Abraham v. Kansas
| Citation | 211 F.Supp.2d 1308 |
| Decision Date | 19 July 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 00-3352-DES.,00-3352-DES. |
| Parties | Brian M. ABRAHAM, Petitioner, v. State of KANSAS; Carla Stovall, Attorney General, Respondents. |
| Court | United States District Courts. 10th Circuit. United States District Courts. 10th Circuit. District of Kansas |
Brian M. Abraham, Norton, KS, pro se.
Jared S. Maag, Kristafer R. Ailslieger, Office of Atty. General, Topeka, KS, for respondent.
This matter is before the court on a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Within this action, petitioner seeks federal habeas relief from his state convictions. Petitioner has filed a Memorandum in Support (Doc. 1), respondents have filed an Answer and Return (Doc. 8), and petitioner has filed a Traverse (Doc. 14). After considering the parties' papers, the court is prepared to rule. For the following reasons, petitioner's request shall be denied.
In the fall of 1995, as a means of seeking leniency in some unrelated criminal charges, petitioner began cooperating with law enforcement officials within Kansas. As a confidential informant, petitioner developed a working relationship with Kansas Highway Patrol Trooper Dan Meyer. In October of 1995, petitioner and Trooper Meyer arranged for a controlled sale of narcotics to be conducted in Wichita, Kansas. Trooper Meyer contacted Special Agent Brandau of the Kansas Bureau of Investigations ("KBI") to assist in the operation.
On the morning of November 3, 1995, Agent Brandau met with petitioner in a hotel room rented by petitioner. The plan was for Agent Brandau to accompany petitioner to the suspects' residence posing as a methamphetamine dealer. Petitioner was responsible for vouching for Agent Brandau, but petitioner was not to have any direct involvement in the sale. Two of the suspects were then to travel with Agent Brandau to a second location to make the transaction. Petitioner was instructed to remain at the residence with the remaining suspect. Petitioner and Agent Brandau agreed, that in order to conceal petitioner's cooperation, petitioner would, at the conclusion of the operation, be arrested along with the suspect who remained at the residence. All the parties understood that petitioner's arrest would merely serve as an illusion.
The ruse was successful. The two suspects were arrested at the purchase location by Agent Brandau, and, back at the residence, the remaining suspect and petitioner were subsequently placed under arrest.1 Petitioner was then transported to the Sedgwick County Sheriff's Department and placed in an interview room.2
At the residence, Agent Brandau, aided by additional law enforcement officers, searched the home and its surroundings pursuant to a search warrant. Because petitioner and Agent Brandau had driven to the residence in petitioner's vehicle, the vehicle was still parked in the street near the residence. During the search, an officer looked into the vehicle and observed "ZigZag" rolling papers within the vehicle. Apparently prompted by the large amount of marijuana already discovered in another vehicle parked at the residence, the officer conducted a full search of petitioner's vehicle. Inside, the officer located a small amount of marijuana and a set of electronic scales.3
The discovery of the items in petitioner's vehicle raised Agent Brandau's suspicions that petitioner was involved in illegal narcotics activity unconnected to the sting operation. After arriving at the Sheriff's Department to assist in interviewing and processing the suspects, Brandau, in consultation with Trooper Meyer, requested that another KBI agent, Agent Bradley, ask petitioner about the seized items and seek petitioner's consent to search his hotel room. Petitioner explained to Agent Bradley that the marijuana was given to him by the suspects. Agent Bradley confirmed this fact with Agent Brandau. However, when asked about the scales, petitioner "became very nervous, upset, and asked to talk to Trooper Meyer." (Suppression Hr'g Tr. at 64).
Trooper Meyer entered the room, and petitioner was again asked to consent to a search. Petitioner questioned what was "going on" and asked why he could not be released. (Suppression Hr'g Tr. at 36-37). Petitioner was again asked to consent, but he refused. As both officers were leaving the room, petitioner called for Trooper Meyer to remain. Apparently without any prompting by Trooper Meyer, petitioner stated he had some "stuff" in his hotel room he did not want the officers to find. (Suppression Hr'g Tr. at 30). Trooper Meyer responded, "What do you mean by stuff?" (Suppression Hr'g Tr. at 30). Petitioner then admitted that he was a heroin addict and that a substantial quantity of heroin and money were inside his hotel room. A search warrant was then obtained for petitioner's hotel room. The subsequent search revealed the drugs, money, and paraphernalia that form the basis of the criminal charges at issue.
On October 11, 1996, an information was filed in the Sedgwick County, Kansas, District Court charging petitioner with one count of possession of heroin with intent to sell, one count of possession of heroin, one count of possession of cocaine, and two counts of failing to have a proper drug tax stamp. A preliminary hearing was held on July 23, 1998. On September 11, 1998, petitioner filed a motion to suppress his inculpatory statements and all of the physical evidence at issue. Thereafter, on October 5, 1998, the state trial court held an evidentiary hearing on petitioner's motion. The following day, October 6, 1998, the trial court orally denied petitioner's motion. On October 21, 1998, the case proceeded to a bench trial. Pursuant to the parties' agreement, the trial court heard very brief testimony and based its findings primarily on the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing and evidentiary hearing. Petitioner was found guilty on all counts except the simple possession of heroin charge. On December 18, 1998, petitioner was sentenced to a controlling term of forty-one months imprisonment. Petitioner's motion for a new trial was subsequently denied by the trial court.
On March 24, 2000, the Kansas Court of Appeals ("KCOA") affirmed petitioner's convictions. State v. Abraham, No. 82,589 (Kan.App. Mar. 24, 2000) (unpublished opinion). On appeal, petitioner unsuccessfully raised the following claims:
Issue I: The trial court committed reversible error when it denied [petitioner's] Motion to Suppress all evidence and statements that were the product of, and flowed from, an illegal search and seizure of his automobile. In addition, all statements made by [petitioner] were elicited without the constitutional protection provided by Miranda warnings.
Appellant's Brief at ii-iii, State v. Abraham, No. 82,589 (Kan.App. Mar. 24, 2000). The Kansas Supreme Court denied review on June 13, 2000. Thereafter, on September 22, 2000, petitioner filed the instant request for federal habeas relief.
II. PETITIONER'S FEDERAL CLAIMS
In asserting he is entitled to federal habeas relief, petitioner levies the following claims:
Ground One: [Petitioner]'s conviction was obtained by use of evidence gained pursuant to an unconstitutional search and seizure.
Ground Two: [Petitioner]'s conviction was obtained by a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination.
Ground Three: Insufficient evidence was presented by the prosecution that could prove that the mere possession of drugs [sic] were in fact possessed with the intent to sell.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254,4 a federal court is precluded from granting habeas relief on any claim adjudicated by a state court, unless the state court's proceeding "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court," 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding," 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-13, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) ().
A state court's decision is "contrary to" an established federal law if the state court reaches a different result than the Supreme Court would when presented with facts that are "materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent" or if the state court "applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases." Williams, 529 U.S. at 405, 120 S.Ct. 1495. A decision is an "unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law if a "state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of [a] prisoner's case." Id. at 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495.
Additionally, the Supreme Court has clearly dictated that "it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). Federal habeas actions do not provide relief for errors of state law. Id. (citing Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780, 110 S.Ct. 3092, 111 L.Ed.2d 606 (1990)).
Petitioner asserts that the search of his vehicle was unconstitutional and that the evidence obtained by the search should have been excluded as fruit of the illegal search. Petitioner raised this issue before the trial court in his motion to suppress, and the trial court held an extensive evidentiary hearing on the motion....
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