AA Professional Bail v. State, No. A03A2343.

Decision Date07 January 2004
Docket NumberNo. A03A2343.
Citation592 S.E.2d 866,265 Ga. App. 42
PartiesA.A. PROFESSIONAL BAIL v. STATE of Georgia.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Leeza Cherniak, Atlanta, for appellant.

Gerald N. Blaney, Jr., Solicitor-General, Gwinnett County, Jeffrey P. Kwiatkowski, Jason R. Samuels, Assistant Solicitor-General, Lawrenceville, for appellee. ELLINGTON, Judge.

In this discretionary appeal, A.A. Professional Bail ("AAPB") appeals from the trial court's order denying its motion to set aside forfeiture of a bond it issued on behalf of John Horsley. AAPB contends OCGA § 17-6-31(e) precludes the State from forfeiting the bond because the State failed to try Horsley within one year after it was posted. We agree and reverse.

OCGA § 9-11-60(d)(3) authorizes a trial court to set aside a judgment based upon a "nonamendable defect which appears upon the face of the record or pleadings." "A trial court's decision regarding a motion to set aside a judgment will not be reversed absent a showing of manifest abuse of discretion." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Head v. Wachovia Bank, 264 Ga.App. 608, 610(2) 591 S.E.2d 424 (2003).

On October 10, 2000, a Norcross, police officer cited Horsley for three misdemeanor traffic offenses and booked him into the local jail. The citation issued to Horsley ordered him to "appear" in municipal court "to answer to this charge" on November 8, 2000. On October 11, 2000, AAPB posted bond for Horsley. Horsley appeared on November 8 and demanded a jury trial. The parties agree that, on February 7, 2001, Horsley's charges were bound over to Gwinnett State Court from the municipal court as a result of Horsley's jury trial demand. On May 1, 2001, the State filed an accusation against Horsley for the traffic offenses. On August 16, 2002, Horsley failed to appear for the first scheduled jury trial calendar call, and the trial court issued a bond forfeiture order.

AAPB moved to set aside the forfeiture order based on OCGA § 17-6-31(e), because the misdemeanor charges against Horsley were not tried within one year after the date the company posted the bond. OCGA § 17-6-31(e) provides:

If the prosecuting attorney does not try the charges against a defendant within a period of two years in the case of felonies and one year in the case of misdemeanors after the date of posting bond, then judgment rendered after such period may not be enforced against the surety on the bond and the surety shall thereafter be relieved of liability on the bond. This subsection shall not apply where the prosecuting attorney's failure to try the charges is due to the fault of the principal.

The State opposed the motion because its "failure to try the charges [was] due to the fault of the principal." See id. The trial court found that the State called the case for trial in the Municipal Court of Norcross, that the defendant exercised his right to have the case bound over to state court and filed pre-trial motions in state court, and that the defendant's actions precluded the State from trying the case within one year. It further found that the "fault" language in OCGA § 17-6-31(e) does not require any wrongdoing on the part of the principal; instead, it simply means that actions of the principal caused the delay.

On appeal, the State argues that the only prosecuting attorney who could satisfy the...

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    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 4 Octubre 2017
    ...Ga. 359, 361 (1), 729 S.E.2d 378 (2012) (looking to dictionary for plain and ordinary meaning of word); A. A. Prof'l Bail v. State of Ga., 265 Ga. App. 42, 44, 592 S.E.2d 866 (2004) (same).12 See Deal, 294 Ga. at 173 (1) (a), 751 S.E.2d 337 (noting that in construing statutory text, "courts......
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    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • 9 Julio 2012
    ...a term of art, but is a word of general use, it is to be given its ‘ordinary and everyday meaning.’ ” A.A. Professional Bail v. State of Georgia, 265 Ga.App. 42, 44, 592 S.E.2d 866 (2004) (interpreting OCGA § 17–6–31(e)). Looking to English and legal dictionaries, the court held that “fault......
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    • Georgia Court of Appeals
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    ...quoting Nadel v. Branch Banking & Trust Co. , 340 Ga. App. 213, 215, 797 S.E.2d 140 (2017). See also A. A. Professional Bail v. State of Ga. , 265 Ga. App. 42, 592 S.E.2d 866 (2004) (holding that a trial court's decision to set aside a judgment based on a nonamendable defect appearing on th......
  • AA–Prof'l Bail Bonding v. Deal
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    • Georgia Court of Appeals
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    ...bond forfeiture.Judgment affirmed.McFADDEN, J., concurs and ELLINGTON, P.J., concurs in judgment only.1 A.A. Prof'l Bail v. State of Ga., 265 Ga.App. 42, 42, 592 S.E.2d 866 (2004) (punctuation omitted).2 Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172(1)(a), 751 S.E.2d 337 (2013) (punctuation omitted); s......
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