Abdul-Majeed v. Emory University Hosp., ABDUL-MAJEED

• Decision Date: 11 May 1994
• Docket Number: ABDUL-MAJEED,No. A94A0518,A94A0518
• Citation: 445 S.E.2d 270,213 Ga.App. 421
• Parties: v. EMORY UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 270

445 S.E.2d 270

213 Ga.App. 421

ABDUL-MAJEED v. EMORY UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL.

No. A94A0518.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

May 11, 1994.

Reconsideration Denied June 2, 1994.

S. Ralph Martin, Jr., M. Gino Brogdon, Atlanta, for appellant.

Long, Weinberg, Ansley & Wheeler, Stephen H. Sparwath, J.M. Hudgins IV, Allen & Peters, Bradley C. Reeves, Atlanta, for appellee.

POPE, Chief Judge.

In this wrongful death action against a doctor and a hospital, plaintiff appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the hospital.

After an automobile accident, plaintiff's decedent was rushed to South Fulton Hospital. South Fulton Hospital did not have room for plaintiff's decedent on its trauma ward, however, so he was taken to defendant Emory University Hospital ("Emory" or "the hospital"). There he came under the care of defendant Dr. Richard Riggins, an orthopedic surgeon who is not a party to this appeal. Several days after surgery, plaintiff's decedent died as the result of a blood clot in his heart. Plaintiff brought suit against Riggins and Emory and attached an affidavit from another orthopedic surgeon who opined that Dr. Riggins and Emory should have diagnosed the blood clots in the decedent's left leg and utilized various devices and techniques to prevent them from moving to his heart, and that they deviated from reasonable standards of medical care in failing to do so. Emory moved for summary judgment on the grounds that: (1) the hospital was not responsible for any alleged negligence on the part of Dr. Riggins because Dr. Riggins was an independent contractor rather than an employee, and (2) there was no evidence of any independent negligence on the part of the hospital or any of its employees. The trial court granted Emory's motion, and plaintiff appealed.

1. On appeal, plaintiff contends that even if Dr. Riggins was not Emory's actual employee, summary judgment was inappropriate because the hospital may be liable under the doctrine of apparent or ostensible authority. See Richmond County Hosp. Auth. v. Brown, 257 Ga. 507, 361 S.E.2d 164 (1987). We agree. In Richmond County Hosp. Auth., the Supreme Court held that a hospital may be liable for a doctor's negligence, even though the doctor is an independent contractor, if the hospital represents or holds out the doctor as its agent and the plaintiff justifiably relies on that representation. Id.; see also Whitaker v. Zirkle, 188 Ga.App. 706, 709(2), 374 S.E.2d 106 (1988). "Quite clearly, a hospital patient whose treatment is under the control and supervision of a privately retained physician is in a categorically different relationship with the hospital than is a patient whose attending physician is furnished to him by the hospital itself.... By furnishing the attending physician, the hospital is in effect holding him out as its own and calling upon the patient to accept his services based on its own reputation rather than the physician's." Brown v. Coastal Emergency Svcs., 181 Ga.App. 893, 897-898, 354 S.E.2d 632, aff'd sub nom. Richmond County Hosp. Auth. v. Brown, 257 Ga. 507, 361 S.E.2d 164 (1987). Although the doctrine of apparent or ostensible authority first developed in the context of emergency room doctors, we have since held that it applies not just to emergency room physicians, but to all doctors who " 'share the common characteristic of being supplied through the hospital rather than being selected by the patient.' " Doctors Hosp. of Augusta v. Bonner, 195 Ga.App. 152, 163(6b), 392 S.E.2d 897 (1990).

In this case, it is undisputed that plaintiff's decedent did not have a doctor when he arrived at Emory and that Dr. Riggins was supplied by the hospital. Plaintiff also stated in her affidavit that Emory employees told her "one of our doctors" would be assigned to her husband's case. Contrary to Emory's contention, plaintiff's testimony regarding this statement by Emory employees is not hearsay because it is offered to show that the statement was made, not to show that the content of the statement was true. See Hurston v. State, 194 Ga.App. 226, 390 S.E.2d 119 (1990). And plaintiff's inability to name the employees goes to the weight of her testimony rather than its admissibility. In any case, we conclude, based on the language from Brown v. Coastal Emergency Svcs. quoted above, that even without plaintiff's testimony regarding the employees' statement, the fact that the hospital supplied the doctor without explicitly informing the patient that the doctor...