A______ Y______ v. State
| Decision Date | 20 July 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 15863,15863 |
| Parties | A______ Y______, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Dinah Denson Gaines, San Antonio, for appellant.
Ben Steinhauser, Asst. Criminal Dist. Atty., San Antonio, for appellee.
Appellant, a juvenile, appeals from an order of the juvenile court of Bexar County revoking probation previously granted him and committing him to the care, custody and control of the Texas Youth Council.
On August 24, 1976, the juvenile court entered judgment, based on a petition alleging that appellant had committed the offense of burglary, finding that appellant had engaged in delinquent conduct and committing him to the care, custody and control of his mother, under supervision of the Chief Juvenile Officer of Bexar County, for a period of one year, with provision for extension of the period of probation for additional one-year terms not extending beyond the date of his 18th birthday. The grant of probation was subject to several conditions, the first of which provided that appellant "not violate any of the laws of the United States, the State of Texas, or any political subdivision of the State of Texas."
On November 11, 1976, the State, as authorized by Tex. Family Code Ann. § 54.05(d) (1975), filed a motion to modify the prior disposition, alleging that appellant had committed the offense of burglary on September 23, 1976. After a hearing, the juvenile court entered the order of which appellant complains. The order recites that the court finds that the evidence "is sufficient, beyond a reasonable doubt to support the allegations of the motion (to modify disposition) alleging (sic) that (appellant) did violate provision number one of the judgment entered on August 24, 1976 . . . ."
One of appellant's contentions is that the order appealed from does not comply with the requirement, embodied in § 54.05(i) of the Family Code, that an order modifying a prior disposition "shall specifically state . . . (the) reasons for modifying the disposition . . . ."
Our attention has been called to no cases construing § 54.05(i). However, this section is, except for the presence of the word "modifying," identical to the language found in § 54.04(f) of the Family Code, which sets out the requirements of a disposition order. In Matter of TRW, 533 S.W.2d 139, 141 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1976, no writ), it was held that § 54.04(f), which requires a specific statement of the reasons for the disposition, makes it necessary that the modifying order contain a specific recital of the offense committed by the child. Cf. In re J. R. C., 522 S.W.2d 579, 583 (Tex.Civ.App. Texarkana 1975, writ ref'd n. r. e.), relating to the requirement, found in § 54.02(h) of the Family Code, that where a juvenile court "waives" its jurisdiction and certifies a child for trial as an adult, the order state specifically the reasons for the waiver.
The State here urges that since the challenged order refers to the first condition embodied in the judgment of August 24, 1976, and such original disposition order sets out fully the provision in question, there is no problem. We disagree. In TRW, supra, the disposition order was embodied in the same instrument which contained the adjudicatory finding that the child had engaged in delinquent conduct. The adjudicatory portion of the judgment specifically named the offense involved. Yet the Dallas Court of Civil Appeals said, "This statement of the offenses in an order of adjudication, even though combined in the same document with the order of disposition, does not constitute a specific statement of the reasons for disposition . . . ."
A statement to the effect that the court finds that the child has violated a reasonable and lawful order of the court does no more than track the statutory language of § 54.05(f). In Matter of ANM, 542 S.W.2d 916, 919 (Tex.Civ.App. Dallas 1976, no writ), it was said that the use of the word "specifically" in § 54.04(f) "emphasizes that the legislature intended the court to do more than merely track the statutory language."
We conclude that the order in this case does not comply with the requirements of § 54.05(i). But we do not agree with appellant's contention that this infirmity requires that the judgment below be reversed and the cause remanded for new trial.
In ANM, supra, the Court reversed the judgment because of the defect in the order and remanded the case for new trial. However, in that case, the Court of Civil Appeals also concluded that, under the facts...
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In re J.M., 06-08-00087-CV.
...child has violated a reasonable and lawful order of the court does no more than track the statutory language of § 54.05(f)." A.Y. v. State, 554 S.W.2d 805, 807 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1977, no writ). The A.Y. court, citing In re A.N.M., 542 S.W.2d 916, 919 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1976, no wr......
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