Jackson v. District of Columbia

• Decision Date: 19 March 2010
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 07-0138 (RMU).
• Citation: 696 F. Supp.2d 97
• Parties: Johnice JACKSON et al., Plaintiffs, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

696 F. Supp.2d 97

Johnice JACKSON et al., Plaintiffs, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 07-0138 (RMU).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

March 19, 2010.

Ellen Douglass Dalton, Paul S. Dalton, William E. Houston, Dalton, Dalton & Houston, P.C., Alexandria, VA, for Plaintiffs.

Richard Allan Latterell, Office of the Attorney General, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

RICARDO M. URBINA, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

ADOPTING IN PART AND MODIFYING IN PART MAGISTRATE JUDGE FACCIOLA'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION; GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO ALTER JUDGMENT

This matter is before the court on the defendant's objections to the Report and Recommendation issued by Magistrate Judge John M. Facciola, issued February 16, 2010, addressing the defendant's motion to alter a prior judgment of this court. The plaintiffs, who commenced actions under the Individuals with Disabilities Education and Improvement Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq., moved for attorney's fees after prevailing in those proceedings. On March 26, 2009, 603 F.Supp.2d 92, this court, adopting in part and modifying in part a Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Facciola ("the First Report"), awarded the plaintiffs $24,425 in attorney's fees. The defendant subsequently filed this motion to alter the award, which the court referred to Magistrate Judge Facciola for a Report and Recommendation ("the Second Report"). For the reasons discussed below, the court adopts in part and modifies in part the Second Report and grants in part and denies in part the defendant's motion to alter judgment.

II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The plaintiffs are thirty-two minor children, their guardians and court-appointed educational advocates.2d Report at 1. The plaintiffs prevailed in thirty-six due process hearings and reached two settlement agreements with the defendant. Id. Following the due process hearings, the plaintiffs filed a petition for attorney's fees in the amount of $64,886 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d), Local Civil Rule 54.2 and 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). Pls.' Pet. for Atty's Fees ("Pls.' Pet.") at 1-2. The court then referred the plaintiffs' petition to Magistrate Judge Facciola for a Report and Recommendation on whether the plaintiffs were entitled to attorney's fees and, if so, the proper measure of such an award. 2d Report at 1-2.

On February 26, 2009, Magistrate Judge Facciola issued the First Report, recommending that the court grant in part and deny in part the plaintiffs' petition for fees. Id. The defendant objected to four aspects of the First Report: (1) the application of the Laffey Matrix¹ hourly rates as the measure of reasonable attorney's fees; (2) the awarding of fees for services performed by attorney Abdus-Shahid; (3) the awarding of fees for services performed by the individual identified as "JMS"; and (4) the awarding of fees for services performed by the educational advocate for plaintiff N.R. See 603 F.Supp.2d at 94-95. The court adopted in part and modified in part the First Report and awarded the plaintiffs $24,425 in attorney's fees. See generally id. Specifically, the court concluded that the Laffey Matrix provided an appropriate basis for assessing the reasonableness of the fees sought, reduced the recommended fee awards for the services provided by attorney Abdus-Shahid² and the individual identified as "JMS"³ and concluded that the education advocate for N.R. was not entitled to fees. See generally id.

On April 2, 2009, the defendant filed a motion to alter the court's ruling. See generally Def.'s Mot. to Alter J. The defendant asserted that the court erred by (1) applying the Laffey Matrix as the measure of reasonable attorney's fees in this case, (2) awarding any fees for the services performed by attorney Abdus-Shahid and (3) by awarding any fees for the services performed by the individual identified as "JMS." See generally id. The court referred the motion to Magistrate Judge Facciola for a Second Report and Recommendation, Minute Order (Apr. 2, 2009), which he issued on February 16, 2010, see generally 2d Report. The Second Report recommends that the court deny the defendant's motion in all respects. See generally 2d Report. The defendant promptly filed objections to the Second Report, asserting the same three errors raised in its motion to alter judgment. See generally Def.'s Objections to Feb. 16, 2010 Report & Recommendation ("Def.'s Objs."). The plaintiffs filed their response to the defendant's objections on March 8, 2010, see generally Pls.' Opp'n to Def.'s Objs. ("Pl.'s Opp'n"), and the defendant filed a reply on March 15, 2010, see generally Def.'s Reply. With this matter now ripe for adjudication, the court turns to the applicable legal standards and the parties' arguments.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard for a Rule 59(e) Motion

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) provides that a motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed within twenty-eight days of the entry of the judgment at issue. FED.R.CIV.P. 59(e). While the court has considerable discretion in ruling on a Rule 59(e) motion, the reconsideration and amendment of a previous order is an unusual measure. Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C.Cir. 1996) (per curiam); McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1255 (9th Cir.1999). Rule 59(e) motions "need not be granted unless the district court finds that there is an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear legal error or prevent manifest injustice." Ciralsky v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 355 F.3d 661, 671 (D.C.Cir. 2004) (quoting Firestone, 76 F.3d at 1208). Moreover, "a Rule 59(e) motion to reconsider is not simply an opportunity to reargue facts and theories upon which a court has already ruled," New York v. United States, 880 F.Supp. 37, 38 (D.D.C.1995), or a vehicle for presenting theories or arguments that could have been advanced earlier, Kattan v. District of Columbia, 995 F.2d 274, 276 (D.C.Cir.1993); W.C. & A.N. Miller Cos. v. United States, 173 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.D.C.1997).

B. Legal Standard for Awarding Attorney's Fees and Costs under the IDEA

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) requires a party seeking attorney's fees and "related non-taxable expenses" to file a motion with the court. FED.R.CIV.P. 54(d)(2). The motion "must specify the judgment and the statute, rule, or other grounds entitling the moving party to the award." Id. It must also state the amount or provide a fair amount of the award sought. Id.; see also Herbin v. District of Columbia, 2006 WL 890673, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2006).

The IDEA allows the parents of a disabled child to recover "reasonable attorneys' fees" so long as they are the "prevailing party." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). A court's determination of the appropriate attorney's fees, in other words, is based on a two-step inquiry. First, the court must determine whether the party seeking attorney's fees is the prevailing party. Id. A prevailing party "is one who has been awarded some relief by a court." Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001); Alegria v. District of Columbia, 391 F.3d 262, 264-65 (D.C.Cir.2004) (applying Buckhannon in the IDEA context).

Second, the court must determine whether the attorney's fees sought are reasonable. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). "The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983); see also Blackman v. Dist. of Columbia, 397 F.Supp.2d 12, 14 (D.D.C. 2005) (applying Hensley in the IDEA context). The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the number of hours spent on a particular task is reasonable. Holbrook v. District of Columbia, 305 F.Supp.2d 41, 45 (D.D.C.2004). The plaintiff may satisfy this burden "by submitting an invoice that is sufficiently detailed to `permit the District Court to make an independent determination whether or not the hours claimed are justified.'" Id. (citing Nat'l Ass'n of Concerned Veterans v. Sec'y of Def., 675 F.2d 1319, 1327 (D.C.Cir. 1982)).

The plaintiff also bears the burden of establishing the reasonableness of the hourly rate sought. In re North, 59 F.3d 184, 189 (D.C.Cir.1995). To meet this burden, the plaintiff must submit evidence on at least three fronts: "the attorneys' billing practices; the attorneys' skill, experience, and reputation; and the prevailing market rates in the relevant community." Covington v. District of Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1107 (D.C.Cir.1995) (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984)).

"Once plaintiffs have provided such information, there is a presumption that the number of hours billed and the hourly rates are reasonable." Blackman v. District of Columbia, 677 F.Supp.2d 169, 172 (D.D.C. 2010). At that point, "the burden then shifts to the defendants to rebut plaintiffs' showing that the amount of time spent was reasonable and that the hourly rates for the attorneys who worked on the matter were reasonable, considering their various skill levels and experience for this kind of case." Id. (citing Watkins v. Vance, 328 F.Supp.2d 23, 26 (D.D.C.2004)).

C. The Court Committed No Error in Applying the Laffey Matrix

The defendant argues that the court erred in relying on the Laffey Matrix because those rates apply only in the context of complex federal litigation and are therefore not an appropriate measure of prevailing rates in the context of IDEA administrative proceedings. See Def.'s Objs. at 10-14. The defendant points out that two judges in this district have rejected the application of Laffey rates for services...