Abdul-Akbar v. State

• Decision Date: 13 July 1990
• Docket Number: ABDUL-AKBA,No. 466,D,1989,466
• Citation: 582 A.2d 934
• Parties: Debro Siddiqefendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. . Submitted:
• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware

Page 934

582 A.2d 934

Debro Siddiq ABDUL-AKBAR, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.

No. 466, 1989.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Submitted: July 13, 1990.

Decided: July 27, 1990.

Court Below--Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for New Castle County: Cr.A. Nos. IN86-05-1296 thru 1299.

Superior Court, New Castle County

AFFIRMED.

Before CHRISTIE, Chief Justice, and HORSEY and HOLLAND, Justices.

ORDER

This 27th day of July, 1990, it appears from the record that:

(1) On July 13, 1989, appellee moved, pursuant to Rule 25(a), to affirm the judgment of the Superior Court on the ground that it is manifest on the face of appellant's brief that the appeal is without merit.

(2) The appellant, Debro Siddiq Abdul-Akbar (a/k/a Debro M. Davis), was convicted after a Superior Court bench trial of burglary in the third degree, felony theft, reckless endangering in the first degree, and felony shoplifting. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed his conviction and sentence. Davis v. State, Del.Supr., No. 14, 1987, Moore, J. (July 13, 1987) (ORDER). He then initiated postconviction relief proceedings. His first motion was denied by the Superior Court, and on appeal this Court affirmed that judgment. Abdul-Akbar v. State, Del.Supr., No. 45, 1989, Walsh, Jr. (June 28, 1989) (ORDER). The defendant's second postconviction motion was denied by the trial court on July 10, 1989. His third postconviction motion was denied on August 17, 1989. Abdul-Akbar did not appeal those decisions but, instead, immediately filed a fourth postconviction motion, which was summarily denied by the Superior Court on procedural grounds.

(3) This appeal arises out of Abdul-Akbar's fourth pro se application for postconviction relief, in which he raises three contentions: 1) defense counsel had a "conflict of interest;" 2) a "vindictive prosecution" claim; and 3) violation of the confrontation clause. The Superior Court denied the application pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(2) and (4), concluding that the motion for postconviction relief was repetitive, that the matters had been formerly adjudicated by the Superior Court and this Court, and that reconsideration was not warranted in the interest of justice. We agree with the Superior Court.

(4) Abdul-Akbar contends that "[t]he issue's of the Motion presented by Appellant have 'never ' been adjudicated by any Court." Even if this were so, Abdul-Akbar was required to include in his prior motions for postconviction relief all grounds for relief which were available to him. Super.Ct.Crim.R. 61(b)(2). His present contentions were available to him. Super.Ct.Crim.R. 61(b)(2). His present contentions were available and were known, or should have been known, to Abdul-Akbar at the time of his prior motions for postconviction relief. See Younger v. State, Del.Supr., --- A.2d ---- (1990); Robinson v. State, Del.Supr., 562 A.2d 1184, 1185 (1989). In order to raise the issue in...