Aaronson v. City of New Haven
| Decision Date | 10 June 1920 |
| Citation | 94 Conn. 690,110 A. 872 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | AARONSON v. CITY OF NEW HAVEN. |
Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, New Haven County; Earnest C Simpson, Judge.
Action by Abraham Aaronson against the City of New Haven to recover damages for injuries to the plaintiff's automobile and for the loss of its use, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant in the maintenance of one of its highways, brought to the court of common pleas in New Haven county and tried to the jury. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $567, with appeal by the defendant. No error.
The injuries in question were caused by the plaintiff driving his automobile against an obstruction in the highway. Plaintiff alleged and claimed to have proved that for some time before the accident the defendant city had maintained, at or about the center of the intersection of Sherman avenue and Elm Street a so-called silent policeman, consisting of a heavy circular base and an upright post, surmounted by a sign and a suitable light; that the device was not otherwise anchored or fastened in the highway than by its own weight, and that some time before the injuries in question were received the device was toppled over and lay in the traveled part of the highway and constituted a dangerous obstruction to its use; and that after notice of the existence of this dangerous obstruction was given to the defendant, it was negligently permitted to remain unguarded in the traveled part of the highway until the plaintiff in the exercise of due care ran over it and injured his motorcar. The specifications of negligence in the complaint are that the defendant and its servants were negligent, in that they placed a dangerous obstruction upon the highway without securely anchoring it, and in that they failed and neglected to guard or remove the same after notice that it had been toppled over and rolled into the traveled roadway. The case was tried to the jury on a general denial, and a general verdict for the plaintiff was rendered and accepted. A motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the evidence was denied. Defendant appeals from the refusal of the court to grant a new trial, and for errors in the charge and in the admission of evidence.
William L. Bennett and Thomas R. Robinson, both of New Haven, for appellant.
Kenneth Wynne, of New Haven, for appellee.
The complaint alleges that in the course of the transaction described therein the city committed two breaches of legal duty toward the plaintiff: First, in placing a dangerous obstruction at the intersection of these highways without securely anchoring it; and, second, by leaving it unguarded in the traveled roadway after notice that it had become displaced and after reasonable opportunity to remove it.
As to the first specification of negligence, the defendant city claims that the silent policeman in question was placed at the intersection of these highways by the direction of its proper officials, for the regulation and direction of traffic and in the exercise of a governmental duty, and that it is not liable for any damage directly and proximately due to placing a silent policeman of its own selection at a location chosen by it for that purpose.
The second specification of negligence was met by the city with the denial that it failed to exercise reasonable diligence in removing the device after notice that it had been displaced and rolled into the traveled highway. Upon this latter issue there was evidence from which the jury might have found that the signal was knocked down and rolled into the traveled roadway about 6:30 p. m. on the day of the accident, that notice of the fact was given to the officer in charge of the nearest police station about 7 p. m., and that it would require not to exceed 12 minutes to walk from the police station to the place of the accident, and that the device lay in the roadway until about 7:30 p. m., when the accident occurred.
Concededly, this device, as it lay displaced in the roadway, was an obstruction and a defect in the highway, and the jury might properly have found that the defendant had not acted with reasonable diligence in removing it after notice. That being so, the motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the evidence was properly denied.
" The verdict was a general one; hence the presumption is that the jury found all issues for the plaintiff." Tillinghast v. Leppert, 93 Conn. 247, 105 A. 615.
In this connection, we think the evidence of the witness Church, to the effect that other accidents of which the city had notice had been caused by this silent policeman being displaced, was admissible as tending to show knowledge of conditions affecting the degree of diligence which might reasonably be required of the defendant in removing it from the traveled roadway after notice.
The other assignments of error relate to portions of the charge defining the legal duty of the city to exercise care in placing silent policemen at the intersection of streets. The court said in part:
" Now, the care required of the city in placing a signal device at the intersection of the street in question is that degree of care that the ordinarily prudent person would have used in placing such an object at the intersection of these two highways or streets."
And again:
" So, if you find that the plaintiff has shown by the proper weight of evidence-that is, by the fair preponderance of the evidence-that the defendant was negligent as claimed by him in not fastening or anchoring the signal device, so that it would not be liable to topple or be knocked over and moved into a position on the highway, and that this should have been reasonably anticipated by the city, and that this did as a matter of fact occur, and that the highway as a matter of fact was made or rendered not reasonably safe for ordinary travel thereby, and that the plaintiff was injured thereby without any fault or neglect on his part, your verdict should be for the plaintiff."
We think the court erred in charging that the mere placing of a silent policeman at the intersection of the streets,...
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