Abraham v. District of Columbia

• Decision Date: 30 September 2004
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A.01-0027(RMC).,CIV.A.01-0027(RMC).
• Citation: 338 F.Supp.2d 113
• Parties: Devon Michelle ABRAHAM, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

338 F.Supp.2d 113

Devon Michelle ABRAHAM, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.

No. CIV.A.01-0027(RMC).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

September 30, 2004.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Ronald Lee Drake, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

Charlotte Anne Bradley, U.S. Attorney's Office, Melvin W. Bolden, Jr., Robert C. Utiger, Office of Corporation Counsel, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

COLLYER, District Judge.

This lawsuit was filed on January 8, 2001, by Ronald L. Drake, attorney-at-law, on behalf of a group of parents of approximately 125 disabled children who require special education services from the District of Columbia Public Schools ("DCPS"). Mr. Drake seeks to recover attorneys' fees arising from his representation of these clients in administrative proceedings to secure rights established by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. The administrative proceedings at issue appear to have been completed between March 1996¹ and 2001.

Despite attempts at mediation, the parties have been unable to resolve a single one of these fee claims. While there are many reasons for this failure, the present posture of the case precludes any settlement without judicial determination of certain outstanding legal issues. The parties have submitted briefs discussing the facts and issues of law in dispute, as well as the appropriate billing rate for Mr. Drake. The Court will address them in turn.

I. BACKGROUND

Congress enacted IDEA to ensure that disabled children receive "a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for employment and independent living[.]" 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). Parents of a disabled child must be notified of any proposed change in "the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child," and are permitted to challenge "any matter relating [there]to[.]" Id. §§ 1415(b)(3)(B), (b)(6). After the possibility of mediation, parents are afforded the opportunity to have their complaints considered in "an impartial due process hearing[.]" Id. § 1415(f). IDEA specifies certain "safeguards" for the hearing process, including "the right to be accompanied and advised by counsel[.]" Id. § 1415(h)(1). Any party aggrieved by the result of such a hearing may "bring a civil action ... in any State court of competent jurisdiction ... or in a district court of the United States...." Id. § 1415(i)(2)(A).

Not surprisingly, having provided explicitly for the safeguard of counsel for parents, IDEA also contemplates the award of attorneys' fees. At § 1415(i)(3), which grants jurisdiction to federal district courts, the statute provides that, "[i]n any action or proceeding brought under this section, the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs to the parents of a child with a disability who is the prevailing party." Id. § 1415(i)(3)(B). Attorneys' fees "shall be based on rates prevailing in the community in which the action or proceeding arose for the kind and quality of services furnished" without a bonus or multiplier. Id. § 1415(i)(3)(C). No attorneys' fees may be awarded "for services performed subsequent to the time of a written offer of settlement to a parent" if the offer is made more than ten days before the administrative proceeding, it is not accepted, and "the court or administrative hearing officer finds that the relief finally obtained by the parents is not more favorable to the parents than the offer of settlement." Id. § 1415(i)(3)(D). If, however, a parent is the prevailing party and "was substantially justified in rejecting the settlement offer[,]" an award of attorneys' fees and costs may be made despite § 1415(i)(3)(D). Id. § 1415(i)(3)(E).

Each disabled child covered by IDEA is entitled to an "individualized education program" ("IEP") that is developed and overseen by an "individualized education program team" ("IEP Team") consisting of the parents of the child, special education teachers, and others. Id. § 1414(d). Attorneys' fees may not be awarded for any meeting of an IEP Team "unless such meeting is convened as a result of an administrative proceeding or judicial action...." Id. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii). IDEA specifically provides for mediation of disputes over the education of a child with a disability. Id. §§ 1415(b)(5), (e). No attorneys' fees are available for a mediation that precedes the filing of a complaint relating to the education of a disabled child² or the placement of such a child in an alternative educational setting under § 1415(k). Id. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii). However, at the discretion of the State (here, the District of Columbia), attorneys' fees may be paid for such pre-complaint mediation. Id.

II. ANALYSIS

The specifics of the underlying administrative proceedings are not before the Court. The complaint alleges that all plaintiffs are or were "prevailing parties" in the administrative forum and that DCPS has "arbitrarily and without cause or justification refused to pay the amount of the bill submitted," or has made "only a partial payment thereon." Compl. ¶¶ 8, 9. The District of Columbia denies any wrong-doing and notes that, even today, plaintiffs' counsel has not submitted his billing records in an intelligible format for review and evaluation. On January 14, 2004, DCPS presented six defenses to the plaintiffs' claims:

1. The plaintiff is not a prevailing party because the [due process] hearing terminated in a settlement and not a decision in the plaintiff's favor.

2. The plaintiff is not a prevailing party because, even though a purported Hearing Officer Decision issued, that decision was no more than the recognition of a settlement.

3. The claim is time barred by either the statute of limitations, the doctrine of laches, or both.³

4. The claimed hours are not associated with the actual litigation of a due process hearing....

5. [The p]laintiff failed to exhaust its administrative remedies by submitting invoices to [DCPS] for payment.

6. The claim arose after filing of this suit and has not been brought within this case by amendment of the complaint.

Notice of Prelim. Defenses, Attachment A at 1-2. As a result, DCPS, after three and one half years of litigation and numerous efforts and hours at settlement and mediation, now finds itself attacking each and every hour claimed by the plaintiffs.

A. "Prevailing Party"

The parties concur that IDEA permits a district court to award reasonable attorneys' fees to the parents of a disabled child who is the "prevailing party." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). There is ample disagreement, however, over the meaning of that term. The parties seek specific guidance from the Court as to whether the plaintiffs may recover attorneys' fees for IDEA claims that result in settlement agreements or HODs recognizing settlements. The plaintiffs argue that "[p]revailing party status is attained if the litigation resolves some dispute which affects the behavior of the defendant toward the plaintiff." Pls.' Brief as to the Facts and Issues of Law in Disp. at 8. DCPS, on the other hand, asserts that Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001), "ruled that statutory provisions allowing the award of attorneys' fees to `prevailing parties' do not apply where the litigation has been terminated by agreement of the parties." Resp. to Pls.' Brief on Issues of Law in Disp. at 3 (emphasis in original).

Prior to 2001, courts applied the "catalyst" theory to determine whether a plaintiff was a "prevailing party" under fee-shifting statutes such as the IDEA. See Smith v. Roher, 954 F.Supp. 359, 363 (D.D.C.1997) (catalyst theory applied to IDEA fee claim); see also Blackman v. District of Columbia, 59 F.Supp.2d 37, 41 (D.D.C.1999) (catalyst theory applied in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 context). In 2001, however, the Supreme Court in Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S 598, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001), changed the landscape for awarding attorneys' fees under fee-shifting statutes by rejecting the "catalyst" theory and adopting a more stringent definition of "prevailing party."

Armstrong v. Vance, 328 F.Supp.2d 50, 56 (D.D.C.2004). Buckhannon involved care homes that provided assisted-living services to elderly residents in West Virginia. The homes failed a fire marshal inspection in 1997 because not all residents were capable of "self-preservation" — i.e., moving themselves (without assistance) from situations involving imminent danger — as required by state law at the time. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 600, 121 S.Ct. 1835. When the government threatened to shut down these residential care facilities, the operator sued for injunctive and declaratory relief that the "self-preservation" requirement violated the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 ("FHAA"), 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. In 1998, the West Virginia Legislature changed the law and the case was dismissed as moot. The operator thereafter requested attorneys' fees as the "prevailing party" under the "catalyst theory." The District Court denied the motion and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to address "whether this term includes a party that has failed to secure a judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree, but has nonetheless achieved the desired result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct." Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 600, 121 S.Ct. 1835.

In holding that the "catalyst theory" is not a proper basis for an award of attorneys' fees under the FHAA and ADA,...