Abbeville County School Dist. v. State, 24939
Decision Date | 22 April 1999 |
Docket Number | 24939 |
Citation | 515 S.E.2d 534 |
Parties | Abbeville County School District, Allendale County School District, Bamberg County School District 1, Bamberg County School District 2, Barnwell County School District 19, Barnwell County School District 29, Barnwell County School District 45, Berkeley County School District, Chesterfield County School District, Clarendon County School District 1, Clarendon County School District 2,. Clarendon County School District 3, Dillon County School District 1, Dillon County School District 2, Dillon County School District 3, Florence County School District 1, Florence County School District 2, Florence County School District 3, Florence County School District 4, Florence County School District 5, Hampton County School District 1, Hampton County School District 2, Jasper County School District, Laurens County School District 55, Laurens County School District 56, Lee County School District, Lexington County School District 4, Marion County School District 1, Marion County School District 2, Marion County School District 3, Marion County School District 4, Marlboro County School District, McCormick County School District, Orangeburg County School District 1, Orangeburg County School District 2, Orangeburg County School District 3, Orangeburg County School District 6, Orangeburg County School District 8, Saluda County School District and Williamsburg County School District, William L. Mills, individually, and as a taxpayer residing in Allendale County and as Guardian ad Litem of Waylon Priester, Waylon Priester, a minor, by and through William L. Mills, as Guardian ad Litem, Betty Bagley, individually, and as a taxpayer residing in Bamberg County and as parent and Guardian ad Litem of Tyler Bagley, Tyler Bagley, a minor, by and through Betty Bagley, as Guardian ad Litem, Evert Comer, Jr., individually, and as a taxpayer residing in Bamberg County and as parent and Guardian ad Litem of Kimberly Comer, Kimberly Comer, a minor, by and through Evert Comer, Jr., as Guardian ad Litem |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
v. BR The State of South Carolina; David M. Beasley, as Governor of the State of South Carolina; Nikki Setzler, as Chairman of the Senate Education Committee and Chairman of the Education Subcommittee of the Senate Finance Committee, in his representation capacity as a properly designated representative of the South Carolina Senate; David H. Wilkins, as Speaker of the House of Representatives and as representative of the South Carolina House of Representatives; Barbara S. Nielsen, as State Superintendent of Education and as a Respondents. representative of the State Department of Education; and Celia Gettys, as Chairman of the South Carolina State Board of Education, BR BR Opinion No. 24939BR BR Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 15 S.E. 2dBR BR THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, In The Supreme Court BR BR Heard October 9, 1997BR BR Filed April 22, 1999 BR BR Appeal From Lee County Thomas W. Cooper, Jr., Judge BR BR Curtis L. Ott, of Turner, Padget, Graham Laney, P.A.,; and Carl B. Epps, II, of Nelson, Mullins, Riley Scarborough, LLP, both of Columbia, for appellants. BR BR W. Hogan Brown and Kenneth A. Davis, of Columbia, for respondent Setzler. BR BR Attorney General Charles Molony Condon, Deputy Attorney General J. Emory Smith, Jr., both of Columbia; Ashley B. Abel, of Jackson, Lewis, Schnitzler Krupman, of Greenville, for respondents State, Beasley, and Gettys. BR BR Stephen L. Elliott, Executive Director of Research, of the House of Representatives, of Columbia, for respondent Wilkins. BR BR George C. Leventis, of Columbia, for Respondent Nielsen. BR BR Barbara E. Brunson and Nancy McCormick, both of Columbia, for the Intervenors South Carolina Protection Advocacy System for the Handicapped, Inc., Suber and Cook. BR BR AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART BR BR FINNEY, C.J.: BR BR This is a declaratory judgment action brought by appellants challenging the State's funding of public primary and secondary education. Appellants are forty less wealthy school districts, their public school students, and their taxpayers; respondents (the State) are the State of South Carolina and individuals sued as representatives of governmental bodies. The circuit court granted the State's Rule 12 (b) (6), SCRCP, motion and dismissed appellants' complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The complaint alleged violations of the South Carolina Constitution's education clause (art. XI, 3), the state and federal equal protection clauses, and a violation of the Education Finance Act (EFA), South Carolina Code Ann. 59-20-10 to -80 (1990 Supp. 1998). We reverse the education clause ruling, and affirm as to the remaining issues. BR BR In South Carolina, public education is funded by the federal, state, and local governments. State funding of education is done primarily through mechanisms established by two acts: the EFA and the Education Improvement Act (EIA), S.C. Code Ann. 59-21-420 to -450 (1990 Supp. 1998). The EFA distributes funds using a wealth-sensitive formula, which results in appellants receiving proportionately more state money than wealthier districts. Unlike the EFA, the EIA distributes funds without regard to the school district's tax base. This Court has previously denied constitutional challenges to these statutory distribution methods, including an equal protection challenge, to the EFA's funding scheme. Richland County v. Campbell, 294 S.C. 346, 364 S.E.2d 470 (1988) (Campbell). BR BR Appellants raise a number of challenges to the State's current education funding system. Essentially, they allege that the system is underfunded, resulting in a violation of the state Constitution's education clause, art. XI, 3; that to the extent funds are distributed without regard to district wealth under the EIA, the system violates the state and federal constitutional guarantees of equal protection; and that the EFA created a private cause of action. Unlike similar suits brought in other states, appellants do not seek "equal" state funding, since they already receive more than wealthier districts, but instead allege that the funding results in an inadequate education. On appeal, appellants allege the circuit court erred in granting the State's 12 (b) (6) motion, and also allege procedural error. BR BR We address the procedural issue first. While the order purports to decide a Rule 12 (b) (6) motion, it is clear that the judge in fact granted respondents summary judgment, making numerous factual determinations, and finding appellants failed to present "clear and convincing" evidence to support...
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