Abdoo v. Sandusky Cnty. Sheriff
| Decision Date | 09 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 3:19 CV 400 |
| Parties | DAVID ABDOO, Plaintiff, v. SANDUSKY COUNTY SHERIFF, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Currently pending before this Court are two motions for summary judgment: one from Defendant-Deputy Matthew Ray and the Sandusky County Sheriff (Doc. 36), and another from Defendants City of Clyde, and Officers J.J Earhart and Mark Roach (Doc. 37). Plaintiff David Abdoo opposed both motions in one omnibus brief (Doc. 44), and each group of Defendants filed reply briefs (Docs. 47, 49). For the following reasons, the Court denies summary judgment for the individual officer Defendants on Count One of Abdoo's Complaint, and grants summary judgment for the municipal Defendants on Count Two and for the individual Defendants on Counts Three and Four of Abdoo's Complaint.
In February 2018, Abdoo left the Red Arrow Saloon and walked about 175 yards to his friend Amber Wesney's apartment. (Abdoo Dep., Doc. 31, at 37-38).1 He did not pay for his drinks prior to leaving. Id. at 36. Ray responded to a call from a Red Arrow bartender, where he was metby Earhart and Roach. (Doc. 34-2, at 1). They heard Abdoo had left after being disrespectful in the bar and went to Wesney's apartment. Id. Wesney's apartment is on the second floor, accessible by exterior stairs to a wooden deck. (Wesney Dep., Doc. 33, at 37). On the deck, Ray, Earhart, and Roach2 confronted Abdoo. (Abdoo Dep., Doc. 31, at 43-44). Abdoo was barefoot, according to Ray. (Ray Dep., Doc. 34-2, at 2). As he bent over to try to pick up a pair of boots, Ray noticed how unsteady Abdoo was; Abdoo also smelled strongly of alcohol. Id. Abdoo admits he was drunk, obnoxious, and disrespectful that night. (Abdoo Dep., Doc. 31, at 34).
Abdoo then sat on one of the chairs on the deck to put on the boots, but Ray ordered him to stand, which Abdoo did. (Ray Dep., Doc. 34, at 59-60). Ray looked at the outside of Abdoo's pockets and saw nothing that suggested Abdoo was armed. Id. at 58. Ray then questioned Abdoo, but Abdoo refused to answer the questions. (Wesney Dep., Doc. 33, at 50-51).
After Abdoo's refusal to answer, Ray told him he was under arrest for theft. Id. at 55. Abdoo placed his hands behind his back, and Ray handcuffed him; Abdoo did not physically resist. (Ray Dep., Doc. 34, at 61). Ray patted down Abdoo's pockets and felt nothing he believed could be a weapon. Id. at 58, 62. After the pat down, Ray told Abdoo he was going to search inside his pockets. Id. at 65. Ray asked if there was anything in Abdoo's pockets that could stick or poke him. Id. at 66. Abdoo said he has something that can poke Ray in his right pocket. (Abdoo Dep., Doc. 31, at 48). Abdoo claims the "something" was his penis, while Ray says he thought Abdoo was referring to a needle. Id.; Ray Dep., Doc. 34, at 66.
Abdoo was handcuffed tightly. (Abdoo Dep., Doc. 31, at 48). As Ray began searching him shortly after he was handcuffed, Abdoo made a "slight motion backwards with his left arm."(Wesney Dep., Doc. 33, at 59). Wesney, who was also on the deck, likewise saw Abdoo stumble backward. Id. at 58-59. Wesney did not see Abdoo push into an officer with his body. Id. at 93-94.
Shortly after this, some combination of officers took Abdoo down to the deck surface. (Ray Dep., Doc. 34, at 27-28). Ray described the takedown as a balance displacement technique, bending Abdoo forward at the waist. Id. at 30. Abdoo said he felt his legs come out from underneath him and his head hit the deck. (Abdoo Dep., Doc. 31, at 48). Earhart says he, Ray, and Roach took Abdoo down. (Earhart Dep., Doc. 32, at 49-50). Roach testified he did not take Abdoo down, but Earhart and Ray did. (Roach Dep., Doc. 35, at 25). Ray testified he and Earhart, and all three officers, participated in the takedown. (Ray Dep., Doc. 34, at 28, 30). Wesney says Ray and Roach took Abdoo down. (Wesney Dep., Doc. 33, at 60). Abdoo says only Roach and Ray participated in the takedown, while expressing some uncertainty about the identity of the officers involved. (Abdoo Dep., Doc. 31, at 49-50).
Abdoo was not flailing, bucking around, fighting, attempting to break free or flee, or physically overpowering the officers. (Wesney Dep., Doc. 33, at 107-08). His feet were stationary when the officers took him down. Id. at 105. The officers "slammed" him into the deck. Id. at 105-06. Abdoo went down hard; his body made a loud thud when it hit the porch. (Ray Dep., Doc. 34, at 40-41).
While Abdoo was on the ground, Ray "took a knee" on Abdoo; he was standing straight up, then forcefully placed his left knee on the back of Abdoo's leg. (Wesney Dep., Doc. 33, at 106-07.) Abdoo saw Ray's knee go down on the back of his leg, and immediately felt pain. (Abdoo Dep., Doc. 31, at 62-63). Abdoo's leg was broken in multiple places. Id. at 66.
After this incident, the City of Clyde and the Sandusky County Sheriff conducted a joint investigation. (Snell Dep., Doc. 40, at 13-14; Kostopoulos Dep., Doc. 42, at 16).
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact" and "the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must draw all inferences from the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The Court is not permitted to weigh the evidence or determine the truth of any matter in dispute; rather, the Court determines only whether the case contains sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably find for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). The moving party bears the burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). This burden "may be discharged by 'showing'—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id.
Defendants collectively move for summary judgment on all claims brought by Abdoo. The officer Defendants argue they did not use excessive force and, even if they did, qualified immunity shields them from liability. (Doc. 36-1, at 11-24; Doc. 37-1, at 3-12). They also move for summary judgment on Abdoo's common law tort claims. (Doc. 36-1, at 28-30; Doc. 37-1, at 15-19). The municipal Defendants argue Abdoo has not pled sufficient facts or a cognizable legal theory to survive summary judgment on the claims against them. (Doc. 36-1, at 25-28; Doc. 37-1, at 13-15). Abdoo opposes summary judgment only on the § 1983 claims against the individual officers and his failure to investigate theory of municipal liability. See Doc. 44. For the following reasons, theCourt denies summary judgment for the officer Defendants on Count One of Abdoo's Complaint, and grants summary judgment for the municipal Defendants on Count Two and for the individual Defendants on Counts Three and Four of Abdoo's Complaint.
Each officer Defendant has moved for summary judgment arguing they did not violate Abdoo's Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable seizure, and even if that right were violated, qualified immunity shields them from liability. (Doc. 36-1, at 11-24; Doc. 37-1, at 3-12). For the following reasons, the Court holds issues of fact preclude summary judgment at this juncture for taking Abdoo down.
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable seizure. U.S. Const. amend. IV (). Excessive force claims stemming from an arrest are judged against this Fourth Amendment "reasonableness" standard. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1985). But what is reasonable is "not capable of precise definition or mechanical application." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). "[I]ts proper application requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). At the summary judgment stage, reasonableness is a question of law, not fact. Chappell v. City of Cleveland, 585 F.3d 901, 909 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 n.8 (2009)).3
The individual officers all raise qualified immunity as a defense. (Doc. 36-1, at 11; Doc. 37-1, at 7). "The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal quotation omitted). There are two prongs to the analysis: (1) do the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff make out a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) was that right clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. Id. at 232. A right is clearly established when it is "sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right." Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015). It is Abdoo's burden to show the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity. Hayden v. Green, 640 F.3d 150, 153 (6th Cir. 2011); Chappell, 585 F.3d at 907.
The Court, ultimately, must answer three questions: which officers participated in the takedown, was the takedown an excessive use of force under the Fourth Amendment and, if so, did that excessive force violate a clearly established right?
The Court finds a genuine dispute of material fact concerning which...
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