Abbott v. Gaskins
| Decision Date | 23 May 1902 |
| Parties | ABBOTT v. GASKINS. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Solomon Lincoln, for complainant.
John Lowell, for respondent.
The sole question presented by this case is whether the power given to the supreme judicial court by Pub. St. c. 142, § 14 is also given to probate courts by St. 1891, c. 415, § 1. The first statute is as follows: 'The supreme judicial court sitting in equity, may authorize the persons named as executors in an instrument purporting to be the last will of a person deceased to adjust by arbitration or compromise any controversy that may arise between the persons claiming as devisees or legatees under such will and the persons entitled to the estate of the deceased under the statutes regulating the descent and distribution of intestate estates; to which arbitration or compromise the persons named as executors those claiming as devisees or legatees, and those claiming the estate as intestate, shall be parties.' The second is as follows: 'The probate courts shall have jurisdiction in equity, concurrently with any other court having jurisdiction of proceedings in equity, of all cases and matters relating to the administration of estates of deceased persons or to wills or trusts created by will, and such jurisdiction may be exercised upon petition according to the usual course of proceedings in the probate courts.' It becomes necessary to consider briefly the state of equity jurisdiction in this commonwealth at the time of the passage of the second statute. Limited equity jurisdiction had been granted to the supreme judicial court from time to time, but finally, by virtue of St. 1877, c. 178, § 1, the court became possessed of 'jurisdiction in equity of all cases and matters of equity cognizable under the general principles of equity jurisprudence,' and as to such matters it became 'a court of general equity jurisdiction.' Speaking in a general way, it may be said that the various statutes under which this jurisdiction was granted were substantially re-enacted in Pub. St. c. 151, §§ 1-4. This court, 'sitting in equity,' also had jurisdiction in certain other cases outside the general principles of equity jurisprudence, some of which are enumerated by Morton, C.J., in delivering the opinion in Baldwin v. Wilbraham, 140 Mass. 459, 4 N.E. 829. The probate court also had jurisdiction in equity to hear and determine all matters relating to trusts created by will and various other matters not material to this inquiry. See Swasey v. Jaques, 144 Mass. 135, 10 N.E. 758, 59 Am. Rep. 65, and the statutes and cases therein cited. In this situation, St. 1883, c. 223, was passed. It conferred upon the superior court 'original and concurrent jurisdiction with the supreme judicial court in all matters in which relief or discovery in equity is sought, with all the powers and authorities incident to such jurisdiction,' with authority 'to issue all general and special writs and processes required in proceedings in equity to courts of inferior jurisdiction, corporations and persons when necessary to secure justice and equity.' Section 1. In Baldwin v. Wilbraham, ubi supra, Morton, C.J., speaks of this statute as follows: 'The language of the statute is broad, and, without doubt, it was intended to confer upon the superior court concurrent jurisdiction in equity in all suits between individuals involving private rights of which the supreme judicial court has jurisdiction by virtue of the general principles of equity jurisprudence.' In that case, however, it was held that the superior court did not have jurisdiction in equity over a petition brought under Pub. St. c. 27, § 129, by 10 taxable inhabitants to restrain a town from an alleged illegal expenditure of money,--that not being a matter within the general principles of equity jurisprudence; and it was said that the intention of the legislature was 'to give the superior court concurrent jurisdiction in all matters within the scope of the general equity jurisprudence, but to retain within the exclusive jurisdiction of the supreme judicial court other special bills, writs, or petitions allowed by our statutes, in which relief in equity is prayed for.' This decision was made and published in the early part of the year 1886, five years before St. 1891, c. 415, was passed. See, also, Langmaid v. Reed, 159 Mass. 409, 34 N.E. 593; Steele v. Signal Co., 160 Mass. 36, 35 N.E. 105; Barker v. Mackay, 168 Mass. 76, 46 N.E. 412,--where the same rule is applied. In the light of the previous statutes, including St. 1883, c. 223, and of the interpretation given as above stated to the one last named, St. 1891, c. 415, was passed. It confers upon the probate courts 'jurisdiction in equity, concurrently with any other court having jurisdiction of proceedings in equity, of all cases and matters relating to the administration of estates of deceased persons,' etc., 'and such jurisdiction may be exercised upon petition according to the usual course...
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