Abramski v. United States
Decision Date | 16 June 2014 |
Docket Number | No. 12–1493.,12–1493. |
Citation | 189 L.Ed.2d 262,134 S.Ct. 2259,573 U.S. 169 |
Parties | Bruce James ABRAMSKI, Jr., Petitioner v. UNITED STATES. |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Richard D. Dietz, Winston–Salem, NC, for Petitioner.
Joseph R. Palmore, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
Rhonda Lee Overstreet, Overstreet Sloan, PLLC, Bedford, VA, Adam H. Charnes, Richard D. Dietz, Counsel of Record, Paul J. Foley, Thurston H. Webb, Elizabeth L. Winters, Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP, Winston–Salem, NC, for Petitioner.
Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Mythili Raman, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. Dreeben, Deputy Solicitor General, Joseph R. Palmore, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Thomas E. Booth, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
Before a federally licensed firearms dealer may sell a gun, the would-be purchaser must provide certain personal information, show photo identification, and pass a background check. To ensure the accuracy of those submissions, a federal statute imposes criminal penalties on any person who, in connection with a firearm's acquisition, makes false statements about "any fact material to the lawfulness of the sale." 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6). In this case, we consider how that law applies to a so-called straw purchaser—namely, a person who buys a gun on someone else's behalf while falsely claiming that it is for himself. We hold that such a misrepresentation is punishable under the statute, whether or not the true buyer could have purchased the gun without the straw.
Federal law has for over 40 years regulated sales by licensed firearms dealers, principally to prevent guns from falling into the wrong hands. See Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq. Under § 922(g), certain classes of people—felons, drug addicts, and the mentally ill, to list a few—may not purchase or possess any firearm. And to ensure they do not, § 922(d) forbids a licensed dealer from selling a gun to anyone it knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is such a prohibited buyer. See Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 825, 94 S.Ct. 1262, 39 L.Ed.2d 782 (1974) ( ).
The statute establishes a detailed scheme to enable the dealer to verify, at the point of sale, whether a potential buyer may lawfully own a gun. Section 922(c) brings the would-be purchaser onto the dealer's "business premises" by prohibiting, except in limited circumstances, the sale of a firearm "to a person who does not appear in person" at that location. Other provisions then require the dealer to check and make use of certain identifying information received from the buyer. Before completing any sale, the dealer must "verif[y] the identity of the transferee by examining a valid identification document" bearing a photograph. § 922(t)(1)(C). In addition, the dealer must procure the buyer's "name, age, and place of residence." § 922(b)(5). And finally, the dealer must (with limited exceptions not at issue here1 ) submit that information to the National Instant Background Check System (NICS) to determine whether the potential purchaser is for any reason disqualified from owning a firearm. See § 922 (t)(1)(A)–(B).
The statute further insists that the dealer keep certain records, to enable federal authorities both to enforce the law's verification measures and to trace firearms used in crimes. See H.R.Rep. No. 1577, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 14 (1968). A dealer must maintain the identifying information mentioned above (i.e., name, age, and residence) in its permanent files. See § 922(b)(5). In addition, the dealer must keep "such records of ... sale[ ] or other disposition of firearms ... as the Attorney General may by regulations prescribe." § 923(g)(1)(A). And the Attorney General (or his designee) may obtain and inspect any of those records, "in the course of a bona fide criminal investigation," to "determin[e] the disposition of 1 or more firearms." § 923(g)(7).
To implement all those statutory requirements, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) developed Form 4473 for gun sales. See Supp. App. 1–6. The part of that form to be completed by the buyer requests his name, birth date, and address, as well as certain other identifying information (for example, his height, weight, and race). The form further lists all the factors disqualifying a person from gun ownership, and asks the would-be buyer whether any of them apply (e.g., "[h]ave you ever been convicted ... of a felony?"). Id., at 1. Most important here, Question 11.a. asks (with bolded emphasis appearing on the form itself):
"Ibid.
The accompanying instructions for that question provide:
Id., at 4.
After responding to this and other questions, the customer must sign a certification declaring his answers "true, correct and complete." Id., at 2. That certification provides that the signator "understand[s] that making any false ... statement" respecting the transaction—and, particularly, "answering ‘yes' to question 11.a. if [he is] not the actual buyer"—is a crime "punishable as a felony under Federal law." Ibid . (bold typeface deleted).
Two statutory provisions, each designed to ensure that the dealer can rely on the truthfulness of the buyer's disclosures in carrying out its obligations, criminalize certain false statements about firearms transactions. First and foremost, § 922(a)(6), provides as follows:
"It shall be unlawful ... for any person in connection with the acquisition or attempted acquisition of any firearm or ammunition from [a licensed dealer] knowingly to make any false or fictitious oral or written statement ..., intended or likely to deceive such [dealer] with respect to any fact material to the lawfulness of the sale or other disposition of such firearm or ammunition under the provisions of this chapter."
That provision helps make certain that a dealer will receive truthful information as to any matter relevant to a gun sale's legality. In addition, § 924(a)(1)(A) prohibits "knowingly mak[ing] any false statement or representation with respect to the information required by this chapter to be kept in the records" of a federally licensed gun dealer. The question in this case is whether, as the ATF declares in Form 4473's certification, those statutory provisions criminalize a false answer to Question 11.a.—that is, a customer's statement that he is the "actual transferee/buyer," purchasing a firearm for himself, when in fact he is a straw purchaser, buying the gun on someone else's behalf.
The petitioner here is Bruce Abramski, a former police officer who offered to buy a Glock 19 handgun for his uncle, Angel Alvarez. (Abramski thought he could get the gun for a discount by showing his old police identification, though the Government contends that because he had been fired from his job two years earlier, he was no longer authorized to use that card.) Accepting his nephew's offer, Alvarez sent Abramski a check for $400 with "Glock 19 handgun" written on the memo line. Two days later, Abramski went to Town Police Supply, a federally licensed firearms dealer, to make the purchase. There, he filled out Form 4473, falsely checking "Yes" in reply to Question 11.a.—that is, asserting he was the "actual transferee/ buyer" when, according to the form's clear definition, he was not. He also signed the requisite certification, acknowledging his understanding that a false answer to Question 11.a. is a federal crime. After Abramski's name cleared the NICS background check, the dealer sold him the Glock. Abramski then deposited the $400 check in his bank account, transferred the gun to Alvarez, and got back a receipt. Federal agents found that receipt while executing a search warrant at Abramski's home after he became a suspect in a different crime.
A grand jury indicted Abramski for violating §§ 922(a)(6) and 924(a)(1)(A) by falsely affirming in his response to Question 11.a. that he was the Glock's actual buyer. Abramski moved to dismiss both charges. He argued that his misrepresentation on Question 11.a. was not "material to the lawfulness of the sale" under § 922(a)(6) because Alvarez was legally eligible to own a gun. And he claimed that the false statement did not violate § 924(a)(1)(A) because a buyer's response to Question 11.a. is not "required ... to be kept in the records" of a gun dealer. After the District Court denied those motions, see 778 F.Supp.2d 678 (W.D.Va.2011), Abramski entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to challenge the rulings. The District Court then sentenced him to five years of probation on each count, running concurrently.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the convictions. 706 F.3d 307 (2013). It noted a division among appellate courts on the question Abramski raised about § 922(a)(6)'s materiality requirement: Of three courts to have addressed the issue, one agreed with Abramski that a misrepresentation on Question 11.a. is immaterial if "the...
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