Abbott v. City of Virginia Beach
Decision Date | 22 July 1988 |
Docket Number | No. 87-885-N.,87-885-N. |
Citation | 689 F. Supp. 600 |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
Parties | Tom ABBOTT, et al., Plaintiffs, v. The CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH, Defendant. |
Michael T. Leibig, Joseph E. Slater, Zwerdling, Paul, Leibig, Kahn & Thompson, Washington, D.C., K.W. Stolle, Virginia Beach, Va., for plaintiffs.
Randall M. Blow, City of Virginia Beach, Virginia Beach, Va., for defendant.
This action was brought for alleged violations of the amended Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. Plaintiffs are the Virginia Beach Policemen's Benevolent Association ("VBPBA"); the Virginia Beach Police Sergeant's Association ("VBPSA"); Tom Abbott and Frank LaPorta, the current and past presidents of VBPBA, and Nicholas Sitarski, the current president of VBPSA, in their individual and organizational capacities and in their capacities as "FLSA Representatives"; and one hundred twenty-six other individual Virginia Beach police officers. The sole defendant is the City of Virginia Beach (the "City"). Plaintiffs seek, among other things, declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and compensatory and liquidated damages under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
On June 3, 1988, plaintiffs moved this Court for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a). On June 7, 1988, the City moved for partial summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(b) on the issue of whether its practices violated 29 U.S.C. § 207(o)(2)(A). On June 13, 1988, plaintiffs submitted a reply brief in which they state that all of the City's alleged FLSA violations had been corrected with the exception of its alleged violation of Section 207(o)(2)(A). Accordingly, this issue is ripe for disposition.
The facts material to resolving this issue are not in dispute. The individual plaintiffs are employees of the City. The City is a municipal corporation organized and operating under Virginia law and a public agency within the meaning of Section 207(o)(1). The Virginia Beach Police Department (the "Police Department") is the law-enforcement agency of the City. Collectively, Abbott, LaPorta and Sitarski (both individually and through the VBPBA and VBPSA) are the designated "FLSA Representatives" for 253 of the between 400 and 500 officers in the Police Department. Some of the 253 police officers are also individual plaintiffs.
On April 1, 1986, the City, through the Police Department, instituted a policy concerning officer overtime pay which continued until January 21, 1988. As required by 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(2), an officer was paid for any time worked over forty hours a week at a rate one and a half times his regular pay rate. Each time an officer worked overtime, he was given the choice of whether to take his overtime pay in compensatory time or money. He indicated his choice by completing a "Form P.D. 130-2" and submitting it to his immediate supervisor at the end of his shift. The City's policy was to honor an officer's choice, and there is no evidence that a Form P.D. 130-2 request was ever denied.
The City adopted this policy of its own accord instead of by agreement with Abbott, LaPorta and Sitarski. No meetings were held between the City and these plaintiffs, although the City did offer to meet with them to discuss their individual problems and concerns.
On January 21, 1988, the City, through the Police Department, promulgated its present policy of paying all overtime in money.
Section 207(o) provides in part:
29 U.S.C. § 207(o) (1985 Supp. III). The parties agree that the City's policy since January 21, 1988 is in compliance with Section 207(o)(2)(A). They disagree, though, over whether the City's policy from April 1, 1986 to January 21, 1988 complied with Section 207(o)(2)(A). Plaintiffs contend that since 253 Virginia Beach police officers were represented by Abbott, LaPorta and Sitarski, Section 207(o)(2)(A)(i) required that the City enter into an agreement with these plaintiffs rather than each of the 253 officers individually concerning the use of compensatory time as pay for overtime. The City takes the position that because Virginia law prohibits it from collectively bargaining with representatives of its employees, see Commonwealth v. County Board of Arlington County, 217 Va. 558, 232 S.E.2d 30 (1977), it was required to comply with Section 207(o)(2)(A)(ii), which it did by implementing a policy of allowing police officers to individually choose to take overtime pay in compensatory time or money.
The issue comes down to whether Abbott, LaPorta and Sitarski needed to be "recognized" representatives in order to make a Section 207(o)(2)(A)(i) agreement. "Recognition", as that term is understood in the context of the National Labor Relations Act, the Taft-Hartley amendments and labor law in general, means the acknowledgment by an employer that a collective-bargaining representative has been designated by a majority of employees in the appropriate bargaining unit and thus that the employer is obligated to bargain exclusively with the representative. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Ralph Printing & Lithographing Co., 379 F.2d 687, 692-693 (8th Cir.1967); N.L.R.B. v. Clinton E. Hobbs Co., 132 F.2d 249, 251 (1st Cir.1942).
Section 207(o)(2)(A)(i)'s use of the term "representatives" is sufficiently ambiguous that resort to the legislative history of the Section is required. Cf. Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters v. West Adams County Fire Protection District, Civil Action No. 87-F-16 at 5, fn. 2 (D.Colo. March 18, 1988). The legislative history makes clear that Congress intended Section 207(o)(2)(A)(i) to apply only where state law permits employees of state and local governmental entities to have recognized representatives. In its report on the 1985 FLSA amendments that created Section 207(o), the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources stated in regard to Section 207(o)(2)(A):
Where employees have a recognized representative, the agreement, or understanding must be between that representative and the employer, either through collective bargaining or through a memorandum of understanding or other type of agreement. Where employees do not have a recognized representative, the agreement or understanding must be between the employer and the individual employee.
S.Rep. No. 99-150, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in 1985 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 651, 658.
Plaintiffs rely on two cases that, to the contrary, hold that Section 207(o )(2)(A)(i) applies to any employee or group of employees who designates a representative to negotiate with the state or local governmental employer concerning the form in which overtime will be compensated, whether or not that representative is recognized. See Jacksonville Professional Fire Fighters Ass'n v. Jacksonville, 685 F.Supp. 513 (E.D.N.C.1987); Dillard v. Harris, No. C86-834A (N.D.Ga. Sept. 30, 1987). The Court does not find these cases persuasive. These cases fail to address the Senate Committee report and instead look to two sources outside of the legislative history in reaching their holdings. The first is the Department of Labor's interpretation of Section 207(o)(2)(A) found at 29 C.F.R. § 553.22. That regulation reads in part:
Letter from Congressional Sponsors of the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1985 to Secretary of Labor William E. Brock at 2 (Sept. 26, 1986). If the Senate Committee report did not address Congress' intent concerning Section 207(o )(2)(A), these two sources would have interpretive value. However, the Senate Committee report speaks clearly and to the contrary of these sources. As legislative history, the Senate Committee's interpretation of Section 207(o)(2)(A) must prevail over the Department of Labor's interpretation and a post-enactment attempt by several Congressmen to place their own gloss on the statute.
The Court need not pause long over the fact that Section 207(o)(2)(A)(i) provides that an agreement under that subsection can be reached by means of a "memorandum of understanding or any other agreement" as well as by means of a collective bargaining agreement. Here again, the Senate Committee report is helpful. Concerning the form that a Section 207(o )(2)(A)(i) agreement is to take,...
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