Abboud v. Papio-Missouri River Natural Resources Dist.

• Decision Date: 12 December 1997
• Docket Number: No. S-96-275,PAPIO-MISSOURI,S-96-275
• Citation: 253 Neb. 514,571 N.W.2d 302
• Parties: Nancy A. ABBOUD, Trustee, Appellee, v.RIVER NATURAL RESOURCES DISTRICT, Appellant.
• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Page 302

571 N.W.2d 302

253 Neb. 514

Nancy A. ABBOUD, Trustee, Appellee, v. PAPIO-MISSOURI RIVER NATURAL RESOURCES DISTRICT, Appellant.

No. S-96-275.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

Dec. 12, 1997.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Motions for New Trial: Appeal and Error. A motion for new trial is addressed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision will be upheld in the absence of an abuse of that discretion.

2. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation is a matter of law in connection with which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent, correct conclusion irrespective of the determination made by the court below.

3. Statutes: Legislature: Intent. When interpreting statutes, a court must determine and give effect to the purpose and intent of the Legislature as ascertained from the entire language of the statute considered in its plain, ordinary, and popular sense, as it is the court's duty to discover, if possible, the Legislature's intent from the language of the statute itself.

4. Statutes. A court should construe statutes relating to the same subject matter together so as to maintain a consistent and sensible scheme.

5. Eminent Domain: Statutes. Statutes conferring and circumscribing the power of eminent domain must be strictly construed.

6. Eminent Domain: Interest. The right to the payment of interest on a condemnation award is a vested substantive right; whereas, the right to have a specific rate govern the interest to be assessed on the condemnation award is not a vested substantive right.

7. Statutes: Legislature: Intent. A legislative act operates only prospectively and not retrospectively, unless the legislative intent and purpose that it should operate retrospectively are clearly disclosed.

8. Eminent Domain: Statutes: Interest. A new statutory interest rate will apply to a condemnation award as of the effective date of the amendment implementing the new rate.

9. Statutes: Legislature: Intent: Appeal and Error. When determining the meaning of a statute, an appellate court may conjunctively consider and construe a collection of statutes which pertain to a certain subject matter to determine the intent of the Legislature so that different provisions of the act are consistent, harmonious, and sensible.

10. Eminent Domain: Final Orders: Attorney Fees. Since a determination of whether attorney fees should be awarded in a condemnation action relies on the existence of a final judgment, an attorney fees award cannot constitute a part of the final judgment on which interest is allowed. Rather, in a condemnation action, attorney fees are allowed and taxed as a part of costs.

Paul F. Peters and Christopher D. Curzon, of Schmid, Mooney & Frederick, P.C., Omaha, for appellant.

Joseph S. Daly and Jeffrey P. McGinnis, of Sodoro, Daly & Sodoro, Omaha, for appellee.

WHITE, C.J., and CAPORALE, WRIGHT, CONNOLLY, GERRARD, STEPHAN, and McCORMACK, JJ.

GERRARD, Justice.

In the district court for Douglas County, Nancy A. Abboud filed a posttrial motion requesting the court to determine the rate of interest to be applied to the delinquent portion of a condemnation award and an attorney fees award. The district court determined that the rate of interest to be applied to both awards was 14 percent for the entire period that the payment of the awards remains delinquent. On February 23, 1996, the district court denied the motion for new trial by the Papio-Missouri River Natural Resources District (NRD). The NRD appeals the district court's order denying its motion for new trial. We determine that Abboud is not entitled to legal interest on the attorney fees award. We further determine that because there was an amendment changing the 14-percent interest rate, the new statutory interest rate must apply to the condemnation award from the effective date of the new rate, and, thus, we reverse the judgment and remand this matter to the district court with directions.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 1991, the NRD sought the condemnation of a parcel of land owned by Abboud. Pursuant to a condemnation award granted to Abboud by a board of appraisers, the NRD, on July 23, 1991, deposited the sum of $202,500 with the Douglas County Court. The NRD appealed the board's determination to the Douglas County District Court, where, on July 15, 1993, a jury returned a verdict granting Abboud a final condemnation award in the amount of $475,000. Subsequently, on August 13, the district court awarded Abboud statutory attorney fees.

On September 15, 1995, Abboud filed a motion requesting the court to determine the rate of interest to be applied to the delinquent portion of the condemnation award and attorney fees award. The district court entered an order on January 23, 1996, finding that the rate of interest to be applied to both awards was 14 percent. The NRD timely filed a motion for new trial, asserting that the findings in the January 23 order were not sustained by sufficient evidence and were contrary to law. The NRD's motion for new trial requested a new hearing solely with reference to the findings and conclusions of law in the January 23 order. On February 23, the district court denied the NRD's motion for new trial. The NRD appeals the

district court's order denying its motion for new trial.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

A motion for new trial is addressed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision will be upheld in the absence of an abuse of that discretion. Koehler v. Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co., 252 Neb. 712, 566 N.W.2d 750 (1997); Blose v. Mactier, 252 Neb. 333, 562 N.W.2d 363 (1997).

Statutory interpretation is a matter of law in connection with which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent, correct conclusion irrespective of the determination made by the court below. Bank of Papillion v. Nguyen, 252 Neb. 926, 567 N.W.2d 166 (1997); State ex rel. City of Elkhorn v. Haney, 252 Neb. 788, 566 N.W.2d 771 (1997).

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

The NRD asserts that the district court erred in granting (1) interest at the rate of 14 percent on the delinquent portion of the condemnation award for the entire period that the award remains unpaid and (2) interest on the attorney fees award.

ANALYSIS

When interpreting statutes, a court must determine and give effect to the purpose and intent of the Legislature as ascertained from the entire language of the statute considered in its plain, ordinary, and popular sense, as it is the court's duty to discover, if possible, the Legislature's intent from the language of the statute itself. Brown v. Wilson, 252 Neb. 782, 567 N.W.2d 124 (1997); In re Interest of Jeffrey R., 251 Neb. 250, 557 N.W.2d 220 (1996). Furthermore, a court should construe statutes relating to the same subject matter together so as to maintain a consistent and sensible scheme. State ex rel. City of Elkhorn v. Haney, supra; In re Interest of Brandy M. et al., 250 Neb. 510, 550 N.W.2d 17 (1996). Finally, statutes conferring and circumscribing the power of eminent domain must be strictly construed. Engelhaupt v. Village of Butte, 248 Neb. 827, 539 N.W.2d 430 (1995).

CONDEMNATION AWARD

In 1991, when this condemnation action was filed, and on July 23, 1991, when the NRD deposited $202,500 with the Douglas County Court, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 76-711 (Reissue 1990) provided that

[i]f an appeal is taken from the award of the appraisers by the condemner, the condemnee shall be entitled to interest from the date of deposit at the rate provided in section 45-104.01, as such rate may from time to time be adjusted by the Legislature, compounded annually, on the amount finally allowed....

Neb.Rev.Stat. § 45-104.01 (Reissue 1988), referred to in the above statute as determining the rate of interest to be applied, provided for a 14-percent interest rate. On November 13, 1992, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 76-711 (Reissue 1996) was amended to provide that

[i]f an appeal is taken from the award of the appraisers by the condemner, the condemnee shall be entitled to interest from the date of deposit at the rate provided in section 45-104.02, as such rate may from time to time be adjusted, compounded annually, on the amount finally allowed....

Neb.Rev.Stat. § 45-104.02 (Reissue 1993), referred to in the amended statute as determining the rate of interest to be applied, provides for a 14-percent interest rate through December 31, 1992. However, from January 1, 1993, and thereafter, § 45-104.02 further provides that the interest rate is to be redetermined every other year by the

Tax Commissioner and shall be equal to the average short-term borrowing rate for the federal government during July of the previous year rounded to the nearest whole percentage point plus three percentage points. If the new rate does not increase or decrease the old rate by at least two percentage points, the old rate shall continue in effect.

The NRD asserts that the appropriate rate of legal interest to be applied to the condemnation award is 14 percent until November 13, 1992. The NRD argues, however, that beginning November 13, 1992, the effective date of the amendment to § 76-711, interest In essence, Abboud contends that the 14-percent interest rate became vested when the condemnation suit was filed and when the NRD deposited a sum of money with the county court. However, we agree with the NRD's assertion that the interest rate could not become vested because § 76-711, before amendment, explicitly provided that the "[interest ] rate may from time to time be adjusted by the Legislature." If the Legislature intended the interest rate to become vested for the entire period that the payment of a condemnation award remains delinquent, this language would not have been included in the statute. See Coleman v. Chadron State College, 237 Neb. 491, 466 N.W.2d 526 (1991). The Legislature was neither silent nor ambiguous concerning the periodic interest rate adjustments on delinquent payments of condemnation awards. The only plausible...