Abood v. City of Jacksonville

• Decision Date: 20 May 1955
• Citation: 80 So.2d 443
• Parties: Fred J. ABOOD, doing business as Fred Abood's Steer Room Restaurant, Appellant, v. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, a municipal corporation, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 443

80 So.2d 443

Fred J. ABOOD, doing business as Fred Abood's Steer Room Restaurant, Appellant, v. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, a municipal corporation, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Florida, En Banc.

May 20, 1955.

Weldon G. Starry, Tallahassee, and Barnes, Barnes, Naughton & Slater, Jacksonville, for appellant.

William M. Madison and Claude L. Mullis, Jacksonville, for appellee.

DREW, Chief Justice.

The question presented in this litigation in whether the appellant, who operates a restaurant in Jacksonville, Florida, 'having accommodations for service of 200 or more patrons at tables and occupying more than 4000 square feet of space,' is entitled to a liquor license regardless of the fact that the maximum number of liquor licenses which may be issued in the City of Jacksonville, Florida, pursuant to the provisions of Section 1 of Chapter 25919, Laws of Florida, Special Acts of 1949, have already, and long since, been issued and are outstanding.

The appellant contends that he is entitled to have such license issued to him for the reason that Chapter 25359, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1949, F.S.A. § 561.01 et seq., which was passed in the same session but subsequent to the aforesaid Chapter 25919, supra, contains the controlling provision authorizing the issuance of such a license as an exception to the limitations imposed in Chapter 25919. Appellant further argues that if any doubt exists that the Legislature intended to authorize the issuance of a liquor license to establishments such as that operated by appellant, regardless of the provisions of any local or special act, such doubt is dispelled by a consideration of Chapter 28117, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1953, F.S.A. § 561.20 and note, which is the last expression of the Legislature on the subject and conerning which more will be said later.

It was the judgment of the lower court set forth in an exhaustive decree that the statutes herein mentioned, construed according to the precepts and rules approved by this Court, led him to the conclusion that so far as the City of Jacksonville was concerned the status of appellant was governed by Chapter 25919, supra, and that appellant was not entitled to the issuance of a license. The appeal is from that decree.

In the 1949 session of the Legislature, a local law relating wholly to the City of Jacksonville (Chapter 25919, supra, effective June 3, 1949) was adopted by the Legislature. This law provided that the number of liquor licenses to vendors in the City of Jacksonville was limited to one license for each 4,000 persons in said City but that at least 76 licenses could be issued in any event. The act contained a provision that it should not apply to certain designated types of licenses which were specifically described. Restaurants were not mentioned in the exceptions. Parenthetically, these exceptions, outside the one relating to the larger hotels, were with reference to licenses for establishments dealt with under the general beverage act such as steamships, trains, etc.

The same session of the Legislature enacted a general revision of a substantial portion of the beverage act, which was designated Chapter 25359, supra, and which became effective June 13, 1949, ten days subsequent to the effective date of the foregoing special act. Included in this general act was a Section 7 which provided that liquor licenses (by liquor licenses we refer to hard liquor licenses) under the applicable statutes should be issued so that the number of such licenses within the limits of any incorporated city or town, or in the territory of any county lying outside of any such cities or towns, should not exceed one such license for each 2,500 residents or major fraction thereof within such city or town or within such county outside the limits thereof. The act contained a proviso that in any event any city or town in a 'wet' county would be entitled to two licenses and the territory outside of any such city or town in any county to three licenses. Said Section 7 also contained the provision, 'no such limitation of the number of licenses as herein provided shall be applicable to * * * restaurant(s) * * * having accommodations for service of two hundred or more patrons at tables and occupying more than four thousand square feet of space * * *.' F.S.A. § 561.20. This Section also contained the following paragraph which is the real nub of this controversy: 'The limitations herein prescribed shall be cumulative to and shall not affect or repeal any existing or future local or special act relating to the limitation by population of such licenses within any incorporated city or town or county that may be in conflict herewith.' (Italics and emphasis added.)

In the consideration of Chapter 25359, supra, in the determination of the instant problem, we observe that said Section 7 was amended by Chapter 28117, supra, in 1953, primarily, it would seem, for the purpose of restricting further the exception in the 1949 act so far as it concerned restaurants having accommodations for service of 200 or more patrons and more than 4,000 square feet of space by further requiring that these excepted restaurants also be restaurants 'containing all necessary equipment and supplies for, and serving full course meals regularly.' This act also contained the usual provision that all laws in conflict with it are repealed, 'provided that nothing in this act shall be construed to affect or cancel any license heretofore issued pursuant to any special or local law.'

The myriad rules which have been designed by courts for the purpose of construing legislative acts were designed for the purpose of ascertaining, in doubtful cases, the legislative intent because of the law is what the lawmaking body intended it to be. Words are the means of expressing that intention, making a permanent monument of it and are, when clear, the best evidence of what the law is. The search in cases of this kind is to ascertain this intent. Because of the complexities and limitations of language and the difficulty ofttimes experienced in expressing thoughts in printed words, the problems of statutory construction are often difficult. In doubtful cases we...