chase. (R. Doc. 33-1 at 1). The EEOC reached the same conclusion after its investigation and explained it was closing "its file on this charge" because "[n]o [e]mployee/[e]mployer [relationship" existed between Plaintiff and Chase. (Pl.'s Dismissal & Notice of Rights, R. Doc. 33-1 at 6). Because Plaintiff is a customer and has no employment relationship with Chase, his Amended Complaint is futile as it fails to state a cause of action under Title VII or any other laws enforced by the EEOC. See, e.g., Bender v. Suburban Hosp., 159 F.3d 186, 190 (4th Cir. 1998) (patient could notsue doctor under Title VII because a "patient is a doctor's customer, not his employer"); Townes v. Finkelstein, 178 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1047 (E.D. Mo. 2001) (dismissing claim "because Plaintiff alleges she is a customer of Defendants and not an employee, she has failed to state a claim under Title VII"); Neal v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 11-1436, 2012 WL 398620, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2012) (finding that judgment was appropriate for defendant because "Title VII provides a cause of action for employees whose rights have been violated by their employer. Plaintiff was not an employee of Home Depot. Rather, he was a customer.").

Likewise, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint also fails to state a claim against potential defendants, Jennifer Sikes and Chanel A. Robertson, both employees of Chase. (R. Doc. 33-1). It is well settled in the Fifth Circuit that there is no individual liability for employees under Title VII or any other laws enforced by the EEOC. See, e.g., Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 653 (5th Cir. 1994) ("individuals who do not otherwise qualify as an employer cannot be held liable for a breach of Title VII."); Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 262 (5th Cir. 1999) (Fifth Circuit "does not interpret the statute as imposing individual liability for such a claim"); Smith v. Amedisys Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 448-49 (5th Cir. 2002) (recognizing the term employer does include "any agent" of an employer, but explaining "Congress's purpose was merely to import respondeat superior liability into Title VII."). As individual employees of Chase, Jennifer Sikes and Chanel A. Robertson are not subject to liability.

Even if, purely for the sake of argument, Plaintiff could establish an employment relationship between Plaintiff and Chase, his Amended Complaint is still not cognizable under Title VII. Plaintiff claims to have been wrongfully accused of sexual harassment and assault. Title VII prohibits an employer from firing, hiring or otherwise allocating the benefits of employment based on an individual's race, sex, national origin, color or religion. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1); see also Hishon, 467 U.S. at 75-76 ("Those benefits that comprise the incidents of employment, or that form an aspect of the relationship between the employer and employees, may not be afforded in a manner contrary to Title VII."). However, being accused of sexual harassment, without alleging any adverse action taken because of some protected characteristic, does not state a cause of action under Title VII or any other law enforced by the EEOC. See, e.g., Balazs v. Liebenthal, 32 F.3d 151, 155 (4th Cir. 1994) ("An allegation that he was falsely accused of [sexual harassment] which, if true, might have given rise to a claim of employment discrimination based on sex by someone else in no way states a cause of action that plaintiff himself was a victim of discrimination based on his sex."). Albert v. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp., 999 F.2d 539, 1993 WL 272477, at *3 (6th Cir. July 20, 1993) (unpublished table decision) ("Plaintiff's...