Abernethy v. Board of Com'rs of Pitt County
| Decision Date | 13 October 1915 |
| Docket Number | 180. |
| Citation | 86 S.E. 577,169 N.C. 631 |
| Parties | ABERNETHY v. BOARD OF COM'RS OF PITT COUNTY. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Superior Court, Pitt County; Bond, Judge.
Action by Charles L. Abernethy against the Board of Commissioners of Pitt County. Judgment in favor of plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed.
In construing statute regarding solicitor's compensation held, that statements of the solicitor and of the senator and representatives from the county regarding their intention and agreement could not be considered.
Civil action heard by W. M. Bond, judge presiding, at August term 1915, of Pitt superior court upon a case agreed submitted under the statute, as a controversy without action, which is as follows:
"There has arisen a controversy between the board of commissioners of Pitt county and Charles L. Abernethy, solicitor of the Fifth judicial district, relative to the meaning and construction of an act of the Legislature, to wit, Public and Local Laws 1915, c. 623, which reads as follows:
'The General Assembly of North Carolina do enact:
Section 1. * * * The board of commissioners of the county of Pitt are hereby directed, authorized, and empowered to cause the treasurer of Pitt county to pay to the solicitor of the Fifth judicial district the sum of six hundred dollars annually, to be paid monthly in lieu of fees now provided by law, which the said solicitor would receive from time to time from the * * * county of Pitt on account of convictions in the criminal courts of said county by said solicitor.
Sec. 2. This act shall be in force from and after its ratification.
Ratified this the 8th day of March, A. D. 1915.'
The said Charles L. Abernethy, solicitor, plaintiff, contends that the act means that he is to receive from the county of Pitt the sum of $600 annually in lieu of such fees as the county would be bound to pay the said solicitor from the treasury of the county under former law, and that under the law, since said act was passed, he is, in addition thereto, entitled to receive such fees as defendants pay themselves in the criminal superior courts of said county in cases wherein there are convictions of said defendants in criminal cases. The commissioners of the county of Pitt contend that the said act means that all fees the said solicitor would receive are to be paid into the treasury of Pitt county, and that he is not to receive any sum for prosecuting crimes, or from any other source in the said county, except the said sum of $600 per annum, and that the same shall be in lieu of all compensation or fees to be received by said solicitor for all services rendered by him in his official capacity, except $20 a term from the state for attending court:
Now, therefore, in order that the question in difference, which might be the subject of a civil action, may without such action be settled between the parties, the said board of commissioners of Pitt county, through their attorney, and the said Charles L. Abernethy, hereby submit the said act for interpretation to his honor W. M. Bond, judge riding the courts of the Fifth judicial district, to the end that the said question may be determined by the court, each party reserving the right to appeal to the Supreme Court.
This statement of case, with the attached statement of the said solicitor and the senator and the representatives, shall constitute the record. S. J. Everett, of Greenville, Attorney for the Board of Commissioners of Pitt County. Chas. L. Abernethy, of Beaufort, Solicitor of the Fifth Judicial District. [ [[Verified.]
Statement of senator and representatives, referred to in case agreed: We, the undersigned, being the senator and representatives of Pitt county, in the Legislature of 1915, state, in reference to Public and Local Laws 1915, ch. 623, set out in the statement of case between the solicitor of the Fifth judicial district and the commissioners of Pitt county, that it was our understanding and agreement with the solicitor, when the act was passed, that it would include all the fees of every kind that he was to receive in his official capacity, as prosecuting attorney and solicitor, for services in Pitt county, and repealed all other laws in conflict therewith. This August 30th, 1914. [ Signed] F. C. Harding, Senator. J. J. Laughinghouse, J. C. Galloway, Representatives.
Statement of solicitor: The undersigned solicitor of the Fifth judicial district says, with reference to the statement of the representatives from Pitt county, that there is a very great difference in his understanding and theirs as to the bill that was passed, to wit, chapter 623 of the Public and Local Laws of 1915. The said solicitor very much regrets any misunderstanding between the representatives and himself, and accords to them the right to have their own understanding, but respectfully submits to the court that the act, which is the matter in controversy, speaks for itself, and the proper legal construction of the same can be and is the only understanding that there could be between the representatives and the solicitor; that prior to the passage of this act the solicitor received from all sources from the county of Pitt and the defendants amounts aggregating from $1,200 to $1,600 per year. If the act should be construed as the solicitor contends it should be, the county of Pitt will receive a part of the compensation which would be coming to the solicitor under the general law in excess and in addition to what the said county of Pitt would be liable for to the solicitor from the prosecution of the criminal dockets of said county. To show the good faith of the solicitor in his contention, if the matter could be so construed by the court, he is perfectly willing that the act be declared null and void, and to leave the matter as it would have been without the passage of the act. That the act, if construed by the court as the solicitor contends that it should be construed, the county of Pitt will be the gainer by the act, and the solicitor would be the loser. Respectfully submitted, Charles L. Abernethy. Solicitor."
The court rendered the following judgment:
"This cause coming on to be heard on a controversy submitted without action on agreed facts under the Code, both sides being present, upon consideration of the facts agreed, the court is of opinion that the meaning of the statute must be arrived at solely by a construction of its language, and that its meaning cannot be shown, or assisted, or affected in any way by any actual or supposed agreements on the part of members of the Legislature which passed the act.
The court is further of the opinion that the compensation provided in the act referred to to be paid to said Abernethy by said county of Pitt is in lieu of such fees as said county would have had to pay under the law existing at the time said act was passed in cases of conviction against insolvents, and that it has not in any way affected the right of said Abernethy to collect and receive, just as he has done before the passage of said act, all fees taxed by law against defendants who paid the cost. This view of the matter is strengthened in the opinion of the court by reason of the fact that said law contains no provision ordering the payment into the county treasury of any fees paid by convicted defendants who were or are able to pay the cost taxed against them.
It is therefore considered, ordered, and adjudged that as to all cases of convictions against defendants who pay the cost said Solicitor Abernethy is entitled to his fees in such cases just as if the said act had not been passed, and that the county of Pitt has nothing whatever to do with any of the fees taxed in favor of the solicitor, except those in cases of insolvent defendants. The monthly payments are in lieu of such sums as the county of Pitt would have had to pay to said Abernethy in cases of conviction of insolvents if said act had not been passed.
It is adjudged that said C. L. Abernethy recover the costs of this case to be taxed by the clerk of this court against the defendants. This September 4, 1915.
Defendant excepted to the judgment, and appealed to this court.
S. J. Everett, of Greenville, for appellant.
M. Leslie Davis, of Beaufort, for appellee.
This is an unfortunate controversy which has arisen between the parties growing out of their misunderstanding as to what was intended to be done and as to the manner of expressing their purpose, if they had fully agreed upon the matter, but we must seek for and find the intention by the rules prescribed for legal interpretation, where there is any doubt as to the meaning of a statute or other instrument. The words used shall be given the ordinary meaning, unless it appears from the context, or even otherwise in the stat ute, that another and different sense was intended. The object of all interpretation, or construction, is to ascertain the meaning and intention of the Legislature, to the end that the same may be enforced, which must be sought first of all in the language of the statute itself, for it must be presumed that the means employed by the Legislature to express its will are adequate to the purpose and do express that will correctly. If the language of the statute is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning, that meaning is conclusively presumed to be the one which the Legislature intended to convey, or, in other words the statute must then be interpreted literally. Even though the court should be convinced that some other meaning was really intended by the lawmaking power, and even though the literal interpretation should defeat the very object of the enactment, still the explicit declaration...
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